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Alternative peace building strategies in Kenya: Focus on Youth Networks

By

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine alternative strategies of peace building in Kenya, with special reference on youth networks in the country. Using primary and secondary sources, the paper points out areas where the youth have been at a disadvantage. The main argument in this paper is that previous studies have paid attention to adults – men and women – in peace building, and very little attention youth. Over 60 percent of Kenya's population is composed of people below the age of 35, making them majority. More than 500,000 young people graduate from institutions of learning yearly many of whom are faced with a myriad of challenges including unemployment. It is my contention that the Sessional Paper No. 4 of 2005 on Youth Development did not cover enough depth on the role of youth. I argue that the Government and other voluntary youth agencies did little to put the youth in the development agenda. Using peace and conflict theories as framework, I suggest that Kenya needs a Youth Peace Networks structure through which youth capacity can be strengthened to facilitate their participation in peace building initiatives at all levels. Previous efforts to incorporate youth have been lukewarm and lackadaisical. Save for the National Youth Service that started in 1964, most youth programmes that existed were recreational in nature. I would like to revisit the issues that were not addressed by the "After School – What" Report following the Kericho conference which created some interest on youth issues. Stakeholders need take more interest in the youth of Kenya. Although the National Youth Policy defines a Kenyan Youth as one aged between 15 – 30 years taking into account the physical, psychological, cultural, social, biological and political definition of the term, there are some texts that go up to 35. This paper proposes the formation of youth networks that will ensure representation of all youth from the grassroots to the national level. There is need to do an inventory of all existing youth either through groups or individual, not forgetting that there is a graduation and exit into and from this age bracket on daily basis. I fault cases where elderly people of up to 60 years have continued to misuse the term youth and purported to be acting on behalf of youth. I point out that their direct association has negatively impacted on the youth especially the political class. Kenyan youth accounts for over 40% of the country's population. Kenya's experience following the 2007/8 post election violence is largely attributed to the young people in the country. Many lost their lives while others were displaced from their homes. A bigger percentage of the youth were indirectly affected. Since then, youth in Kenya have participated in peace building in a number of ways. There are a number of institutions that have undertaken to ensure a peaceful and cohesive society. This paper proposes youth peace network structure at sub-county, county and national levels in order to address some of the peace issues.

Keywords; Youth, Development, political class, unemployment, peace issues,

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Introduction

In the 1960s, as revealed in the Sessional Paper No. 4 of 2005 on Youth Development, the Government and other voluntary youth agencies did little to put the youth in the development agenda. Save for the National Youth Service that started in 1964, most youth programmes that existed were recreational in nature. They were mostly urban based. The “After School – What” Report following the Kericho conference took keen interest on youth issues. So far, the Government and other youth practitioners have come up with strategies of unraveling challenges that affect the youth.

In response to the requirements of the African Youth Charter, that member countries form ministries in charge of youth affairs, the government of Kenya created the Ministry of Youth Affairs (MOYA) in December, 2005. MOYA finalised the Kenya National Youth Policy (2007), which was a buildup of the Kenya National Youth Policy (2002) initiated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Heritage and Sports. This policy endeavors to enhance youth participation in national development goals and ensure that programs are well-coordinated to address the welfare of young people in Kenya. The objectives of the policy are; to sensitize national policy makers on the need to identify and mainstream youth issues in national development; to emphasize, support and partner with positive and effective initiatives and programmes set up by associations, no-profits groups that help the youth to fulfill their expectations and meet their needs; to create proper conditions for the youth to empower themselves and exploit their potential; to identify ways of empowering the youth; to promote a culture of volunteerism among the youth and to explore and suggest ways of engaging the youth in the process of economic development. Moreover, the policy aimed to identify constraints that hinder the Kenyan youth from realizing their potential and to propose ways of mentoring the youth to be just and morally upright citizens and to promote honest hard work and productivity among the youth (MOYA, 2007).

To complement the work of the ministry of Youth Affairs, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund, was formed in 2006 to increase access to capital for young entrepreneurs and to provide business development services, facilitate linkages in supply chains, create market opportunities locally and abroad for products and services of youth enterprises, and facilitate infrastructure to support growth of youth businesses (Youth Enterprise Development Fund, 2009). However, for a young person to qualify for a project loan, he or she must finance 20% of the project’s cost. This requirement may encourage youth to begin to save so that they can qualify for a loan. Vision 2030, the Kenyan development blueprint covering the period from 2008 to 2030, aims to encourage savings and other investments among economically active Kenyans and reduce the burden of economic dependency among the under-14 and over-65 age groups in the working population.

A recent report (Youth Employment in Kenya, 2011) reviewing Kenya’s various youth policies reported a number of impacts, including;

- Training on entrepreneurship for approximately 8,000 youths
- Employment of 24,000 youths in the Trees for Jobs program
- Training of 16,000 youths in industrial skills
- Establishment of 6 youth empowerment centers (Washington University, Center for social Development, April 2012).

The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the United Nations Programme on Youth (2011) reported that Africa is the world's youngest continent, as the proportion of youth among the region's total population is higher than in any other continent. In 2010, 70 percent of the region's population was under the age of 30, and slightly more than 20 per cent were young people between the ages of 15 to 24.

Wamuyu (2010), holds the view; Kenya's population is largely youthful. 75% of the country's population is made up of persons aged 1 to 30 years. Youth number 10.1 million, accounting for 32% of the country's population. Of these, 51.7% are female and 48.3 % male. Youth form about 60% of the total labour force in the country, but a majority, about 65%, is unemployed. Out of 750,000 youth who graduate from various tertiary institutions in the country, only 25% access employment. The rest, 75% have to bear the burden of unemployment.

Definition of the Term Youth

According to UNESCO, "Youth" is best understood as a period of transition from the dependence of childhood to adulthood's independence and awareness of our interdependence as members of a community. Youth is a more fluid category than a fixed age-group. "Youth" is often indicated as a person between the age where he/she may leave compulsory education, and the age at which he/she finds his/her first employment. However, employment age limit has been increasing, as higher levels of unemployment and the cost of setting up an independent household puts many young people into a prolonged period of dependency. The United Nations for statistical consistency across regions defines 'youth', as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years on demography, education, employment and health. Nonetheless, different member states have adopted varied definitions of the term "youth" and this is acceptable to the United Nations as it implements programmes with different member states.

The African Youth Charter defines "youth" as "every person between the ages of 15 and 35 years". While the Kenya National Youth Policy defines a Kenyan Youth as one aged between 15 – 30 years taking into account the physical, psychological, cultural, social, biological and political definitions of the term.

Challenges Faced By Youth

After 50 years of independence and the initiatives put in place by all manner of players, Kenyan youth still experience a myriad of challenges some of which are not limited to; unemployment and underemployment, health related problems, increasing school and college drop-out rates, crime and deviant behaviour, limited sports and recreation facilities, abuse and exploitation, limited participation and lack of opportunities, limited and poor housing and limited access to information and communication technology (ICT) (MOYA, 2007). Pressure from their peers and exploitation from the politicians cannot go underscored. These summed up, drive the youths' participation in conflict. In Kenya, individuals beyond the youth bracket definition, aged 35 years and above, referring to themselves as digitals, tend to hoard opportunities meant for young people leaving them disillusioned. In return, youth fight to stay alive and relevant by engaging in compromised behaviour not worrying about their future because they have nothing to hold on to or lose.

Outline of Conflicts in Kenya

Though on small scales, Kenya has continued to experience conflicts in many parts of the country especially between neighboring communities which is time and again caused by the struggle for resources. Some have had it as a cultural habit and especially the pastoralist communities. There has been a rising wave of crime and proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. This is worsened by the youth unemployment challenge coupled with mushrooming militias, terrorism and regional dynamics. In many of the instances, youth are in the forefront acting on their own behalf, for political mileage or for the communities they represent.

There have also been witnessed cases of violence in nearly every electioneering period though 2007/2008 hit the country most resulting to over 1000 deaths and an approximated 350,000 people being internally displaced. The situation has persisted with incidences in some pockets of the country. Currently the western region is experiencing cases of attacks on the locals and youth mostly implicated as indicated the media. These conflicts are alive and need to be managed by involving every fibre of the society especially youth, given their bulge and the aspect of their involvement in causing or being used to perpetrate conflicts every time they occur.

In a Report on National Conflict Mapping for the Active Citizen Programme, Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs (MOJCA) in collaboration with British Council (BC) and PeaceNet- Kenya indicate that although Kenya is considered to be peaceful, a closer scrutiny reveals an unprecedented wave of internal and cross-border conflicts. They observe that in a multi – ethnic state like Kenya, people have strong attachment to their communities, espousing fundamentally different values, and in competition with each other for access to, or control over resources, hence creating acrimony and divisions. These conflicts are mainly manifested as political, economic, environmental, exploitation of natural resources, land clashes, religious differences and lately terrorism. The country has thus continued to be divided on the basis of ethnic, socio-cultural, regional, political and economic lines. As a result, there have been sporadic conflicts among different communities in Kenya.

Pastoralist communities in are perceived to be hit most by the situation. Pastoralists in northern Kenya have borne much of the brunt of internal conflicts and considerable efforts have been directed at addressing their specific conflict environment by a number of stakeholders that include the government, Civil Society Organizations, religious organizations and Community Based Organizations. The resource-based conflicts prevalent in Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASALs) have completely distorted development programmes and eroded civil administration of this vast and rugged countryside (MOJCA, BC & PeaceNet-Kenya, 2011).

Multipartisism shares blame in the state of affairs in the country today as evidenced in the report.

“The dawn of multi-party politics in Kenya brought in its wake new dimensions of conflict. Communities were divided along political and ideological lines, which gave rise to protracted and institutionalized waves of ethnic and land clashes. Ethnic and political conflicts in Kenya have become more evident during elections, as reflected during the 1992 and 1997 general elections. The intensity of these conflicts following the 2007 General Election resulted in a shattered national fabric culminating in the loss of about 1,300 lives with over 350,000 people internally displaced. The conflicts adversely affected not only Kenya’s economy but also that of the neighboring countries, namely Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan. The post election violence and the form it took revealed that when differences arise, Kenyans are more inclined to retreat into their

ethnic groupings rather than forge ahead as a nation with a common destiny. This situation if left unattended could degenerate into complete national disintegration (MOJCA, BC & PeaceNet-Kenya, 2011).

Sporadic violence amongst and against communities continue to spread country wide. Clan violence continued throughout 2008, causing at least 200 deaths in the Mt. Elgon district. Additional estimates by independent media place the death toll in the Mt. Elgon district upwards of 500. Although post-election violence largely came to an end in March, it spurred on old rivalries in the Laikipia district in the Rift Valley Province and also revived the Mungiki sect, an outlawed quasi-religious militia group operating mainly in the Nairobi slums. This continued violence which stemmed from the election violence in early 2008, resulted in a combined total of approximately 100 deaths. Finally, an additional 13 deaths occurred in various regions of the country as fighting over resources such as water continued in 2008 (MOJCA, BC & PeaceNet-Kenya, 2011).

This report unveils chronologically some of the conflicts as they occurred;

2005: Inter-communal violence over natural resources, mainly land and water, escalated in northeastern Kenya. Over 180 people were killed including 76 civilians killed in a single episode in July. 2004 Inter-communal conflict continued in several parts of Kenya at a reduced level. Clashes again were economic in nature, with land at the forefront. 2003: Inter-communal violence, fueled mainly by economic interests, continued especially in the north-west as Kenyan, Ugandan and Sudanese populations clashed with each other, often in cross-border raids. 2002 Clashes along ethnic lines in several districts of the country resulted in more than 100 deaths. There also was violence around presidential elections in December.

2001: Conflict between numerous tribal groups continued through 2001, with an escalation in the fighting targeting non-combatants. Over 100 people were reported killed in the clashes. 2000 Inter-tribal feuds, cross-border fighting pitting Kenyan tribes against tribes in Uganda and Ethiopia, and mob violence continued during the year. At least 100 people were killed by the end of September, down from estimated figures for 1999.

1999: Political and mob violence, police-sanctioned extra-judicial killings, and ethnic clashes increased in 1999 with most of the last concentrated in the northern regions of the country. At least 550 people died in the violence, up from the previous year.

1998: Post-election peace and reform aspirations were shattered as politically- and economically-based ethnic clashes and police-sponsored extra-judicial killings increased during 1998. Most clashes took place in Rift Valley Province between members of the president's ethnic group and rivals, though serious fighting also occurred in the northeast among several groups, including ethnic Somalis and Sudanese (MOJCA, BC & PeaceNet-Kenya, 2011).

Intervention Measures on Conflict Management In Kenya

Most of the existing peace building and conflict management approaches in Kenya have little involvement of the youth ranging from local to international. These are state response which include; Commissions of Inquiry, Disarmament, Conflict Early Warning, Judicial System, National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management and Community-Based Policing.

The national policy on Peacebuilding and conflict Management affirms there are a number of regional initiatives on peace and security to which the Government of Kenya is a signatory. These initiatives have components within their frameworks, which promote the peaceful management of conflict. They exist within the African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and, the East African Community (EAC). Separately, Kenya is a signatory to the Nairobi Protocol that established the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), which co-ordinates sub-regional initiatives addressing the illegal proliferation and use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The secretariat is based in Nairobi Kenya. Civil society and the private sector too contribute towards peace building and conflict management.

Collaborative responses are fostered at various levels in addressing issues of peace building and conflict management. On the one hand are national initiatives involving government and the civil society and on the other Peace Committees at lower levels of administrative units bring together Stakeholders who work on peace and security issues. Humanitarian responses in conflict situations which offer the first aid is usually in the form of relief supplies for the affected people. This takes the form of food and non-food items to make living conditions bearable before the conflict resolution process begins. In Kenya, these efforts are co-ordinated by the Ministry of State for Special Programmes. This component can benefit from the agility of young people. Accordingly, the inter-state initiatives which comprise of The Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism including the IGAD Member States – Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia and Uganda have formalized this understanding in the "Protocol on the Establishment of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism". Joint Cross-Border Commissions are inter-state structures in place to address issues of peace and security. In particular, there are Joint Cross-Border Commissioners/Administrators meetings that are held regularly. They have been instrumental in addressing conflict issues of cross-border nature. East African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (EAPCCO) is a regional initiative by the East African states governed via a protocol on the Prevention, Combating and Eradication of Cattle Rustling in Eastern Africa (Ministry Of State For Provincial Administration And Internal Security, September 2009).

All the strategies employed appear to take little cognizance of the youth ability to participate and contribute towards peace building. Besides, the existing interventions tend to be concentrate in conflict prone areas yet conflict in the country are now sporadic and erupt where least expected. Social, economic, political and cultural conflicts are experienced in all parts of the country and many at times the conflicts are attributed to youth. There is need to directly involve the youth in conflict resolution initiatives. This paper therefore proposes youth networks from Sub County to national levels to avert and mediate conflicts in the communities in which they live.

National policy on peace building and conflict management identified anumber of gaps existing in response mechanisms in Kenya some of which are inadequate understanding of the factors which breed conflict, limited peace education, limited networking for peace and inadequate capacity building for peace all of which can be attained through youth networks.

Why Youth Networks

Youth have continued to handle their affairs disjointedly and in most cases duplicating their efforts. In my view, Youth Networks as an Alternative peace building strategies in Kenya may accrue benefits to both the government and the youth of Kenya. Youth networks possibly will enable a synchronized system with great significance where youth have collective goals, knowledge from others by becoming part of the wider system by benchmarking and having a common goal for youth concerns thus directing the concerns on the national agenda for representation. There also may be room for policy advocacy involving a bulky number of youth and personal enrichment cannot be underscored. Through networks, youth will be able to get information on youth related opportunities. Their will be increased trust from adult partnerships while the youth will exercise responsibility and leadership through the positions given within their groups. There will be multiple effects of knowledge otherwise existence in one group to another e.g. one group teaching another what they have learnt yet from another group or persons. Through networks, meaningful opportunities for youth to be involved in peace and conflict resolution concerns may be established. Youth are able to define targets unmistakably with group associates and gain new ideas. They will be able to synergize their efforts to do bigger activities as a group thus, saving on both time and resources. Networks may generate an environment to meet new people and be able to socialize. Youth will take advantage of the potentials in individuals by assisting others find out what resources are available from other networks/ individuals and exploit.

Proposal of youth networks structure and functions sub-county

- Will take stock of all the youth groups in the sub-county, their activities and raise their needs from time to time.

- Organize for capacity building at sub-county level

- Match groups according to themes

- Benchmark from other sub-counties/ counties on how youth participate in peace building and conflict resolution

County level

- Sub-county representatives to appoint county leaders

- Benchmarking standards

- Capacity building

- National networks

National Level

- This will bring together all the county leaders

- Share experiences and benchmarks

- Strategies of peace building

- Participating in national peace building initiatives

Conclusion

The Youth Peace Networks is the structure through which youth capacity can be strengthened to facilitate their participation in peace building initiatives at all levels as well as empower them economically. The government, through the youth agencies needs to facilitate the formation and operationalization of youth networks with proper reporting and monitoring mechanisms. The Kenya National Youth Council now being a constitution independent office should fast track the formation of Youth Networks. Adults with fine reputation should be identified to support this youth structure. National Cohesion and Integration Commission should avail a peace education strategy targeting youth both in and out of learning institutions. As proposed by the first medium term plan of Kenya's Vision 2030, peace building and reconciliation programmes targeting the youth should be given a youth approach as opposed to programmes run for youth.

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Containing conflicts in Africa; issues on peace education and development

By

Adewale Adepoju*

Abstract

African is the most central of all continents and the cradle of mankind. Except for the Isthmus of Suez in the Northeast, which connects it with Asia, Africa is the biggest Island in the World. She could be regarded as the Heartbeat of world treasures, the second largest continent of the world. Through incessant conflicts, she is the least developed continent in science and technology. The continent has the largest hotspots in the world, has about 25% of the world's refugees and about 50% of world trouble areas. Africa has above average of everything that is negative, unproductive and in fact all crises that human race is trying to put behind. This article explores a conceptual analysis of peace education and argue that the inclusion of peace education in all stages of educational development in Africa will be an investment in the younger generation and test to the fact that by educating younger minds in the virtues of peaceable future would be secured in the continent that will bring about all round development.

Keywords; conflicts, development, continent, Island, human race

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Introduction

The African continent has continued to experience armed conflict among and within nations well into – the 21st century. Such conflicts are not only brutal but also devoid of conformity to any laid down conventions on the conduct of combatants. That peace, security and development are greatly needed for human welfare and happiness is a truism, yet these three values have eluded Africa since its scramble and partition by the colonial masters while the rest of the world is taking giant strides towards global harmony and world peace. Africa remains the hot bed of conflagrations that has sent her back into the dark ages.

This paper in support of the UNESCO chapter helped to make the invaluable point that since wars originate from the minds of men (and women), it is in the same minds that the defenses of peace must be constructed. This therefore means that deliberate efforts, must be done to ensure that everyone is educated in Africa and enlightened about peace and young persons made vanguards of peace. Children and young persons have been repeatedly a victim of wars for reasons which they have little knowledge about as the saying go in Yoruba wise sayings that “old people declare wars and it is the youth that fight the war”. In many of Africa’s conflicts like those in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Sunda, Nambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Libys, Mozambique, Somalia, Entrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti, the phenomenon of child soldiering became a menace to be tackled.³ Peace education sets out to redress this culture of violence and aggression and to inculcate values of non-violent change among young persons and adults alike.

Peace education in Africa will provides hope for a better future for the younger members in the continent, because it indicates that the continent is aware of its ills and is striving to remedy them in order to build a better place to live. Such hope is essential in this paper as it provides goals toward a better future and places it within their grasp; for without such goals, the continent is doomed to decline, decay and there will be no room for holistic development in the continent.

Peace, together with freedom, equality, and justice, is one of the most desirable values in almost every society; therefore peace is a great value which the world needs dearly but which it has not yet found a formula to achieve on a permanent basis. It is necessary ingredient for security, and meaningful development to occur. Oguntomisin (2004) aptly captured the human need for peace when he asserted that: “Peace is a sine quo non for political stability, socio economic development and social well being. It is the latest desire of all human communities at all times. Thus, it is not surprising that many societies decide to educate the younger generation in the light of this symbol and Africa cannot be an exemption. The educational system fulfils this mission for society through the schools, which have the authority, the legitimacy, the means and conditions to carry it out. Schools are often the only institution that society can formally, intentionally, and extensively use to achieve this mission through its many agencies.

Peace education therefore is the process of acquiring the values, the knowledge and developing the attitudes, skills, and behaviors to live in harmony with oneself, with others and with the national environment.

Ian Harris and John Synott have described peace education as a series of “teaching encounters” that draw from people:

Their desire for peace

Nonviolent alternatives for managing conflicts, and

Skills for critical analysis of structural arrangements that provide and legitimize injustice and injustice and inequality

Peace Education: Conceptual Clarifications

Peace education is the deliberate attempt to educate children and adults in the dynamics of conflict and the promotion of peacemaking skills in homes, schools and community throughout the world using all the channels and instrument of socialization. It provides education for global security and focuses on direct, organized violence, particularly the institutions of war and armed conflicts, employing the framework based on recent theories of human security. Peace education concerns itself with human and social dimensions of peace. It introduces the concept of human dignity and human right with specific reference to such values as economic equity, political participation, ecological balance and particularly the formative principles fundamental to international human rights standards.

Though the field of peace studies is relatively new with broad parameters. It is, according to one useful guide.

An interdisciplinary academic field that analyses the causes of war, violence, and systemic oppression, and explores processes by which conflict and change can be managed so as to maximize justice while minimizing violence. It encompasses the study of economic, political, and social systems at the local, national and global levels, and of ideology, culture and technology as they relate to conflict and change.

Moreover, peace education is one means of bringing about rational awakening of humanistic, aesthetic and ethical values, while are the precondition for peace in individuals, family, society, national and international life. Peace education had been of the integral parts of the United Nations with the synergy in the process of teaching and learning, peace education is out to enlighten students and adults concerning the ills that confront the human race on daily basis. These dehumanizing ills which are caused by man and woman's inhumanity to mankind which peace education will eradicate based upon fundamental scientific and ethical principles.

Development is defined here as a transformation into better state of living, which implies an improvement over the previous style of living. In this sense therefore it is unarguable to believe that less of conflict in Africa will give way for more developmental programmes, all things being equal. In a conflict-ridden continent like Africa, experiencing religious, economic, tribal, ethnic, political based conflict most often, the implication is that the security is under serious threat and not guarantee. In a situation like this, foreign investors are sacred to invest in the continent. Africans who are business oriented may not want to invest in Africa because of the crises which many lead to massive destruction of their investment. This may also lead to refugee problems of one citizens of a country from an area they had settled for long and had established their business to another area or their own cultural settlement.

The revelation below is therefore not an exhaustive document but rather an introduction to the major troubled spots in Africa that have bedeviled the continents and have hindered the development.

Conflict spots in Africa since 1960

A lot of factors have been identified as being responsible for conflict in Africa, one of the major factors, and perhaps the most far-reaching one, is the colonization of Africa which began with the partitioning of the continent at the Berlin Conference of 1885-1886. At that time, parts of Africa were ceded to the major European powers, which included Britain, Germany, Portugal, Spain and France.⁸ These nations exported their different brands of politics, ideology and culture to their respective colonies. No regards were given to the existing political structures or culture of the African nation states.

Different peoples of Africa with clearly demarcated borders suddenly found themselves with one geo-political contraption called a country. The presence of the colonial administration could not effectively stop them it is not surprising, therefore, that many of these countries have fought and some are still fighting bloody civil wars that have left them impoverished and under-developed.

As a result of under-development and poverty, a very large percentage of the African population remains poor and uneducated with little or no hope of future empowerment. This bleak scenario thus provides enough fertile soil on which the educated and political elites used to torment the politics of ethnicism in Africa. They usually appeal to the base gullibility of the masses, enhancing them with money and promises of a better future. Commenting on these issues, Osaghae (2005) summed it up thus:

“.....the fact that the post-colonial state is at the critical juncture of state building where the use of force by state operators tends to be most pronounced, the consumerist nature of forces and heightened anxiety over control of state power, and the virtues or values which promote consensus are in short supply” (117)

This is a brief and the remote cause of interactive political crises, border clashes and several other levels of conflict on the African continent. We shall now mention the hot spots- those countries whose history of armed conflict, has spanned over a decade or whose prosecution of wars had led to massive human degradation, death and general environmental devastation.

1. Congo crises (1960-1965) Zaire (1965-1997)
2. Nigeria 1967-1970
3. Angola
4. Djibouti
5. Rwanda-Burundi
6. Somalia
7. Ethiopia-Eritrea May 1998-June 2000
8. Liberia
9. Sierra Leone
10. Libya Revolution/Civil War 2011
11. Tunisia (December 2010)
12. Egypt Revolution 2011
13. Cote d'Ivoire
14. Chad
15. Mali (Ungoing)
16. Namibia
17. Sudan (1995-1972) The First Civil War
(1983-2005) The Second Civil War

Darfur Conflict (early 2003)

Note: This list is therefore not an exhaustive document but rather, an introduction to the major troubled spots in Africa

The Need for Peace Education in Combating Conflicts in Africa

There is no gain saying the fact that development thrives only in an atmosphere of peace, yet conflicts are inevitable in any human society through it takes various dimensions. But the point is that if well managed, the continent can still enjoy national development. This is where Peace Education can come to rescue the continent. Peace education can give children exposed to violence positive images of alternatives to violence

This paper will propose five different types of Peace Education that can be used at the end of the twentieth century to galvanize more peaceful future in the continent. These Peace Education strategies can be broken into five different stages: Continental Peace Education, Conflict Resolution Programmes, Violence Prevention Programmes, Development Education and Non-Violence Education

Continental Peace Education

Continental Peace Education is closely allied to international studies where educators inform their pupils about an international system that promote wars. This form of Peace Education provides an understanding of security systems and cultural awareness. Followers of this strategy can try to get students to think of themselves as compassionate African citizens who identify with other people of African descents who are struggling for peace e.g. Man O' War in Nigeria. The goal behind Continental Peace Education Programmes is that learning about the humanity of any enemy will reduce hostilities between opposing forces and African children will see themselves as one unit family. Young people in different parts of Africa face ethnic wars based upon long standing hatreds. Civil wars often fail to provide social stability as it happens in Nigeria Education about these issues attempts to break down enemy images, break barriers and seeks reconciliation of long standing feuds.

Conflict Resolution Programmes

Conflict Resolution training help children to resolve interpersonal conflicts constructively. Whereas continental educators are concerned with international forms of violence, school personnel are trying conflict resolution programmes into schools to address aspects of interpersonal violence where teaching peacemaking skills such as mediation, empathy and alternative dispute resolution methods. If African children received these training they will have more positive attitudes about conflict. They are less likely to avoid conflicts and more likely to seek non-violent remedies for conflicts in their lives. The end results of this programme is for the children to increase their use of supportive comments, were more cooperative and exhibited more caring behaviour and a greater understanding of other points of view.

Violence Prevention Programme

This programme is targeted on violent behaviors some children exhibit in school, hostile acts that make it hard for students to learn the cognitive lessons they are supposed to master. Peace

educators pursuing a violence prevention strategy are often concerned with fights, street crime, unruly students in school settings and sexual assaults.

Evaluations of violence prevention programmes show that they help to reduce aggressive physical acts and increase pro-social behavior. There are many risk factors for violent behavior family patterns of behavior, violent social environments, negative cultural models, peers, alcohol and/or drug abuse and availability of weapons. Addressing some of these factors directly in school can provide children with positive ideas about how to respond to conflict. Though, such programmes do not solve all the problems of violence, but they can have additive effect. Each new behavior that helps an individual who might otherwise be violent to resolve conflict in constructive ways helps in overcoming destructive behaviours.

Development Education

In this form of education, which has often been referred to as development education, students learn about the plight of the poor and about strategies to address the problems of poverty. The goal is to build peaceful communities by promoting an active democratic citizenry that is interested in equitably sharing the world's resources. Peace educators promote poor people's involvement in planning, implementing and controlling development schemes. They would like to see resources controlled equitably rather than monopolized by elites. They teach a critical consciousness that challenges injustice and undemocratic policy making. In nutshell, peace educators use development education to provide their student with insights into the various aspects of structural violence, focusing on social institutions with their hierarchies and their propensity for dominance and oppression. Human Rights education falls into this category, in which children learn about their rights as guaranteed both by the constitution and law of their land.

Non Violence Education

Non Violence education attempts to put positive images of peace in children's minds. To create a peaceful society those images must be so attractive that humans will choose to behave non-violently when confronting conflict. Teaching young people about non-violence provides them with an image of "shalom" a world where human beings work together to resolve their differences and live sustainably on the planet.

Education about non-violence can help to counter the culture of violence that reverberates throughout the media, the entertainment industry, politics, national policy, the schools, the community and the family. Non-violence in education provides an image of positive peace where human needs are met and there is no overt violence. Solutions to problems are sought in a win-win perspective. Students in classes where teachers are promoting non-violence become motivated to work for peace. The re-introduction of Scout Youth Programme, Red Cross, Girls Guide, Man O' War, e.t.c. is necessary to play a healing role in Africa.

Conclusion

Millions of people in Africa have been killed, wounded or maimed for life. Property has been destroyed; children have been orphaned, abducted and raped. Many have watched in horror as their parents, relatives, sisters, brothers, friends and neighbors are butchered in cold blood. The

trauma is unfathomable. The number of African countries at war continues to rise over the years. There is need for a lasting solution: an end to this act of madness: therefore there is need to include curricular approaches to peace education to provide concrete examples of how peace works, helping students to understand what escalates and what de-escalates violence. Peace education is a holistic approach to the complex forms of violence experienced in diverse communities. Children can learn in school how non-violent strategies have been used to address injustice by studying the activities of Peace heroes and heroines in Africa who have been active in peace movement, but who are often overlooked in traditional history classes. Through peace education to the youth, Africa will be bringing up a generation immune to ethnic hatred and religious harmony.

In addition, it has been established by this paper that Peace Education can contain conflicts in Africa as it will express students to concept of peace conflict, violence and non-violence with their inherent values and problems. However, if the above are honestly implemented in Africa, conflicts could be reduced drastically and bring salutary change or succor to all and sundry, and tremendous development that will lead to social, economic and political transformation of the continent.

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Economic Empowerment a Panacea to Conflicts: A Case of Mashonaland Central Province, 1999 to 2012.

By

Obediah Dodo*

Abstract

Since Zimbabwe's political independence in 1980, the government has been making efforts of trying to raise the living standards of the citizens through various means. However, because of a variety of challenges and other factors like colonial policies, national divisions, illiteracy, selfishness and a poorly performing economy amongst others, poverty has continued to affect Zimbabweans. Subsequently, conflicts have characterised Zimbabwean communities. This study, through an intensive desk research supported by some interviews, sought to establish the most prominent conflicts that have bedevilled the society and their respective possible remedies. The study was focussed on Mashonaland Central province, Zimbabwe and was conducted in 2012. Data was collected from key stakeholders; farmers, technocrats, business-people, the youth, peasant farmers, public servants and political activists while reviewed literature was from government policy papers, political party policy positions, specialist organisations (RBZ, Zimstat, TIMB, GMB, AREX, Lands, Veterinary Services and ZIA), security services, media and past research papers. The study established that economic empowerment is indeed one of the best long-lasting and sustainable solutions to the conflicts, albeit with some short-comings and challenges. It also established serious politicisation of the efforts. (177)

Key words: Economy, Empowerment, Conflict, Politics and Poverty.

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Introduction

Zimbabwe's pre-independence colonial governance system was characterised by dispossession, marginalisation and exclusion of black Zimbabweans from participation in the mainstream economy and politics. Such was perpetuated through a variety of laws and policies such as the Land Apportionment Act (1931), the Land Husbandry Act (1951), Unlawful Organisations Act (1959), Land Tenure Act (1969) and the education system bottlenecks. This visible discrimination sowed seeds of hate and vengeance within the structures of the society. The same system of governance sidelined the black population from acquiring the much needed education. At the end of it all, the black indigenous population remained poor and disadvantaged thus creating social, political and economic conflicts both within the black community and against the whites. It is this 'backwardness' on the part of the blacks that the concept of economic empowerment has been coined seeking to lift same to the same levels with those of the white minority group.

Background

Prior to 1890, Zimbabweans followed a peaceful life characterised by endogenous mechanisms and traditional value systems. When the whites got into Zimbabwe, life was transformed socially, economically and politically as the latter had brought in completely alien systems and values. That alone created a rift in society subsequently leading to national classes and conflicts. Black Africans were driven to arid and semi-arid areas and deliberately secluded from mainstream politics and economics. Eventually blacks became poor and disadvantaged so much so that they could no-longer join main-stream activities.

When the early nationalists registered their concerns, they were over political and economic segregation. Naturally, with such concerns, it became apparent that any subsequent liberation struggle was going to be around those matters. One of the main reasons and motivation for the second "Chimurenga" war (1966-1979) was the need to reclaim land. It was also realised that during the war in the 1970s, almost every refugee camp and military training centres outside the country had some learning institutions. These were to expose Zimbabweans to education and knowledge.

The level of discrimination within the employment sector was so deep that there arose a need to clamour for some ownership of the capital. However, the playing field was not allowing and therefore kept the majority of Zimbabweans out and completely invisible. All these challenges faced by the indigenous now forced the present government to review both political and economic playing field with a view to accommodate the majority population. However, this discussion will only focus on the economic aspect of empowerment in the province of Mashonaland Central between 1999 and 2012.

The province under discussion lies in the north-east of Zimbabwe; bordering with Zambia to the north, Mozambique to the east, Harare to the south and Mashonaland West to the west. Geographically, the province lies in natural region 1 and 2 and is popular for such crops; maize, cotton in Muzarabani and Guruve, soya-beans, tobacco in Centenary, Mvurwi, Mt Darwin and Guruve and cattle rearing. In terms of natural minerals, the region is endowed with the following; gold in Bindura, Mazowe, Guruve and Shamva, nickel in Shamva and Bindura and tantalite in Bindura while Mazowe also has chrome. In terms of viable industry, largely there are mines; Mazowe Jumbo mine in Mazowe, Shamva Gold mine in Shamva, and Eureka Mine in

Guruve- all into gold extraction; Bindura Nickel mine in Bindura, and Ceasar Chrome mine in Mazowe. There are also some isolated industries in the following areas; Mazowe Citrus Estates that produces citrus produce, and countable small-scale light industries in Bindura and Mazowe.

Prior to 1999/2000, the province was largely a commercial farming region. However, following an infamous land reform programme, most of the farms were given to the majority black Zimbabweans in a move that was described by the international community as unfair, undemocratic and unnecessary. Subsequently, Zimbabwe was imposed with some targeted sanctions, which however grievously affected the majority and unintended Zimbabweans. Later on, after the land reform exercise, in 2007, the government embarked on an economic empowerment programme dubbed “Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment” which again sought to review ownership of the capital with a view to re-equitably redistribute it between Zimbabweans and foreigners.

The economic empowerment thrust by the government followed a realisation that the majority of the indigenous people were still poor and excluded from the mainstream economic arena, thus posing a serious threat politically and economically. However, questions come to mind; have the prevailing conflicts been a result of greed or grievance as posited by Collier (2000) or are simply a motivation of either a culturalist or premonialist ideology as posited by Thandika Mkandawire (2002)?

Methodology

The paper is a product of an extensive research that was conducted on the conflicts in the province vis-a-vis their causes and the possible corrective mechanisms. The study was based on a desk research supported by interviews with 126 prominent and key informants in respective sectors. The study followed a triangulation approach supported by portraiture methods which recognise that researchers undertake a study already armed with some background knowledge that could influence their perceptions. However, every effort was made to ensure that no background information could taint or influence the results of the study. The interviewees were drawn from key stakeholders; 30 commercial farmers, (5 from each of the 6 farming districts), 40 youth, (5 from each of the 8 districts), 40 peasant farmers, (5 from 8 of the districts) and each respondent from the following sectors; Environmental Management Agency (EMA), Department of Parks and Wildlife Management (DPWM), Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (TIMB), National Economic Commission (NEC), Zimbabwe Statistical Office (Zimstats), Department of Lands, Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union (ZCFU), Department of Veterinary Services (Vet), Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF), Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU), Grain Marketing Board (GMB), Agricultural Research and Extension Services (AREX), Ministry of Youth, Indigenous and Empowerment (MYIE), District Administrator’s office (DA), Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA) while reviewed literature was from government policy papers, political party policy positions, specialist organisations (RBZ, Zimstat, TIMB, GMB, AREX, Lands, Veterinary Services and ZIA), security services, media and past research papers.

All the selected respondents were identified specifically for their wisdom, experience in the fields and their placement on strategic professional positions. The 5 respondents sampled in each district were randomly selected while those in specialist sectors were purposefully sampled. In

all the reviews, past trends were critically analysed and juxtaposed against previously proffered solutions. This was meant to find the most suitable solutions for different conflicts and disputes. Data gathered was compared and critically analysed against other sources that were also employed in-order to ensure accuracy and building a new body of information.

All the respondents were subjected to the following key questions though other ancillary questions could be probed further.

1. Respondents' understanding or appreciation of economic empowerment.
2. Identify measures that have been put in place by the government since political independence.
3. How they view various empowerment results.
4. Identify challenges and successes.

Theoretical Framework

The study is to some extent guided by the Youth Bulge theory (Heinsohn 1998), which posits that the more there are idle youth in an economy, the more that economy is exposed to conflicts perpetuated by a youth constituent demanding social services and employment. In this instance, the province under study has had several mines and other employment offering institutions that closed over the years thus seeing thousands becoming redundant. Thousands more youth hoped to be absorbed into the economic bowls soon after the establishment of the National Youth Service project. However, many of these are still idle but potentially dangerous.

The study will also in some instances, be guided by two economic hypotheses (Keen 1994) that focus on some of the causes of conflicts, typically experienced in Zimbabwe and Mashonaland Central province during the period under review; Private motivation hypothesis (Keen 1994 and Collier and Hoeffler 2000) which posits that uneducated youth take advantage of conflict situations to find employment either as hired hooligans or as thieves. According to the hypothesis, conflicts create opportunities to loot, profiteer from shortages, and trade in illicit and other commodities. The other hypothesis according to Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) is the Failure of the social contract which derives from the view that social stability is based on a hypothetical social contract between the people and the government. In instances where government fails to deliver as per its promises or pledges, the people respond by venting out their anger variedly.

Empowerment

Empowerment, understood from a Zimbabwean perspective means attempting to redress an economic imbalance or irregularity on the part of the majority indigenous blacks, with the support of the state and the legislation. Quoting Gergis (1999: 3),

“It is seen as a response to the failure of modernization and ‘trickle down’ economics of the 1970s and the 1980s, and the widespread perception of the State’s inability to intervene successfully on behalf of the poor or other disempowered groups in the society”

From a development understanding, it is the participation of the generality of the marginalised population in an activity previously considered elite. The development-oriented approach suggests that empowerment is largely directed at those communities previously sidelined. It therefore seeks to describe members of the society according to their resourcefulness and income levels before a class of the marginalised is identified. What that means is that any attempt at classifying society can easily lead to a variety of conflicts. McArdle (1989) also looks at

empowerment as “the process whereby decisions are made by people who have to bear the consequences of those decisions”. In other words, the people being referred to in this context are the intended beneficiaries. However, the approach depicts a gloomy tomorrow as it suggests that the process is followed by some ‘consequences’.

Black Economic Empowerment Commission (BEEC) of South Africa defined Black Economic Empowerment as an integrated and coherent socio-economic process, located in the context of national transformation that is aimed at redressing the imbalances of the past (Enterprise, 1999). This approach by BEEC recognises the existence of an established system which has to be respected and followed systematically if any empowerment of the previously disadvantaged is to be successful. The approach also recognises the fact that the process is a transformative activity which systematically seeks to balance past economic playing ground.

Empowerment as defined by Parsons (1988) is a process of internal and external change whereby the internal process is the individuals’ ability to make decisions and attend to other personal matters. External change is one’s ability to impart or practically employ skills and learnt knowledge. According to Parsons’ conception of empowerment, it meant that while any government may be interested in empowering its citizens, the people themselves must have the passion and liking for the programme. Actually, the idea of empowerment must have come from the people so that there is some element of programme ownership. Having established the above, Parsons goes on to argue that the people to be empowered must also be able to practically apply at least some of the skills and information that they would have acquired during the process so that they do not simply take over economic activities and fail to be initiative and creative as they move on. In other words, the people must exhibit some skill in the areas of empowerment. Yung (2006) pointed out that the origins of empowerment could be traced back to the Brazilian Paulo Freire (1973) when he suggested rolling out an extensive education programme as a way of liberating the oppressed. Others have viewed empowerment as the idea of power, giving power to the people whilst others view it as a multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their lives.

Those already in the echelons of power but in the indigenous majority group regard empowerment as the movement of the powerless into positions of power and making those at the higher levels of power accept sharing power with them. This is what the generality of the leaders in the developing world where empowerment has been implemented have believed and tried to adopt. This is aptly shown by these’ attempts at ‘selfishly’ taking over some institutions without regard to possible negative eventualities. By-and-large, empowerment seeks to create a practical and meta-practical whole characteristic of language, ideology, and action principles. Other practitioners have interpreted this to mean that empowerment process is defined by some professional and convincing language based on some acceptable ideology and supported by objective, feasible and realist on-the-ground programme implementation.

Over the years, economic empowerment has been observed to be a rigorous process which takes cognisance of several professional and social factors. Whenever the sort of empowerment adopts a preservative and corrective approach, then there are some basic routes that several scholars and researchers have noted to be crucial and necessary. Parsons (1988) noted that any successful empowerment programme employs some strategy. First and foremost, according to Parsons,

there has to be a permanent component of the community so that all inhabitants can be used and adapt to its implementation. It is believed that there will not be any conflicts within the communities over either their concept or implementation process. Any government that wants to engage in this programme should also think big and act locally. This is meant to tap a wide range of expertise and knowledge and yet focus attention on a smaller community when implementing the programme. Parsons also pointed out the need for collective approach towards empowerment programmes arguing that since this is a multi-layered concept, it is bound to draw in a variety of perceptions, ideologies and modus operandi thus creating conflicts. The other facet of the strategies devised by Parsons is that empowerment is a multi-levelled concept which draws in a variety of interests; individuals, groups, organisations, environment, cultural and historical contexts.

However, to achieve the above, Parsons pointed out that there are also some tactics that are followed. Communities to benefit in the empowerment programme have to be enabled; capacitated adequately for a task ahead before they are linked together into either a professional or specialist network. That way, they are expected to share notes and skills. An empowerment agent or government should also catalyse the entire process so that cases of shortages or deficiencies will not be reported. In other words, this is simply a process of availing basic resources so that beneficiaries do not fail. This process is complimented by the availability of information and knowledge to the people. This is where specialist departments and organisations come in to offer expertise in various ways. Parsons also point out the need for a deliberate development of skills for respective fields and subsequently followed by a clearly structured and defined model which then guides the whole implementation process. Once a model is in place and seen to be working out well, values for the programme, albeit derived from the people themselves have to be instituted and monitored from the agency level. At this juncture, communities develop social technologies for sustenance that are however supported by professional technical assistance from either the government or implementing agency. However, Friedman (1992) argues that people can empower themselves by mobilising for political participation as social, political and psychological disempowerment could lead to poverty.

In a nutshell, empowerment should be directed to all the people in society regardless of their sex, age, or religions for all are prone to encountering survival challenges. It is also rolled out through the following amongst others; accessing the marginalised to the core of the economy, educating the masses academically and technically, availing land to the marginalised, creation of legislative instruments supportive of the marginalised, and allowing the marginalised to own valuable properties amongst others.

Meanwhile, the government of Zimbabwe has put in place different mechanisms and policies to promote indigenous empowerment in most of the key areas; economic, social and political. The Employee Share Ownership Scheme or Trust (ESOS/T) is one of them. It is a deliberate programme by the government of Zimbabwe set to allow employees of companies to access at least 5% of the company's total equity although businesses can offer shares up to 28 percent of the equity. Meanwhile, the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board monitors to ensure that companies adhere to the indigenisation and economic empowerment legislation (Sunday Mail, 2012). According to the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, it has since established the following ownership schemes; Mhondoro- Ngezi,

Chegututu Community Share Ownership Scheme (Zimplats Holdings), the Tongogara Community Share Ownership Scheme (Anglo America- Unki) Hwange Community Share Ownership Scheme (Hwange Colliery) and the Zvishavane Community Share Ownership Scheme (Mimosa Mining Company). Several more are still being considered throughout the country.

This comes under the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act (Chapter14:33), which was passed by parliament in 2007, (GoZ, 2007). Under the same empowerment programme, all companies operating in Zimbabwe are required to arrange for 51% of their shares to be availed to indigenous people so that they also have a stake in their wealth and the development of their economy. The same Empowerment Act makes provision for the protection of some low capital investments for the indigenous people only so that they are not completely shut out of economic business in their country. Besides, these investments are low capital intensive and so locals can easily run them without any need for foreign intervention or expertise. According to Statutory Instrument 21 of 2010 (GoZ, 2010), these are some of the sectors reserved for indigenous Zimbabweans:

Primary production of food and cash crops through the land reform that was recently completed has been reserved for the local players. That way, it avails markets for the producers so that they do not get stuck with their produce. The transport business such like passenger buses, taxis and car hire services are some of the economic activities which indigenous Zimbabweans have successfully ventured. The sector does not require sophisticated foreign investment or expertise. The retail and wholesale trade is also considered a low expertise sector which local businesspeople could easily take up. Barber shops, hairdressing and beauty salons have been deliberately preserved for the locals especially the youth. It is a field which is usually taken up by the unemployed school-leavers and some who would have failed to secure other sectors of their dreams. Employment agencies, advertising agencies and estate agencies were also identified for indigenous entrepreneurs simply for their low cost capital requirements. Valet services and bakeries are some of the production and processing sectors which do not require outsiders to invest. Rather, these are some of the sectors which have created jobs for the traditionally idle women and men in the townships. The tobacco grading and packaging sector was identified for the local players considering the fact that it also affords an opportunity to the local farmers to add value on some of their produce. The same argument similarly applies to the milk industry which has also been preserved for indigenous entrepreneurs. The arts and craft, marketing and distribution industry has also been left solely for indigenous players since it does not require foreign expertise. Besides, it is one of the sectors that have created employment for the idle youth especially along the high-ways and in resort towns.

Conflicts

Conflicts in developing countries, Zimbabwe included, have heavy human, economic, and social costs and are a major cause of poverty and underdevelopment. Some of the major causes of conflicts include political, economic, and social inequalities; extreme poverty; economic stagnation; poor government services; high unemployment; environmental degradation; and individual (economic) incentives to engage in disturbances.

When the study focuses on conflicts due to lack of some form of economic empowerment or some other causes but which could be resolved by some economic empowerment, then pointers narrow down to economics of the society. This therefore directs us to look at conflicts around these areas; social, political and economic. Generally, conflicts are misunderstandings or failure to share a common meaning on some thoughts or inadequate resource leading to hate, isolation and in some cases the creation of social classes as defined by Karl Marx. These misunderstandings, because of lack of patience in most of the people who believe that they are being disadvantaged or taken for granted, result in fatal physical and armed aggression

Most scholars and political researchers have widely written and confirmed that bad economic policies imposed by the West, political and economic development failures have been some of the root cause of Africa's political instability that has subsequently led to the loss of millions of lives. Civil wars in Uganda, the South Sudan, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were and are being carried out by rebel movements which are organised across ethnic lines. The question of ethnicity is only becoming glaring when one group is left out or feels robbed of its share of the resources. This has also led to an increase of cases about secessionism in Africa; DRC, Nigeria, Mali, Zimbabwe, Libya and soon South Africa.

There are some studies that argue that aid decreases the risk of civil conflicts by promoting economic growth and strengthening state capabilities (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). However, there are some instances when communities fight over food aid while in other instances, that aid could be converted into valuable resources to sustain conflicts or wars. This shows that conflict causes are wide and varied so much so that it sometimes becomes difficult to really know the actual triggers of conflicts in respective situations. Either lack of this aid or abundance of it could trigger conflicts.

Aid shocks have in some cases led to situations whereby people's lives are required to adjust rapidly in the negative after aid has been cut off, (Powell, 2004). In Zimbabwe, following the US-imposed smart sanctions in 2001, aid was cut to unsustainably low levels so much so that the powerful had to scramble for the little available for personal aggrandisement while the needy starved. It was then the powerful, accessible to the media who cried foul giving an impression that the sanctions were directed at the entire nation.

Resource abundance-conflict correlation (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002), in respect to Mashonaland Central province and indeed in the entire Mashonaland region, particularly land-related conflicts were high and severe largely because that is where some of the best agricultural land is found. Both the former white commercial farmers and the new black farmers wanted to occupy that region hence the conflict. The other reasons about being the strong-hold of ZANU PF and that probably the most provoking whites were based in that region, are of less value.

In Mashonaland Central province, conflicts of varied magnitude have been recorded often in different areas over the period. Most have assumed a political attitude and appearance and yet instigated by either poverty or delays in the availability of some facilities and or commodities in the society. In most instances, politicians ride on these long-ripe grievances to advance their political agenda. A clear example could be the 2000 land invasion in Svosve area, Mashonaland

East province by some impatient community in the redistribution of land. Similarly, in 2012, there was a land conflict at Tavydale farm, Mazowe pitting 17 new black farmers against one white commercial farmer over 70 hectares of land (The Herald, 2012). These aspirations had long been in the people so much so that they simply required some slight detonation. History of Zimbabwe also tells us that in 1995, the late Ndabaningi Sithole, president of ZANU Ndonga, a minority political party had redistributed his farm (Churu farm) in Harare to the land hungry Zimbabweans. The land conflict was wide-spread in the entire province where a minority white group had splashed lavishly and spent extravagantly and yet their next door black majority suffered in the abyss of poverty.

The landless Zimbabweans strongly believed and knew that it was on the land that their future could be anchored, on the land where they could develop properties, in the land where they could invest their money and sweat, in the land where they could claim nativity, in the land where their heritage was and where all their generational poverty could be addressed. When eventually the slightest opportunity to claim land came their way, it was no-longer a land conflict alone. The vengeant black majority went for anything that they could lay their hands on either for self enrichment or for destruction. This saw most of the properties that had been developed by the white commercial farmers in the farms going to waste. It should also be realised that inequitable land distribution forced people in communal areas to subsist through overexploitation of resources, leading to resource degradation. Therefore, when the land-hungry blacks moved into the commercial farming areas, they had ‘some sort of vendetta’ to solve against the white farmers.

Over the years, land related conflicts have shifted from the traditional Black/White war to a new phenomenon of the Black/Black war. This new war is pitting the first land beneficiaries who had participated in the physical struggles against the late comers called “mafikizolo”, those wealth people who had sided with former white farmers hoping that the land reform programme was a non-event. The other dimension is that of political activists who were being used by politicians to clear the roads and later failed to secure land against those who acquired vast tracks of land contrary to the set allocations.

Other conflicts that have been recorded in the province also include wars over small-scale mine ownership and dominance popularly called “makorokoza”. Besides fighting amongst themselves, these illegal panners have also caused untold land degradation which has rendered most of the areas that they would have worked on inhabitable or irreparable.

Elsewhere, especially in the urban set-ups, there is a serious challenge of unemployment. Urdal (2005) observed that countries with youth bulges have a markedly higher risk of conflict as the youth have little opportunities for self-sustenance. Bindura, Glendale, Mvurwi, Mazowe and Shamva have not had any meaningful industrial sectors that could absorb able-bodied and other school leavers. All these have been left at the mercy of poverty and joblessness thus making room for criminals of all sorts. In the other growth points; Guruve, Muzarabani, Centenary, Rushinga, Chimhanda, Dotito, Mt Darwin, Madziva, Nzvimbo and Manhenga, most of the youth and potential workers have since left for the towns and outside of Zimbabwe for greener pastures. This development has seriously affected opportunities for development since most of the active age-group is no-longer available. In the farming areas, another form of conflict has

been recorded especially in Mazowe and Bindura. This has been over water. Soon after the land reform programme, some of the new black farmers upstream harnessed water thereby depriving other downstream users. This ignited fierce conflicts as all claimed ownership to the natural resource.

The Zimbabwe Young Adults Survey of 2002 and the 2003 study on domestic violence (Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre and Network, 2012), highlights that women had become increasingly marginalized from mainstream economic activities, despite the fact that they constituted 52 percent of the population. This alone clearly showed the glaring discrepancies that existed in society. Clearly, that also contrasted with the gender commitments under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women and the SADC Gender Protocol to which Zimbabwe is a signatory.

The economy

Zimbabwe’s economy has traditionally been supported by agriculture both in terms of production and employment creation. For this sector to do well, it has been the efforts of both the black majority and white minority. However, that sort of relationship only saw the minority prospering at the expense of the majority. Actually, according to Moyo (2005:4), in 1980 at independence, there were over 700 000 black small holder farmers on 14.4 million hectares of land whereas by the end of the land reform programme in 2004, there were over 1.312 866 farmers on 24.34 million hectares of land. The over 4 000 white farmers who had been on the bigger portion of the land had been reduced drastically by this era.

Besides the fact that it is on the land that the economy is based, built and nurtured, Zimbabwean black population simply wanted their heritage back. It gives and restores confidence in the citizens. This desire for land then led to the infamous land reform of 1997 though in earnest, the implementation part was rolled out in 2000 to 2004/5. At the end of the redistribution programme, over 300 000 people benefitted in different land holding schemes.

Results

After conducting all the 126 interviews and going through all the selected literature, the following responses were gathered and categorized as shown in the chart below.

RESPONDENTS' REACTION TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS		
RESEARCH QUESTION	RESPONDENTS	% (response rate)
Respondents' understanding of empowerment	119	94
Identify measures instituted by government	85	67
Views about empowerment outcome	80	63
Challenges and successes observed	84	67

The responses to the research questions were varied. However, 119 of the 126 respondents, especially from the technocrats, commercial farmers and the youth did express knowledge about what economic empowerment was and its implications to the Zimbabwean programme. They all

generally defined it as the provision of the reigns of the economy to the previously disadvantaged indigenous people in a society. The other 7 respondents were either not sure or avoided the question. On the measures that had been instituted by the government to ensure empowerment since 1980, only 85 drawn from across the board responded with the rest either avoiding the question or failing to identify the measures. Amongst some of the most prominent measures cited are; land reform programme, share ownership, RBZ-funded farm mechanization, free education, free health, establishment of micro-income-generating projects in the rural areas, provision of residential stands in urban and semi-urban areas, livestock restocking programmes, legislative quota for women and establishment of more tertiary colleges.

On the respondents' view of the empowerment results, 80 answered the question indicating that there were areas of successes and areas of failures across the board. Mixed views were also expressed on the implementation approach as some cited politicization, nepotism or patronage. The question to the challenges and successes was answered by 84 people and the rest were hesitant to talk about it. However, they raised issues around economic, social, political and environmental matters.


All the technocrats and civil servants (totaling 16 and constituting 13% of the respondents) interviewed proposed that the government devises some strategy of availing education to all the disadvantaged youth especially in the form of practical knowledge so that they find professions to keep them busy and earning an income. This could be achieved in the province by way of deliberately creating a quota for students who hail from the province to benefit in all tertiary colleges like Bindura University, Chaminuka Technical College, Madziva Teachers' training College, Ponesai Vanhu Vocational College, Blackfordby Agricultural College, and Mazowe Veterinary College. The respondents also pointed out that the roll-out of this programme should be apolitical as it was bound to benefit members of the ruling party, which is more dominant in the province. On the same subject, 10 of the 16 technocrat respondents (63%) or 8% of the entire sample pointed out that empowerment is not all about availing tangible resources to the marginalized communities; rather, it is also about the definition and pronouncement of the rights of respective sectors in society. According to this argument, each constituency of people in society needed to understand what it stood for, its rights, benefits and obligations and how it could manage the outlook of the society and economy in general. That way, communities would have been empowered enough to be able to distinguish the good from the bad, conflicts from harmony and development from destruction. Empowerment also meant having the confidence, belief and trust that whatever one owned or had is really his or hers to a point that everyone becomes jealousy of the surroundings. This could be achieved by ensuring unhindered and unpoliticised access to the use and or benefit of the resources and social services. Generally however, different constituencies' responses were captured, analysed and presented accordingly as explained below.

Respondents in the agricultural sector revealed that tobacco production figures for 2010 show that smallholders produced over 75% of the crop compared to less than 10% two years previously. The increase was attributed to contract farming that the corporate sector had engaged with the farmers banking on a sound economy. In other agricultural sectors, though production has fairly improved, it has not matched the anticipated levels largely due to lack of or low support levels by government structures in the form of favourable pricing systems and

availability of commercially competitive loans and policies. According to the Tobacco Industry Marketing Board (TIMB), GMB, ZCFU and ZFU, generally commodity prices have been suppressed and this has negatively impacted on the farmer who expected more. On the general, tobacco has been selling for an average of US\$3.20 per kilogramme instead of the expected US\$4.20, maize fetching US\$250 per tonne instead of the expected US\$350, cotton going for US\$0.30 per kilogramme instead of an expected US\$1.60 and soya-beans fetching US\$530 per tonne contrary to an expected US\$800 during the 2012 marketing season.

The Environmental Management Agency (2012) reported that there had been a wave of inter-farmer conflicts over the use and abuse of firewood and forests within the commercial farming communities. According to EMA, there is a category of farmers who are also into the destruction of forests in-order to get firewood for resale while others are totally against the practice. Closely akin to the above, there are also farmers who have depleted wildlife through illegal hunting within the farming communities. Cases in point according to the Department of Parks and Wildlife Management (DPWM) and EMA (EMA 2006), were noted around Manzou Game Park and Jumbo dam, both in Mazowe where zebras, gazelles, antelopes, kudus and warthogs were being hunted down illegally. In Guruve district, according to DPWM, Nyamanechi Game Park had also recorded an increase in poaching cases from 21 per month to an average of 45 different cases per month. The most affected animals were antelopes, kudus and ducks. Similarly, in Gonono area in the same district, elephants and buffalos were the main targets whereby responsible departments had recorded an increase of poaching from an average of 3 and 7 to 8 and 15 elephants and buffalos per year respectively. In Bindura, Matepatepa commercial farming area, most of the wildlife that had been reared and left behind by some former white farmers had been forced away due to increased human population and the fact that some were being deliberately poached.

Mining had proved to be one of the fastest growing sectors in Zimbabwe since 2009. According to the National Economic Commission (NEC), platinum accounts for 45% of mineral export revenue while gold contributes 22%. This means that mining now accounts for 64.7% of merchandise exports in Zimbabwe following the collapse of agriculture and manufacturing. The manufacturing sector's contribution to GDP had shrunk from 28% in 2000 to 10% in 2008, before recovering to 17% in 2009 and over 40% in 2011. The sector still suffers from low capacity utilisation which presently (2012) stands at over 43% largely due to lack of skilled personnel, eroded market share and obsolete machinery. Overall, Dodo (2012) and Zimstats indicated that the following sectors have contributed the following towards the economy during the period 2012.



NEC, ZIA, Zimstats, ZCFU, RBZ and 9 of the 30 farmers (30%) indicated that the government had however over the period failed to expeditiously address a rigid labour market, land tenure frictions and improving the business climate. The Government of National Unity's failures are seen in various fronts, chief amongst them, failure to deliver as promised. At the beginning of the GNU in 2009, government announced a Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP) which sought to liberalise the agriculture sector, administrative and government processes, social protection on health, food, security, and education. At the end of 2009, there was STERP II, which was a three-year macroeconomic and budget framework for 2010-12. Up to this date, the government has not been able to deliver any of the policy pronouncements; elimination of multiple farm ownership, eradication of inefficiency on the part of government, improving gender equality and reformation of over 2 million hectares of under-used land, (ibid).

Generally, most of the food items in Zimbabwean shops is imported and has reasonably served the interests of the people well. Because of the liberal policy that has been adopted by government in as far as the importation of food is concerned, there has been competition of supplies so much so that there has been a subsequent reduction in prices. To an ordinary household of 5 people, according to a February 2012 Consumer Price Survey and Zimstat (2012), clothing requires US\$82.6, water, electricity and gas – US\$129.5, health –US\$93.6, transport –US\$113.1, food and beverages –US\$97.3 and education requiring US\$117.3, thus requiring a total of US\$633.4 per month. The survey presented an average monthly inflation rate of 4.3%. All these figures come against an average monthly salary of US\$400 per month for an average worker in Zimbabwe. This therefore means that the majority of Zimbabweans cannot afford to purchase most of the basic food requirements.

On the education front, in 2010, the Net Primary School Attendance Rate (NAR) stood at 91%, an indication of an improvement of 9% from the era of the economic crisis. According to Zimstats (2012), of the 91% NAR, 71% of the children had failed to attend school due to financial challenges while 9% had dropped owing to either pregnancies or marriages, (ibid). Despite the above statistics on education enrolment, Zimstats reported that over 100 000 youth

from the 8 districts in the province were either unemployed or under-employed thus increasing the risk of conflicts and the propensity to be lured into sinister projects on the promises of financial rewards. Most of these unemployed were in the communal areas and growth-points while the under-employed were in the farming areas and illegal mining areas.

Challenges

Like it has been noted that the concept of empowerment dates back to the 1970s and before, over the period, its implementation has been rocked by several factors. Some of the same factors however, have also worked to the advantage of the programme. Some of the noted factors impeding empowerment are; lack of finance to kick-start the programmes and lack of facilities where these programmes can be based or delivered. Closely akin to the above is the question on the availability of appropriate operational facilities for respective empowerment programmes. It has already been alluded to above that lack of training and education has also seriously affected empowerment programmes. Partly, the above is a result of lack of political will by the powers that be to direct attention and funding towards that needy area. Another impediment has been that of political interference especially towards national elections, whereby most contesting parties will be propagandising programmes and development schedules.

Empowerment Benefits

In this discussion, the essence of the empowerment programme is to ensure that the majority of indigenous Zimbabweans are taken on board in the economic arena with a view to cushioning them from potential exposure to the risk of poverty-induced conflicts. However, beside the above stated agenda, the province benefits in other various ways.

Mkandawire's premonialist argument around conflict clearly states that poverty eradication corresponds to peace, stability and development. It is therefore beneficial to both the state and the communities at large to roll out a successful empowerment programme considering the peace dividends that ultimately come out. Closely akin to poverty eradication and peace dividends, is the issue about security. Paul Collier talked about an insecure society largely fuelled by the grievances within the same people. What it simply means is that for as long as the communities have grievances over politics, social or economic matters, there is no security or if it is there, then it is fragile. The other perspective to this argument is that for as long as the communities are empowered and own immovables, they never allow conflicts or wars for they fear that their properties will be destroyed. In other words, empowered communities have got stakes to protect. Could the same hypothesis explain why South Africans easily engage in fatal and destructive violence compared to Zimbabweans?

In the province, according to Ministry of Youth Indigenisation and Empowerment, over 1400 youth have benefitted under the Land Reform programme in all the 6 administrative districts (with Farms) while another 16 300 have been economically empowered in one way or the other (small-scale income generating projects, employment, mining, and National Youth Service). Effectively, that has accessed people to social, educational and economic facilities though in different ways. According to ZANU PF provincial youth officials, a sizeable number of the youth are comfortably doing well in small-scale mining especially in Shamva, Bindura, Mazowe, and Guruve so much so that they were now employing several hundreds more. Because of an

improved income, the same youth and their communities were now able to access other modern entertainment and communication facilities, thus modernising their communities. That way, both their immediate families and distant communities, could be kept away from poverty-induced conflicts. However, according to MDC, National Youth Service could not be considered to be part of empowerment as it perpetuated violence. The same respondent also indicated that another challenge that some of the youth were facing had to do with politicisation of empowerment programmes where opposition party elements were being left out. It must be appreciated that once a considerate single member of the community is out of the poverty pit, there is some form of knowledge and capacity building in the entire community as that single personality is bound to upgrade others through; sending siblings to school, provision of food and health and exposure to modern information and communications technologies amongst others.

Empowerment, by nature provides the requisite institutional mechanisms for the marginalised's participation in the core of the national economic arena. According to the Department of Lands and MYIE, in Mashonaland Central province, out of the over 23 000 beneficiaries of the Land Reform programme, over 65% have been actively involved in the mainstream productive sector of the economy through; crop farming, animal rearing, transport services, tillage services, poultry projects, retail services and consultants amongst others. It has become a common sight to see cars, tractors, satellite gadgets and imported beers in the most remote parts of Mashonaland Central province unlike before the government had adopted a deliberate economic empowerment drive. The present situation where there is equal participation builds dedicated, loyal and motivated citizens who do not tolerate conflicts. This has over the period built confidence amongst the people. However, it must be noted that the availability of finances especially the youth sector has brought in a new culture of violence. This is usually experienced when the youth involved in gold-panning earn some income. They indulge in sexual escapades and uncontrolled beer drinks, in most cases leading to sexually transmitted diseases and grievous fist-fights amongst themselves especially over women. To some extent, these conflicts defy Heinsohn's notion of youth bulge as a cause of conflicts in society. Instead, this could be resource bulge contributing to conflicts.

Effective empowerment has also led to vibrant and effective civil society organisations that are representing various interest groups in society. Friedman (1992) observed that the effectiveness of a civil society group is determined by the availability of both financial and material resources. As such, an empowered community is bound to avail all the required resources for the effectiveness of its representative group. In the province, farmers are now more represented by their traditional Zimbabwe Farmers' Union and Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union because they are timely paying their periodic subscriptions. At the end of the day, the previously idle and jobless youth are kept busy with some remuneration for their sustenance.

Recommendations

Given the above background, where the majority blacks had suffered in poverty and isolation at the instigation of the minority whites, it makes a lot of sense when some form of empowerment is rolled out in favour of the majority. Simply, this will be to ensure economic equity and normalisation of the economic playing field. This is done and achieved through a variety of ways. Given the problems that had characterised Zimbabwe, socially, politically and economically and juxtaposed against the positions that were presented by respective government


agencies regarding what they had seen on the ground and the best possible solution to the said challenges, it is this paper's contention that a systematic programme be instituted in-order to find a lasting solution.

First and foremost, an economy that wishes to embark in this empowerment programme needs to objectively identify the need for the programme before causing unnecessary anxiety in society and economy. Need is determined by the concerns raised by the generality of the population especially over a skewed societal and economic structure. Considering the fact that Zimbabwe has a society that is difficult to dissect in terms of classes, it becomes imperative to carefully identify the needs of various members of the society so that they can be categorised accordingly. After drawing a needs analysis, an appropriate policy is designed based on the surrounding environment and cultural needs.

Once a policy is in place, it becomes easy for any awareness and consciousness raising programme to be implemented so that people begin to appreciate the need and the people's needs in that programme. This exercise takes care of all possible hostilities within the communities and educates people on how to manage the same empowerment programme. When people are considered to have appreciated the nobility of the programme, deliberate training programmes are rolled out as per one's need and level of literacy. This is supposed to develop the intended beneficiaries so that they assume local ownership of the programme and all its materials and facilities. At this stage, it becomes important to identify the needy members of the community so that they benefit on the ground to systematically reduce horizontal inequalities. This should guard against multiple beneficiaries or benefitting the upper class at the expense of the needy. When every stakeholder in this programme is satisfied with the selection that would have been spearheaded by the local leadership, then empowerment programme can now be rolled out in earnest, albeit in phases depending on the most needy and available resources. From the day of the empowerment proper, monitoring and control should concurrently be initiated. This is also a specialised activity which should be undertaken by specialists in respective areas to ensure quality compliance, production continuity, ethic adherence and cordial relationships amongst all participants. At the end of the programme, satisfied by all stages implementation, then beneficiaries can now be weaned off so they can stand alone. However, the stage at which these newly empowered members can be released cannot be really set; it depends on the success of all the other stages before. Also important to note is that this model was considered ideal for the Zimbabwean situation but its applicability to other situations 'may' not be guaranteed.

From an extensive study of the empowerment programme under way in Zimbabwe, it is imperative that one understands a conceptual framework shown below.

Author's Conception of the Empowerment Process



The empowerment proper can be viewed from the following perspectives amongst several others. The Land Resettlement Programme that was rolled out ever since 1980 in Zimbabwe, especially the 2000 to 2004, saw over 23 000 beneficiaries benefitting according to the Department of Lands, Mashonaland Central province, thus transforming their livelihoods socially and economically. The essence of the programme, according to respondents from TIMB, ZCFU and Veterinary Department, was to uplift the majority of the needy but equally competent Zimbabweans into commercial farmers' status thereby empowering them financially, socially and morally. That way the traditional abuse of the idle youths by the rich and the politicians would end. Indeed, the bulge that had been created by the youth who had no jobs was deflated as more youths have been transformed into serious farmers, businesspeople, agricultural commodity merchants, and project managers. For the rural poor in Mashonaland Central province, land and financial resources are of foremost importance, but technology, seeds and fertilizer, livestock, general infrastructure (water, roads, clinics and schools) and employment in general are also important. To ensure that the agrarian reform is successful, it is imperative that the government avails some form of long-term land tenure-ship. That way, people will have some sense of ownership and responsibility so much so that they begin to develop their areas.

The Education For All policy that was pronounced soon after Zimbabwe's political independence has seen millions of Zimbabweans improving for the better. The policy has confirmed the notion that 'an educated society is a progressive community'. Most of the people and in particular the youth who have been exposed to education have managed to shun violence and all other barbaric activities that characterise youths in other communities (MYIE, 2012) albeit with some exceptions in this province. However, there is still a lot that the government can do to help the situation especially ensuring that the youth are exposed to practical skills' education supported by peace and human rights concepts so that they are able to distinguish the good from the evil.

Infrastructure establishment and upgrading in communities where the youth are is another approach that could be taken to ensure empowerment of the youth in Mashonaland Central province. It may not be enough to educate the youth and avail land for farming and yet the other entire relevant infrastructure; socially, politically and economically is missing. It is important that the government establishes an appropriate legislative mechanism to support and guide the youth and everyone else in their endeavours. The current Economic Empowerment Act may not be enough. It needs to be supported by policies that specifically cushion vulnerable groups in society. Socially, community and leadership systems must be either built or revived where they are down so that cultural and societal expectations and obligations are sustained and fulfilled. The absence of these societal structures, to some extent contributed to the political violence that was experienced in 2008 whereby the youth arbitrarily terrorised elderly people without regard for age, health and moral dictates, (Dodo and Musorowegomo, 2012). It must be realised that all the conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi and Rwanda, Sudan, DRC, Kenya, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique and Nigeria amongst others were waged by the youth.

Social analysts have observed that an empowered youth is a responsible one. This is particularly true with some of the Zimbabwean youth who own immovable properties and are reluctant to participate in violent and destructive activities for fear that theirs may be affected too. Property ownership is considered one of the key strategies to ensure that everyone is responsible in as far as community policing is concerned. People need to know their fate in the event that there is a change of government; will they not be chased away from the new land, will they not be dispossessed of their new business shares, will their education certificates still be valid and will the international community still embrace them in a new dispensation? The same laws must also ensure that environmental needs are catered for so that degradation is minimised.

In-order for the empowerment programme to be successful both in its planning and implementation, all the 126 respondents posited a diversity of suggestions. However, a summary of all the proposed suggestions point to the provision of education and training both to the administrators of the programme and the beneficiaries themselves. It is argued that since the indigenous will be venturing into completely new sectors in which they have no experience and in some cases, professional knowhow, there is serious need for some exposure of the stakeholders to the sectoral information and education. Relevant training and education enable stakeholders to be responsible in the management and preservation of the resources around them. It also gives them some sense of ownership so much so that they become jealousy of the resources in the locality.

There is also need for political will in the empowerment programme. Parsons (1988) and some respondents from the business community indicated that while a noble programme might have been rolled out on the ground, lack of specialised support, injection of monitored financial services and lack of a deliberate legislative framework, may see all the effort going to waste. Deliberate support on the ground survives courtesy of the will power of the political leadership and the entire structures. There is need for principled determination by all concerned stakeholders. Closely akin to the above requirement is the aspect of a conducive environment for the sustenance of the empowerment programme. Ideally, empowerment drives should never be meant to revenge for past wrongs; it must be executed along professional lines whereby relevant

specialists are assigned to carry out specific tasks and the allocation of resources conducted through meritocracy and not patronage.

Another important requirement for a successful empowerment programme is the right people and the right sectors to be availed out. While the right person is moulded by the training and education that was previously alluded to, passion and physical commitment also play an invaluable role. When we talk about the right sector, it is all about the ability to identify sectors that can be availed to indigenous people. The essence of this programme is not to run down the economy but to take on board the majority of Zimbabweans. Therefore, if the surrounding communities do not qualify to take up stakes in a sector, it must not be forced simply for the sake of 'empowerment'. Most importantly, the "Zanufication" of the entire programme must be corrected.

Conclusion

Conflicts are known to exist in most normal societies as was aptly noted by Galtung that they are like sex; needed and controlling societies. However, all what is required is that there is some deliberate policy by the government to ensure that all the people are adequately provided for in a sustainable manner without having a society defined by exaggerated classes.

Social exclusion, deprivation, and political thuggery were some of the mechanisms by which the 'war-lords' consolidated their power and disenfranchised perceived but powerless enemies. These are war-lords in the sense that they virtually controlled all the resources available depriving all they considered potential threats. To them these are 'enemies'. Patrimonialism perpetuated and feeding on the youth bulge was thus seen through the impoverished and disenfranchised youth. However, all this inequality and disenfranchisement has been part of the causes of conflicts and under-development of Mashonaland Central province. Beside these poverty and inequality-induced conflicts or simply resource-based conflicts, there are some largely based on other factors like ideology, ethnicity and simple selfishness that are still dogging the province. By and large, most of the conflicts have and are still motivated by the need for resources in whatever form by the bulging youth.

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Human capital insecurity and democratization in Nigeria: a reflection on the political economy implications

By

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Abstract

One of the fundamental relevance of democratization has been located in its capacity to guarantee human freedom both in the determination of choice of leadership and sanctity of existence. However, the above tenets can no longer as it is today, be extended to the Nigerian democratic project of the fourth republic under the leadership of President **Good luck Jonathan**. This work therefore is an attempt to periscope the persisting human capital insecurity under the Nigerian democratic setting since the year 2011 when the leadership of the incumbent was legitimized in a democratic election of the same year and the running battle brought into the scene by the members of the dreaded Islamic fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram. Employing therefore the Marxian class theory of the state as a theoretical framework and content methodology, the work was able to uncover the fact that the spate of human capital insecurity as unleashed on the Nigerian state by the members of the fundamentalist Islamic sect Boko Haram today is of class undertone. It was also discovered that the spate of human capital insecurity as it exists in so many states in Nigeria today particularly the northern region has adversely affected productivity and commercial enterprise both on the side of private and public sector workers. Arising from its findings, the work recommends that the government should be more proactive in upholding the constitutional secularity of the Nigerian state by ensuring that every act of culpability is visited with the full weight of the law no matter whose ox is goad. Equally, it was the recommendation of the work that the government should not in any form relinquish state sovereignty to any entity by dragging itself into undue negotiations on matters of religion and faith since that may negate the country's constitutional secularity. Finally, it was also the recommendation of the work that national security should be a constitutional matter and as such, no amount of opposition should be allowed to take undue advantage of the democratic culture of the moment to trigger actions that are capable of jolting the country's national unity.

Key words: Human capital, Insecurity, Democratization, commercial enterprise Productivity.

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Introduction

Nigeria's appetite for democratization has been severally demonstrated through her repeated post colonial efforts to enthrone democratic sanctity both as a process and a form of government since her attainment of statehood on October 1, 1960. Despite observed discontents from within and by internationally acclaimed democratic rating organizations in most of her previous democratic outings which were all described as being excessively marred by irregularities, the country has more than ever remained resolute and determined to pursue to a logical end, a democratic credibility of international standard. This was however to be in the year 2011 when Nigeria held her democratic elections that ushered in the democratic regime of President **Good luck Jonathan**. The logicity in question as regards her democratic aspiration intones the urge to make the desired sacrifice to resurrect an enduring democratic ethos where the essential ingredients of international acceptability and rig free electoral outcome would be both the norm and the practice. Of course, the wind of democratization now blowing across most states in the world especially the emerging states of Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean is an adventure borne out of the curiosity of western capital to further better her chances in the already asymmetrical relationship that has come to characterize today's unipolar world. In this regard, democratization amounts to being disposed to a better sense of rationality and shared freedom in majoritarian leadership where the people's wishes and aspirations predominates and prevails over senseless anarchy and oligarchy. As is envisaged, democracy holds the capacity to extend freedom of choice of leadership to citizens. In the reasoning of the west, the attendant freedom as given in democratic regimes can quickly turn in acceptability and cooperation that would pave the way for easy access to the natural fortunes of these emerging states. This is why several billions of dollars have by way of charity or otherwise gone into the democratization projects in most states in Africa at the expense of the west. Today, democratic capability has no doubt become a pre-condition for access to international capital as doled out by most donor agencies and the international community under the watchful eyes of the United States of America.

With military in politics almost turning into an aberration and a cliché in a new world order of democratic appeal, Africa in general and Nigeria in particular cannot but begin to learn new orientations in democratic governance with its tortuous trials and errors. Historically, Nigeria's spirited efforts at democratization dates back to the era immediately after her independence in the year 1960 but was short lived following her chequeared political upheavals not only from the point of view of the western region crises of 1964 but also from the coup and the counter coup d' tats of 1966 that culminated in the thirty (30) months secessionist civil war which ended in the year 1970.

The year 1979 however became another test moment for the country's new found democracy but the events that unmasked her democratic incapability became rather luminous too soon when the country's democracy was desecrated again in the year 1983 following from a military intervention which for the second time in her political history, further diminished the democratic appetite of the citizenry with state leadership convoked under the military and the constitution quickly replaced with edicts and decrees. Given the ensuing circumstance, the country's democracy nosedived only to be resurrected again in the year 1992 when the then military in power under the leadership of General Ibrahim Babangida rekindled the citizen's democratic dream. This effort to return once more to a presidential democracy witnessed the birth of two political parties in what became a two party arrangement between the Social Democratic Party

(SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC). The history brokered by the outcome of this democratization effort approximated an acceptable package of an international and local appeal but its annulment on June 12, 1993 became too undeserving for that democratic epoch.

Within the context of all these democratic test cases, the country is known to have lost much in terms of human and material resources that are of essence to the developmental aspirations of the Nigerian state. For instance, most of the premeditated political killings during these eras were hatched by political actors but executed by political thugs who were adequately or otherwise rented by political principals to hew down perceived political opponents in what can be described as politically motivated killings.

As if these were not enough, the country's democratization effort is today being challenged by such other destabilizing instincts like resource control agitations, ethnic militarism, religious insurgency and man kidnapping. However, the greatest challenge to the country's democratization process and survival as a geo political entity can be located in the activities of the dreaded Islamic fundamentalist sect; the Boko Haram. The human capital losses arising from the spate of suicide bombings orchestrated by the members of this Islamic Mafia organization has unarguably remained very colossal and a serious challenge to the sustenance of Nigeria's 4th democratic republic.

As aptly noted by the IDEA (2001) in her year 2000 survey conducted on "democracy in Nigeria", it was revealed that eighty-one (81%) percent of the Nigerian population are kindly disposed to democratic form of leadership. However, what has become worrisome is not with democracy in itself, but rather with its practice. Today, Nigeria's democratic journey under the fourth republic is again at the front burner with palpable fears hanging over its survival and that of the country as a geo-political entity. The country's human capital especially in the northern part has been severally shortchanged as the coordinated suicide bombings on grounds of religion and politics by the members of Boko Haram have almost rendered that part of the country ungovernable with citizen's lives and property very unsafe and the democratic appetite no longer a wish for many. The human casualty figure has continued to rise with the government not yet very close to any known solution. Indeed, with national security and intelligence at its lowest ebb, the Nigerian state has become an enterprise that has lost every sense of purpose on how to engender collective security for her human capital at a time like this that is very crucial to her national economic development and reconstruction. Despite, all these, what has however remained an area of less emphasis is the political economy implications of the dastard acts of the members of Boko Haram both in terms of human capital, economic losses, national unity and international image.

As the Nigerian state today can no longer guarantee freedom of movement, assembly and protective atmosphere for a thriving socio-economic activity in most parts especially in the Northern region of the country ostensibly due to the threatening impact of the Boko Haram sect, democratization in the context of government of the people and for the people depicting "will collectivization" can no longer to say the least, find any better footing in the country.

This work is therefore an attempt to periscope Nigeria's democratization efforts in the ensuing internal insecurity challenges as arising from the activities of the members of the Islamic

fundamentalist sect- the Boko Haram and the concomitant human capital implications on one part and the overall impact on Nigeria's democratic journey on the other. Secondly, it is equally the desire of the work to consider the issue of politically motivated killings within the Nigerian democratic terrain and the role of the state in this regard and the attendant consequences of both interplay on national productivity and finally, the conclusion.

Theoretical Perspective

There is no doubt that the theory of the state in the radical and progressive Marxian tradition has assumed a central position in the Marxian paradigm as a profound and efficacious tool for the analysis of interplay of relations in capital reproduction in bourgeoisie capitalist and neo-capitalist states of which Nigeria is a no exception. Despite the fact that the state with respect to its meaning has not been consensually reconciled as noted by Lenin (1975), its central role in production, distribution and exchange in a capitalistic society cannot be underestimated. However, following from the few writings of Engels (1978), Marx and Engels (1979), Lenin (1984 and 1975) and Marx and Engels (1969), a deeper meaning of the state has come to be and scholars of the Marxist persuasion have, following from these pockets of works, made profound modifications to arrive at what today in the conception of Alan (1973) can be known as the concept and theory of the state.

Notwithstanding the lack of a better founded ground for general consensus, some dominant opinions seem to have sufficed on the better interpretation of what the state stands for. In the first instance, it is a common consensus of scholars of political economy that the state is a product of class struggle and as such, the society is torn apart by the ensuing class struggle between on one hand, those who have (bourgeoisie) and on the other, those that do not (proletariats). In this case, the state becomes an instrument in the hands of the dominant class (bourgeoisie) and basis through which personal aggrandizement can be accomplished.

In the common consensus of the Marxian orientation, the state is nothing but a representative of the dominant interests of the ruling class which on the contrary, repudiates the claim by the bourgeoisie scholars that the state is a neutral entity in every of its dealings. In Nigeria, the state has increasingly become a magnet for virtually every facet of socio economic and political life of the society (Ikejiani and Ezech, 2008). Given this interplay, the ensuing struggle over the seizure, consolidation and use of the state power has turned the Nigerian state into an avenue for undue contest; the basis as well as an instrument for primitive accumulation of resources. Since the state has become the assured means through which material acquisition can be guaranteed, politics is approached with every pecuniary tendency and religion, ethnicity and politically motivated killings deployed as better founded tools by the ruling class either to weep up undue sentiments or to hew down perceived opponents.

Alluding to the above, Joseph (1980) had noted that the situation has led to the hot chase for the control and exploitation of the offices of the state by the ruling class. It is therefore against this ensuing background that one can explain the emergence to lime light of the dreaded Islamic fundamentalist sect, Boko Haram since the declaration of the electoral victory of President Goodluck Jonathan in the year 2011 following from Nigeria's one of the best adjudged free and fairest democratic elections.

Therefore, the Boko Haram insurgency is nothing but a ploy to showcase the grievances of a certain group of the Nigerian petit bourgeoisie that have been excluded from the control of the machinery of state power. What is here is that religious and ethnic feelings as well as politically motivated killings are now employed as instruments of Primordialism intended to aid in the recapture of the state power by such dislodged petit bourgeoisie. In order to actualize their dream, religion and ethnicity have primarily been dragged into action as primordial tools of proletarian appeal which at best can compel the mass of vulnerable adherents and instigate them into action as readily available tools to destabilize as well as possibly dislocate the other ruling class that is in control of the machinery of government and ostensibly, the commanding heights of the forces of production, distribution and exchange. Therefore, the orchestrated skirmishes now prevalent in Nigeria is all an effort to find relevance in the country's resources by those who feels that they are not in any way better advantaged in the present dispensation.

Democratization, National Insecurity and the Nigerian State

Extant literature offers extensive explanation of the concept of democratization with most of them emphasizing a common trend in its meaning. In the words of Yagboyaju (2011), democratization is a process that implies a series of continuous actions and changes. The process here in the words of Yagboyaju (2011) suggests the replacement of an already subsisting order or system that is authoritarian and undemocratic in nature with the one that is participatory and democratic. Gunther, Diamandurous and Puhle (1995) have argued that the process of democratization can be located in three phases namely; the fall of the authoritarian regime, consolidation and finally, the stage of an enduring democracy. What can however be noted here is that the above conceptualization of democratization did not articulate in any form a time frame upon which the process of democratization can be said to have completed. What is however clear is that each of the phases is to play discernible role in the process of actualization of the democratization journey. However, the source of worry in the case of Nigeria has been in the slow pace to democratize since we know that given the number of democratic years that the country had passed, visible democratic consolidation traits ought to have been firmly established. The same sense of worry seems to apply to the generality of Africa where the general observation tends to point to the fact that the democratization efforts in the continent has turned into mere political liberalization. What should be noted here is that political liberalization is just an aspect of the process of democratization. However, care must be taken to ensure that the later do not slide into a dangerous reverse of the former as noted by Ibrahim (2003). Irrespective of the fact that the present leadership in Nigeria has demonstrated both in practical and theoretical terms the urge to strengthen the process of democratization, the sporadic incidences of such curtailing factors as corruption in high places, insecurity as a result of suicide bombings occasioned by sectarianism and kidnapping have all become antithetical to the process of democratization in Nigeria.

Gbanite (2001) on his part notes that the failure of security agencies to get down working and get the country's security better managed may signal making the Nigerian democracy to disunite the people. Indeed, we must have to note that the success or failure of any administration is predicated on its capacity to put up enduring security administration that is capable of democratizing existence. The fact remains that in Nigeria today, insecurity is being ostensibly encouraged by the opposition as a basis to campaign against the incumbent even when citizen's lives and property are wasted with reckless abandon. In advanced states, this is not so. For

instance, in countries like Britain and the United States, there is the spirited effort to maintain a degree of continuity on matters relating to national security irrespective of which political party is in power. As noted by Gbanite (2001) with respect to the Nigerian state; a situation where an opposition party abandons the democratically accepted role of an opposition party to crusade for threats that are capable of dislodging the ruling party from concentrating on the task of good governance is to say the least anti democratic, anti security and anti development.

In what may be described as an incisive in road into the challenges of democratization in Nigeria, Irene-omo Bare (2009) notes that as is usually the case, Nigerians in their successive transition from military to civilian democracy had always welcomed the democratic moment with jubilation and transparent joy as they looked forward to a new era of stability, peace and prosperity. But, in all these, their expectations had often been dashed and truncated following from either the abysmal performance of the civilian regime in office or failure to manage properly the country's democratic relationships among the citizenry. No doubt a conference which took place at the Kennedy school at Harvard in December 2002 in which at least forty prominent Nigerians and other experts that gathered to deliberate on the future of Nigeria expressed their profound distress at the parlous state of Nigeria's democracy. As noted by Iren-omo-Bare (2007), the above participants were quick to identify and suggest possible solutions to Nigeria's **nine** critical governance problems which according to them includes;

1. Over centralization of governance
2. lack of transparency
3. lack of economic diversification
4. corruption
5. the sharia and imposition of Islamic law
6. lack of human security
7. lack of human rights
8. leadership challenges and
9. Failure to convoke national conference to debate constitutional reforms.

Apart from the number one (1) point as highlighted above, the rest of the other problems are elite centered. There is no doubt that the Nigerian federal system of government has in most cases aligned itself with the unitary form in practice. The center has been over dosed with both power and resources to the extent that even the country's fiscal federalism has become subject of national question and debate. In the ensuing condition of this over bearing by the center, the political hub and center of attraction has become that of how to capture state power and in each of the overtures brought into play, both the masses and true democratic spirit are either trivialized or put into undue jeopardy.

No matter the level of disarticulation that may have been brought into the democratic practice, it has no doubt gained ascendancy and prominence far more than any other form of government (Held, 1993). What perhaps may have informed this and the inherent beauty in its patronage by states can be located in what scholars like Salami (1994) termed, "its democratic ideals" which among many others includes its capacity to encourage wider participation and freedom for both the ruler and the ruled. However, the interplay within Nigeria's democratic corridor today raises the doubt as to whether democracy is still the best form of government where citizens' freedom can be celebrated without any reservations. May be Obianyo (2008) must have toed the right step

when she averred that the term democracy far from being the engine of mass freedom is only being over flogged in terms of its meaning just because of its innocuous tendency and capacity to undergo such abuses without losing its symbolic value. Indeed, the fact remains that the term democracy is being universalized for the fact that it is no longer threatening to the power elites who would wish to enjoy democratic legitimacy without as a matter of fact, the notorious inconvenience of practicing it (Ake, 1993).

Nothing demonstrates the problem of democratization in Nigeria more than that of the challenges of ethno nationalism. This has been a recurring challenge to both electoral governance and democratic process as a whole in Nigeria. The issue of ethno nationalism has made the project of democratic compromise a herculean task to the extent that every attempt to create a broad based political spectrum devoid of any ethnic appeal had often in the long run proved unattainable. This is mainly occasioned by the fact that every ethnic grouping is in constant clamor to control state scarce resources and since this can only be assured by ascendancy to political power, the endless struggle for control of government and its machinery has become “a do or die” dream for the elite of various ethnic extractions who employ ethnic sentiments to lure the vulnerable and impoverished masses notably the youths into undue restiveness. This has led to what Chirot (1977) aptly refers to as democratic paralysis which today, is a major threat to democratization in Nigeria. Even in the case of more advanced democracies of the western world, ethno nationalism as a challenge to democratization manifests itself in what Usher (1981) refers to as “conflicts over assignments” and this, in an equivalent manner, can be very troublesome to deal with.

As an antidote, Usher (1981) harps that for any democratic political system to make it, the citizens must come to terms with the best suited agreement that sets out the consensus for resource allocation. This interest aggregation and sharing is an attempt to come to terms with the “general will” upon which certain substantive issues pertaining to governance can be hinged. For the fact that the Nigerian state was not privileged a consolidated initial consensus on the modalities upon which the state enterprise and its resources can be reordered, the democratic space has often thrown up agitations of all kinds with some so dislocating to the democratization project as a whole. In short, in the years following the inauguration of the Obasanjo’s administration in Nigeria, the country has passed through more than fifty (50) ethno religious conflicts which has claimed more than twenty-five (25,000) thousand lives and properties worth several billions of naira damaged (Irene-omo-Bara, 2007). The more deadly of these strives since the year 2000 has been recorded in Kaduna, Jos, Tiv-Jukun, Lagos and Kano. Apart from ethno nationalism, democratization in Nigeria is equally under the threat of economic agitations for resource control. For instance, in the Niger Delta region, ethnic militants in agitation for claimed disproportional representation in resource exploitation and allocation to the region has taken to arms to threaten Nigeria’s economic interest (**oil**) in the region through open confrontation and wanton destruction of oil pipe lines and extermination of lives as well as kidnapping of oil expatriate works. This singular action has provoked in no small measure the state of insecurity in the Niger Delta region thereby significantly causing grievous shortfalls in oil production per day (**ppd**) to the tune of several million barrels. Government’s posture in this regard has alternated between the use of force and negotiation both of which have not produced the desired results thereby further diminishing the confidence of the people on government in particular and the entire process of democratization in general.

Political Economy of Ethnic Militia Insurgency and Politically Motivated Killings in Nigeria

There is no doubt that the upsurge in insecurity of lives and property in most parts of the country has thrown up some kind of security challenges to the Nigerian state and her leadership. Rather than settle for good governance and infrastructural development, she is at the moment confronted with the duo challenges of fighting for the corporate existence of the country and that of shifting her budgetary priority to national security at the expense of other critical sectors and sub-sectors of her national life. For instance, in the year 2012 alone, her national budget on national security allocation topped all the other sectoral allocations with an ear mark of nine hundred and twenty one billion, ninety-one million (N921,91b) naira as against the paltry sum of four hundred billion, fifteen million naira (N400.15b) and eighteen billion thirty one million (N18.31b) naira for education and communication technology respectively. What is clear is that the state of insecurity as is today in Nigeria has in both ways affected the country's human and commercial enterprises particularly in the Northern states as many are now weary of where they can live in, do business or work. Even international investors are no longer eager to take up any business trip to certain designated spots in Nigeria owing to security / intelligence reports on how unsafe such areas have become. As so many countries including the United States of America have continued to issue travel warnings to her citizens on state of insecurity in Nigeria, the perception has become even over amplified that nothing works well again. This state of affairs have continued to heighten the state of insecurity and other related fears about Nigeria thereby deterring would be potential investors from investing in most sectors of the country's economy. Since the year 2012, Nigeria has been paying forty (N40m) million naira annually to Niger Delta ex-militants to help protect oil installations in the Niger Delta (Osundefender, 2012) but despite the above huge financial commitment on the side of the Nigerian federal government in order to ensure uninterrupted oil and oil related activities in the Niger Delta, the worst has continued to happen. Owing to oil pipe line vandalization and other related militant activities, estimated daily crude oil production has continued to drop as a result of insecurity and youth's restiveness in the Niger Delta area of the country. A fluctuation in the barrels per day (bpd) production of crude oil which is the main stay of the Nigerian economy has continued to widen her budgetary deficits with national economic planning in terms of financial inflow almost a near impossibility. In the year 2012 alone, her crude oil and condensates production decreased to 2.09 million barrels per day (bpd) from 2.14 million barrels per day (bpd) in her first quarter of fiscal projections which accounted for a loss of 2.4 million barrels per day (Ogoni news, 2012). The reasons adduced for the above slide in oil production was nothing other than increased vandalization of oil pipe lines in the Niger Delta region. In concrete financial terms, Nigeria's minister for finance Dr. Ngozi Okonjo Iwuala has just disclosed that the federal government of Nigeria loses one billion dollars (\$1b) which is an equivalent of one hundred and fifty-five billion naira (N155b) per month due to oil theft and vandalization (Soundcity.TV,2013). Within the few months into the year 2013, it has been estimated that Nigeria has lost N1.01 trillion to oil theft and vandalization while crude oil production has dropped by 0.05mbd or 2.5 percent (Vanguard, 2013). Within the context of politically motivated killings, there is no doubt that the democratization project in Nigeria has thrown-up series of unraveled premeditated killings of country's states men and women who are the best in terms of the country's human capital. The aftermath of the annulment of the June 12, 1993, democratic elections in Nigeria paved the way for an early signs of politically motivated killings in the country which was to become very rampant thereafter. For instance, in the year 1994, Pa Alfred Rewane, one of the finest elder states man in the country was assassinated. In

the year 1996, Alhaja Kudriat Abiola, wife of the late chief M.K.O Abiola; the acclaimed winner of the annulled June 12, 1993 presidential election was equally assassinated. Other politically motivated killings within the Nigerian democratic journey between 1999 to date that are of political and economic implication to the country included but not limited to the following:

1. Chief Bola Ige – The Attorney General of the federation and Minister for Justice who was assassinated in Ibadan on December 23, 2001.
2. Dr Harry Marshal – River State based politician and the ANPP vice chairman, south-south assassinated in Abuja on March 5, 2003
3. Chief Aminasoaru Dikkibo – Assassinated on a South-south of the country's high way on February 6, 2004
4. Hajia Sadatu Rimi-wife of Abubakar Rimi, a onetime civilian governor of Kano state- assassinated in 2006
5. Mr. Jesse Araku – Gubernatorial aspirant in Lagos state on July 27, 2006
6. Engr Funsho Williams- Gubernatorial aspirant in Lagos state –assassinated on July 27, 2006 in his Ikoyi residence.
7. Dr Daramola-Gubernatorial aspirant for Ekiti state- assassinated on 14 August 2006
8. Bar and Mrs. Barnabas Igwe who were assassinated in Onitsha, south east Nigeria on Sept 1 2003 and a host of others. What can be emphasized here is that the political economy implications of the above chronicled human deaths has remained unquantifiable to the Nigerian state especially as their exit came at a time that each of them was trying to contribute his or her own quota to the growth of democracy in Nigeria (Ezeh, 2009). The above premeditated killings brought into the political scene in particular and the country's democratization project in general the feeling that the freedom as provided by democracy can no longer amount to security of lives and property. Ethnic, tribal and religious disaffections were exacerbated at the expense of national unity and cohesion.

Democratization, National Insecurity and Human Capital Implications of the Activities of Boko Haram

Perhaps, a better option to setting the tone for discussing the overall import of human capital implications of national insecurity as it is today with the democratization process in Nigeria as a result of the activities of the Boko Haram Islamic fundamentalist group is to take first a holistic look at the role of human capital in productivity of any enterprise or society. Human capital in the parlance of an organization or state is used to designate the knowledge, skills and abilities of people that are engaged to impact on productivity. Bontis et al (1999) projected a more elaborate definition of human capital when they perceived it to denote the combined intelligence, skills and expertise that give the organization or society its distinctive character. Their further elaboration intones that the human elements of any society or organization embraces those that are capable of learning, changing, innovating and providing the creative thrust which when properly motivated, can ensure sustainability on a long term for the enterprise or organization. Considering the fact that every society or organization is a network of relationships, and man himself a gregarious being, human capital is often in close interrelationship with the social capital which Putman (1996) refers to as the features of social life- networks, norms and trust- that enable individuals to act together in pursuant of common objectives. In the words of the World Bank (2012), social capital refers to institutions, relationships and norms that shape both the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions.

In this case, the term social capital provides the glue with which the society can be held together. From the above social linkage to human capital, it can be gathered that all the intense heat that exudes from the ceaseless attacks on the Nigerian population by the members of Boko Haram constitutes an action that can to a large extent; dislodge the social connecting rod that gird the Nigerian state together. This can be made possible by simply breaking up of the social relationships that hold together the social fabric of the Nigerian state. What is certain is that no organization or state can exist and remain relevant outside its human capital. To be productive and remain attuned to social expectation, the state or organization must generate its relevance through adequate care for its human capital. The human capital can function optimally only in a guaranteed environment of assured security which is why it is necessary that the work environment has to be freed from undue tensions and life threatening circumstances that are capable of negating the psychological composure to focus on productivity. This is where the Nigerian democratic environment of the fourth republic has become a matter of concern as life and property are becoming increasingly unsafe with the passage of each day particularly in the northern part of the country. With the spate of palpable fears that now pervade both work and residential environments in most Nigerian states, it is obvious that productivity is under threat and the Nigerian state and her helpless citizens' remains unarguably the greatest casualties.

Boko Haram: Etymological Roots and Political Economy Implications of its Activities

Various accounts exist to explain the background to the emergence of the Islamic fundamentalist group "Boko Haram". This is why Onuoha (2012) discloses that a huge controversy surrounds the exact date of the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Notwithstanding the unsettled consensus about its origin, Boko Haram whose official name is the group of "AlSunna" for preaching and jihad, which is the English translation of "Jama' atu Ahlis Sunna lidda await; waljihad" meaning "western education is sin" can be said to have originated in 1995 in northern Nigeria under the name of "Ahlusunna Wal'jama' ah hijira" (Olugbodo, 2009, Odoh and Chigozie, 2012). On the other hand, another account of the encounter with the group had it that they operated in the year 1995 under the name 'shabaah' Muslim youth organization with the Idimi mosque which is located along Dambea road, Maidguguri providing the base under the leadership of one Mallam Lawal and Mallan usman as its secretary. As could be seen, the term 'Boko Haram' takes its root from the Hausa word; "Boko" which when translated means "western education" and its Arabic attachment, "Haram", which when translated stands for 'sin'. Therefore, the name commonly translated in Hausa means, Western education is sin. However, the group seems to be rejecting this very common translation. As projected in the vanguard newspaper (2009), one of its leaders, Mallam Sanni Umara has argued that Boko Haram does not in any way mean, "Western education is a sin". According to him, this is just one of the unfriendly ways to misrepresent the group by the "infidel" media. To him, Boko Haram really means; Western civilization is forbidden. Furthering his interpretation, he harps that the difference lies in the fact that while the first gives the impression that the group is opposed to formal education coming from the west, which is not true, the second affirms the group's belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education) for culture is broader which encompasses education but not determined by western education.

Irrespective of the etymology of the Boko Haram sect, what is certain and an area of concern is that the group's activities have been of socio-political and economic implications to the Nigerian state. The human capital loses associated with its activities has become of grave consequence to commerce and other human enterprises with each passing day recording more than a multiplicity

of devastating encounters. The political economy implications of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria apart from the already heightened insecurity conditions of the Nigerian state can be located in the wanton damages across Nigeria particularly in the Northern states and the federal capital territory. Whereas some of the damages incurred runs into several billions of naira, most are irreparable as they have to do with the losses associated with human lives.

Perhaps, the table below can give a clearer insight into some of the devastating effects of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria today.

Table displaying the devastating effects of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria since 2009

Date	Incidence / target	Casualties / Damages
2009-07-26	First clash with security agencies after an all-night attack on Dutsen-Tanshi Police Station	39 members of the sect and 2 policemen killed
2009-07-27	First attack in Yobe state during an invasion of Potiskum Divisional headquarters	Three policemen, one fire service officer died
2010-03-13	Another sect operation in northern part of Jos, Plateau state	300 people killed
2010-09-8	Bauchi central prison set ablaze	Sect members who were in prison released
2010-10-01	Explosions near the Eagles square, Abuja	12 dead, many others injured
2010-12-24	A bomb explodes in BarkinLadi, a town in outskirts of Jos	Heightened social fear
	Three bombs explodes in the city of Jos	3 killed
2010-12-21	Explosion at Mogadishu Mammy market, Abuja	Claim 10 lives
2011-01-21	Attached Governorship candidate in Borno state chapter of ANPP, Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio	Killed Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio and six others
2011-03-02	Attacked two policemen attached to the residence of a Divisional police officer (DPO) at Rigasa area of Kaduna	Killed Mustapha Sandamu attached to DPO
2011-03-30	Bomb explosion in Damaturu	A policeman injured
	Bombed Dutsen Tanshi Police Station	Injured two policemen
2011-04-9	An explosion hit a polling booth at Unguwar Doki, Maiduguri, Borno state	Injured more than ten people
2011-04-08	Bomb explosion at INEC office in Suleja	Kills 11
2011-	Army barrack in Bauchi bombed	Casualties not disclosed

04-29		
	A blast in Kaduna	Two suspected bomb makers killed
2011-05-30	Three bomb blasts rip off through Tudu palace hotel and Kano motor park in Maiduguri, Borno state	Destroyed building and property worth several million,13 dead and 40 injured
2011-05-29	Explosion at mammy market in shandawanka barracks in bauchi	Several unverifiable lives lost
2011-06-07	Series of bomb blasts in Maiduguri	5 dead, several others wounded
2011-06-16	Bomb blast at Damboa town in Maiduguri, Borno state	4 children killed
2011-06016	Nigerian police headquarters Abuja bombed by suspected boko haram	3 killed and several vehicles damaged
2011-06-20	Boko Haram attacks kankara police station in katsina state	7 policemen killed, 2 security officers equally killed
2011-07-15	Planted bomb at Lagos street, Maiduguri	Blast injured 2 soldiers, 3 policemen; a policeman was shot dead same day in the city
2011-07-09	A clash between Boko haram and the military in Maiduguri	35 people dead and much other casualty.
2011-07-12	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle	Claimed 5 lives
2011-07-15	Explosion in Maiduguri	Injured 5 people
2011-07-23	An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbi Elkanem	Injured 3 soldiers
2011-07-25	An explosion near the palace of a traditional ruler in Maiduguri	8 people killed
2011-08-25	A bank robbery in Maiduguri by sect members	4 policemen, 1 soldier killed and several civilian casualties, huge sums of money carted away
2011-08-26	Boko Haram suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja	23 killed and 60 injured with several vehicles burnt
2011-08-12	Attack on a police station in Misau Baudi state	7 people including 4 policemen killed
2011-09-13	Sect members shot in an attack in Maiduguri following arrest of 15	= = 4 soldiers injured

	members in Boko Haram hideout in Bauchi	
2011-10-03	Boko Haram attack Baga market in Maiduguri	3 people killed
2011-11-04	Boko Haram attack in Damaturu, Yobe state	About 150 people killed
2011-11-27	Attack in Geidam, Yobe state	7 people killed
2011-12-24	Bombing in Plateau state	About 80 people killed
2011-12-25	Christmas day bombing in Madalla, Niger state	About 50 people killed
2011-12-30	Bomb attack in Borno state	7 people killed
2012-01-05	Attacked a church in Gombe state	6 people killed
2012-01-06	Attack in the Christ Apostolic Church, Yola, Adamawa state	17 people killed and 20 Igbos killed in a separate incident in Mubi same day
2012-01-20	Multiple attacks in Kano	250 killed
2012-01-22	Two churches destroyed in Bauchi state; the hq of Tafawa Balewa local govt area in the state	2 military personnel, a DPO and 8 civilians killed
2012-01-26	Explosion at Sabon-Gari area of Kano state	Many injured and many luxurious buses damaged
2012-02-26	Headquarters of Church of Nigeria in Jos attacked	3 female worshippers killed, 50 others wounded including the state commissioner for information
2012-02-28	Boko Haram bombs primary school in Gomari Costain, Kulagumna and abbagannaram	Over 5,000 primary school pupils and their teachers forced to remain at home
2012-05-31	Christian worshippers at the old campus of Bayero University Kano attacked	20 persons killed including 2 professors
2012-05-31	Encounter with the JTF in Danbare suburb along Gwarzo Highway to free a kidnapped German expatriate	Kidnapped German and 6 others killed
2012-06-03	Church bombed at Bauchi	15 worshippers killed and several others injured

Sources: Foreign and Commonwealth Office; 2012, Vanguard Newspaper, July 8, August 27, and July 11, 2011, Punch, Sept 12, 2011, The Nation, Oct 11, 2011 and Aljazeera news 8/05/2013.

The statistics of events as chronicled in the above table are just some of the few misgivings that have befallen the Nigerian state since the inception of the activities of the Boko Haram sect. One of the most touching attacks by Boko Haram was in the early months of 2013(March) when a bomb was detonated by the sect at a motor park in Sabon Geri area of Kano state with un-estimated number of lives lost.

Today, the widened operations of the sect has compelled the Nigerian democratic leadership to opt for amnesty for the group who, up to the moment are not too keen at negotiated settlement of their claimed grievances. The group has in recent times through some un-clarified spokespersons made the claim that they are bent at Islamizing some of the core northern states of Nigeria against the secularity of the state as enshrined in her constitution. As the members of the group are not forthcoming for the proposed amnesty package which is assumed to be against the possible fears of being unmasked and the identity of its sponsors disclosed, the federal government acting on a wider consultation declared in the month of May 2013 a state of emergency in three (3) states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa believed to be the strongholds of the sect. As to how this can go in restoring normalcy and dismantling the activities of the sect in the country is now left for time to tell. What has however remained speculative has been the possibility of the sect's linkage with other global terrorist organizations such as the Al Qaeda that may possibly wish to lend military and financial support to the Boko-Haram sect as they battle the Nigerian military in a war of supremacy to make the declared state of emergency work. What should equally be of concern is the political economy of the declared state of emergency since the execution of such would be of gigantic cost in terms of the country's man and material resources. Not only that such unfortunate commitments would amount to shortchanging the resources which the state ought to have channeled into the provision of democracy dividends for her citizens but also that the anticipated human casualties are irreparable and have vitiating effects on the production capacity of the Nigerians that live and work in the affected areas.

Conclusion / Recommendations

There is no doubt that for sometimes now, the Nigerian state has been under the grip of disintegrating factors ranging from resource control agitations, man kidnapping, religious and ethno based violence of various magnitudes and now the devastating effects of the Boko Haram on slaughts. The democratic appetite which the citizens have longed for has now become sour as insecurity occasioned by incessant loss of lives and property has remand very high. What is clear is that most of the skirmishes as projected against the Nigerian state today constitute parts and parcel of the democratic opportunities for freedom of expression but above all, the demand for a better bargain in the sharing of the wealth of the nation-state. The instigative tendencies of the petit bourgeoisies cannot be finely isolated as most of them who lost out in the recent democratic contest have continued to threaten the peaceful co-existence of the Nigerian state. In order to carry through their threats, there is every indication of an unholy alliance with thugs and other riffraff to scuttle the democratic ambitions of the state thereby taking the law into their hands against the time tested legal means. It is against the above background that it is here being recommended that the government position should always be in the proactive rather than waiting

for moments of full blown disaster only to declare a state of emergency with much resource of the citizens being mortgaged. Secondly, it may not be in the best interest for the Nigerian state to drag itself into negotiations with faceless individuals on grounds of religion since such may be premeditative to jolting the constitutional secularity of the Nigerian state. Finally, as national security is a constitutional matter and critical to state survival, all those that are found culpable must be summarily dealt with in line with constitutional provisions no matter whose ox is goad.

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Internal conflicts and development challenges in Nigeria's fourth republic

By

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine internal conflicts and development challenges in Nigeria's fourth republic. The advent of democracy in 1999 ushered in democratic governance in Nigeria after a long period of military rule. Democracy is thought to promote peace, rule of law, equality and justice, but Nigeria since 1999 has suffered various forms of internal conflicts and security threats ranging from communal conflicts, ethno-religious conflicts, resource control and indiginship conflicts to terrorism by religious extremist. All these conflicts have threatened the corporate existence of the country and the development of some parts of the country. The conflict is it ethnic or religious has become a daily occurrence with threats to life and properties as well as human security. The paper relied on data from secondary sources such as journals, books, reports from national sources and international organizations and it is basically descriptive. It is found that the democracy in the fourth republic has bread conflicts and little peace for development. It is also found that the democratic process in Nigeria breads corruption, intrigues and discord among its citizens. It is recommended that government should dialogue with all aggrieve zones. Justice and fairness is important for meaningful development and to address fiscal federalism.

Key Words: Internal Conflict, Development, Challenges, international organizations

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Introduction

Nigeria is a plural society with multiplicity of ethnic groups of over 370 and religions namely Christianity, Islam and traditional religion. The plural nature of the county creates primordial attachments that offer opportunities for social cohesion at the communal level, but creates social conflicts at the national, state and local level, as the arena for socio-political and economic competition and development. However, the pluralistic structure also includes religious diversity which also creates social conflicts and political instability. The colonial administration policy of indirect rule exacerbate cultural differences favoured the traditional rulers who saw themselves as custodians of these diverse cultural values and heritage and worked hard to protect same (Lawmaker, 2012). The advent of independence saw political leaders that emerged as communal champions rather than nationalist. The national arena became the centre of regional, ethnic, communal and religious interactions more often resulting in conflict which often becomes a challenge to development. This paper examines internal conflicts and development challenges in Nigeria's fourth republic.

Conflict can be seen as a pursuit of incompatible goals marked by varied degrees of disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interest or concerns. Conflict can be categorized as non-violent and violent. The non-violent conflicts is expressed without the use of force and is seen by many as a natural element in human society and an essential driving force for social change (Ubona, 2012).

Violent conflict on the other hand, is expressed with the use of arms by the parties involve. The internal conflicts in Nigeria are characterized by use of arms, bombings and other dangerous weapons which normally takes the violent form. In Nigeria too, the violent conflict is predicated mostly on the struggle for economic and political advantages, inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic, inter-state as well as religions conflicts.

Conflicts have increasingly been on the rise across the much of Nigeria since the creation of the present democratic governance. Conflict process include relative deprivation and the strengthening of bonds along ethnic, linguistic, national or regional fault lines prevalent in almost all societies. Poverty is a pathway leading to conflict in the sense that hunger, malnutrition, disease, are vulnerable to internal conflicts. Internal conflicts take the shape of ethnic/communal, political, indigene-settler, resource control and violent religious conflicts. These conflicts with its ever more destabilizing impact in Nigeria's fourth republic have become a matter of security threats and existence of the Nigerian polity. Since the handing over of reigns of governance to civilians by the military in May, 29, 1999, Nigeria remained a deeply unsettled land, inhabited by mutually antagonistic ethnic religious rivalry. The politics in the fourth republic has not changed from what it was in the democratic before it. The deep sense of disunity has characterized the Nigerian democratic governance.

Before the imposition of colonial rule, cleavage conflict tended to occur more within, rather than between geographical zones occupied by ethno-regional constituencies now considered to be culturally united and homogeneous entities. With colonial rule, however, the various regions or zones were brought together in 1914 by Lord Lugard, as a means of creating a governable state.

Thus, an ethnic identity was regularized and manipulated to invent or at least rigidify tribal boundaries and divisions, with colonial historiography selectively emphasizing inter-tribal conflicts (Agbaje, Adigun, 2007 citing Ekeh, 1978). The invention of a tradition of inter-ethnic schism and ethno-regional cleavages as the dominant modes of group mobilization for political and social action during and after colonial rule extending to the fourth republic. These group mobilization and communal identities have generated internal conflicts in Nigeria. To compound the problem of sectional chauvinism was the fact both elite and non-elite falls back on sectional and tribal cleavages as well as religious symbols of their search for advantage, as well as regional imbalances in the Nigerian federation (Agbaje, 2007).

The relationship between Democracy and development has elicited debates and discussions among nationalists, researchers and policy makers. This debate is heightened due to the understanding that democracy and development are essential for prosperous and equitable societies. Development is a multidimensional concept which can be viewed from political, economic, and social dimensions. Agaba (2010) pointed that Todaro (1985) conceptualizes development as a multidimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality and the eradication of absolute poverty. Todaro (1989) Agaba argues added three core values of development which includes the ability to provide as many people as possible with their basic needs or the ability to acquire adequate food, shelter, health care and protection.

Democratic government is predicated on political norms that emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful means. Durable political stability is critical for development and this can only result from a political system which enjoys the legitimacy and support of its people. Larry (1995) argued that democratic norms allow for an atmosphere of 'live and let live' that results in a fundamental sense of stability at the personal, communal and national level. These norms are greatly sustained by strong institutions which provide the structural foundations in democracies. However, in Nigeria's fourth republic (1999-date), the democratic competition encourages conflicts that are political, religious, ethnic or communal and economic. Rather than applying democratic norms and institutional constrains in their interaction in order to prevent conflicts, the democratic governance in Nigeria creates conflicts by way of electoral fraud, threats, and display or us well as use of force as well as corruption to suppress the opposition and individuals.

Theoretical Framework

This paper subscribed to conflict theory to explain the study. Conflict theory emphasizes the role of conflict in society. The early writers on conflict theory were Dahrendorf, David Lockwood, John Rex, and Lewis Coser in the 1950s and 1960s. Karl Marx (1818-83) popularized the theory. Conflict perspectives recognizes in one form of another, the notion that there are groups in the society that have different interests. In this respect, they believed that social arrangements will tend to benefit some groups at the expense of others. Thus, the existence of different interests is the potential for, and likelihood of conflicts, which is always present. Different groups pursuing their interests are likely to clash and produce some degree of instability in society (Haralambos and Holborn, 2008). They also argued that the existence of groups with different interests does not mean that the groups will be in conflict at all times. There are periods of truce and the period of harmony does not last forever, and eventually conflict will return. Conflict theory from Weber

and Marx perspective arose in relation to the emphasis on consensus in the then dominant factionalists approach. From their perspective, they argued that society was characterized by a number of fundamental conflicts and not by consensus. Marx (1818-83) argued that the history of human society is a process of tension and conflict. Social change is not a smooth, orderly progression which gradually unfolds in harmonious evolution. Instead, it proceeds from contradictions built into society, which are a source of tension and ultimately the source of open conflicts and radical change. The contradictions in Nigerian society include high poverty rate despite the huge oil and gas revenues without meaningful development policies to reduce poverty among the people. In addition, corruption has taken over all facets of the lives of the society. Government officials are seen as the most culpable and embezzling monies meant for development purposes and even pensions of retired workers. Nigeria is multi ethnic and multi religious as well as divided into regions with different interests and development (socially, politically and economically). The Nigerian society led by political elites believes in ethnic nationalism and religious interest when it comes to politics and development. These contradictions in Nigerian society all leads to conflicts among ethnic groups and religions.

Coser (1956) in “functions of social conflict” argued that though conflict can be destructive of social order, it can in some circumstances serve to preserve order. He further argued that conflict takes place within a matrix of wider disagreement and may function as a safety-valve or a source of creative tension that may actually strengthen a social organization. This means that conflict in some respect can be functional and can lead to development of a society. However, Mark etal (1997) pointed out that Alexander (1987; 1995) argued that the problem with the conflict theory is that if it is taken, it is unable to explain the degree of stability in society other than by recourse to some notion of power and domination.

Sources of data

The paper relied on data from secondary sources such as journals, books, reports from national sources, conference paper, government reports and international organizations. It is basically descriptive.

Overview of Internal Conflict in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic

Nigeria is a plural society with over 370 ethnic groups and all these groups poses a challenge for national integration, a sense of belonging and participation in decision making. The lack of these sense of belonging and participation in decision making, and the lack of equity and justice have resulted in conflicts in Nigeria. Particularly, since the beginning of the fourth republic in May, 1999, civil disturbance, contestations and their attendant violence have been unrelenting in all parts of the country. A major factor for contributing to internal conflicts in the country is the economic crises resulting in the people suffering from economic deprivation and poverty. Thus, they seek solace in group membership and collective action.

According to Alubo (2008) Nigeria media have fed the readership with headlines on civil conflicts such as Sharia tears North Apart, (Tell March6, 2000) sharia riots in Aba claim 50’ (Vanguard March 1, 2000); Bloodbath in Kano and Taraba (Newswatch, October 29, 2001); “Benue Massacre” (Tell, November 5, 2001); FCE Zaria: How campus politics turned bloody (weekly Trust October 4 – 10, 2002); 13 killed in fresh Jos violence (This day, January 2, 2002); Miss World Riots: shame of nation (Newswatch, December); Death Toll in Adamawa Class rises

to 110 (Vanguard, March 6, 2003); Warri: 7 Die in fresh violence (This day, January 26, 2004); Five die in fresh Plateau violence (The Guardian, May 19, 2004); Military men kill 52, Burn 300 in Benue, Delta (The Guardian May 19, 2004).

All these conflicts were religious, political or ethnic in nature. In all human lives were lost and properties destroyed, and thousands are displaced while fleeing for their safety. There are also sights of charred and disolate buildings as the conflicts have become both recurrent and frequent (Alubo, 2008). It is also pointed out by Alubo (2008) that over 80 major conflicts have been recorded in various parts of the country in the 55 months of civilian rule by December 2004. This represents a much higher frequency than at any 55 month period, and more than triple in the 96 months of the military regime of General Babangida. Furthermore, Alubo (2008) cited Imobighe (2003) as arguing that “ethnic and inter-communal conflicts have become so pervasive that there is hardly any part of the country that has not been affected. Moreso, hardly does any month pass without some form of conflict since the inception of the fourth republic in Nigeria.

Based on the experiences since May, 1999, it is now understood that Nigeria’s fourth republic is grappling with wave of ethnic, religious, political and economic violent conflicts with its attendant bloodshed. Ugoh and Sotunde (2001) estimated that well over 2000 people have died since military rule ended in 1999. Alubo (2008) cited the Economist for example, stating that: more than 6000 people have been killed in civil unrests since 1999. The Muslim – Christian divide has usually defined the combatants, more than 2,000 people in clashes in Kaduna in February, 2000 and hundreds more in Aba the following month. In June, 2001 hundreds died in similar clashes in Bauchi state, and more than 500 died in Jos, a city in the centre of Nigeria (the Economist, October 20, 2001).

These various conflicts are related to claims and contestations over identity as a basis of determining who is included or excluded from decision making or opportunities. The introduction of Shari’ah (Islamic Law) has also propelled religious conflicts in most states in Northern Nigeria. Beginning with Zamfara in September 1999, over ten Northern states have formally introduced Islamic law. This resulted in rising tension in these states and violence conflicts between Muslims and Christians has emptied and contributed to frequent internal conflicts in some states such as Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba. The persistence of the conflicts has taking a new dimension of terrorism and bombings by Islamic sects “Jama’atul Ahlissunnah Idda’awati wal jihad popularly known as Boko Haram literally meaning western education is a sin.” The sect since the killing of its leader by security forces in 2009 in their strong hold Maiduguri, Borno state, the country have not known peace from their persistent attacks of religious places of worship, government properties, international organizations, media house, banks, individuals, the police and their stations and the military as well as other security personnel. Their main activities has been concentrated in the north east geopolitical zone of the country, even though they have led attacks in Abuja (FCT), Kaduna, Zaria, Kano in the north west zone. The persistent attacks and bombing resulted in the loss of lives of thousands of Nigeria and properties till date. Moreso, their activities have crippled economic and social development efforts in the northern part of the country and threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria

The intermittent conflicts in Nigeria also involve violent conflict between agriculturalists and pastoralists over grazing land, political appointments and representation, resource control or rebellion in the oil producing Niger Delta region and settler-indigeneship conflicts, disputes over chieftaincy, marginalization and boundary disputes. In Nigeria all ethnic groups have a geographical space which they regard as the homeland. Thus, there are the indigene (native) or son/daughter of the soil) and the settlers are those who come to live in the area from elsewhere or outside the ethnic homeland. Ethnic group members may share diverse religions such as Christianity, Islam and traditional religion (Nnoli, 2003, Osaghae, 1995 cited by Alubo (2009). Due to this share of religions particularly Christianity and Islam, whenever there is conflict between groups of the different religions, it takes violent religious conflicts. Similarly, conflicts revolve round politics of identity. The identity refers to 'who am I?' and the group identity which defines and separate 'we' from 'them' in intergroups/ethnic relationships. In effect identity is about the politics of identifying with ethnic, religious, area or zone, gender and class. It is common place for people who share ethnic and religious identities in one circumstance to be excluded in decision making. Where this happens, other definitions such as 'settlers', 'strangers' or non-indigenes come to the fore (Alubo, 2008).

Since 1999, there are groupings of various ethnic groups under issues of identity, participation and citizenship. Many sections of the country have regrouped under regional and ethnic umbrella for political participation and mobilization. Prominent among these groups are the Pan Yoruba group, the Afenifere, campaigning for the Yoruba nation interest in the south west, the Arewa consultative forum doing the same for the old North, the Ohaneze for Igbos in the South East. Similar associations such as Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), the Ijaw Congress in the South-South, criteria for southern minorities. The recognition and attachments to these ethnic or regional enclaves has constituted a challenge to the government. Alubo (2003) quoted Gen. Babangida as saying:

Ethnicity is currently a huge social movement and human investment across the country. It is not only nurtured around structure and ideology of ethnic nationalities, it is also increasingly becoming a preferred mode of loyalty by Nigerians as opposed to loyalty to the Nigerian state. It is therefore an important subset of the national question in Nigeria (Babangida, 2002).

From these major regional and ethnic association there developed cracks. In 2004, there were secessionist movements such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) in the Southeast; the Taliban group in the Northeast agitating for a reconstruction of Nigeria as an Islamic state, and most recently the 'Boko Haram' agitating for the same thing; and the Niger Delta volunteer force demanding for the control of oil wealth. These are groups that are threatening the Nigerian corporate existence. All these groups are coming up as a result of lack of true federalism or commonly referred to as the national question which encompasses issues that has to deal with citizenship, identity and sense of belonging, self determination, justice, equity and true federalism.

Nigeria is so engulf in internal conflicts in that at 50 years of attaining independence, analyst and commentators has a field day x-raying Nigeria's developmental problems from socio-economic and political perspectives, arriving at a general consensus that we have done poorly, considering the country's rich, vast and varied endowments in both natural and human resources (Zubairu, 2012). He added that the causal factors of this unwholesome state of affairs revolved round bad

leadership, poor governance culture, uncritical but docile followership, prolonged military interventions in politics and governance that stagnated our growth and development, rampant, pervasive corruption in the public service and larger society; lack of continuity of sound policies and programmes; lack of a master-plan for development; collapse of moral/ethical values. He further argued that:

Nothing has changed. If anything, the nation is not a drift with palpable threat of succession by not a few federating units and the executive, nor has the legislature publicly denounced these treasonable declarations/actions that threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria (Zubairu, A. 2012).

Challenges of Internal Conflicts to Development in Nigeria

Political stability and security is important for development. Similarly, stability is the key to both development and democracy. However, what is required is stability based on good governance and not stability championed for party or purely personal reasons. The notion that democratization is a peaceful process does not tally with reality in Africa. Political elites in Nigeria believed that democracy is the only form of power in which the appointment of the government is peacefully regulated. At the sometime, it leads to escalation of underlying tensions due to electoral malpractices, competition and struggle for power by leaders including religious fanatics. This leads to clashes and militarization of ethnic-accentuated conflicts over resources, power, and prestige (Tetslaff, 1997).

Bringing down the level of Poverty in Nigeria since the inception of the fourth republic has been challenge. Despite the fact that there is high level of economic growth in Nigeria in recent years- the country having the third fastest rate of growth in the world indeed, the evidence suggests a greater concentration wealth in few hands, at a time of a growing cohort of young people with minimal prospect of employment. Oxford research group in 2012 pointed out that some 40 millions Nigerians of 18-25 years are unemployed thereby resulting in Disempowerment, anger and resentment. The group also noted that the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) in the 2012 poverty survey, 69% of Nigerians are defined as poor, representing 112 million people. The World Bank in May, 2013 gave the estimate of the poor in Nigeria as 70 million and added that poverty is more severe in the rural areas than the urban areas. Nigeria have teeming youth population which means the country's population will be growing rapidly and can be alarming. The current population of 163 million people is expected to rise to 389 million by 2050 and over 700 million by 2100 going by United Nations projections (Oxford Research Group, 2012). This portends a very serious challenge to the economy and social development in the future. With the high level of corruption, expensive democratic system in practice and persistence of Internal conflicts across the country, there is overwhelming denial of the right to quality life to majority of Nigerians. For example, Oxford research group states the National Statistical Bureau (NSB) that: "In 2009/2010, the perception index of households living in poverty had risen to 92.5%. The effect of poverty on health and education in Borno state, where 'Boko Haram' had its origin shows that only 2% of children under 25 months have been vaccinated; 83% of young people are illiterate; 48.5% of children do not go to school" (Oxford Research Group, 2012).

Boko Haram's activities particularly in northern Nigeria have constituted a serious challenge to development of the region and the entire country. Boko Haram activities are accompanied by destruction of lives and insecurity. This does not argue well for investment but results in

unemployment and illiteracy. Oxford research group (2012) for example, noted that government statistics show that the northern states have the highest proportion of uneducated persons.

The persistence of internal conflicts in Nigeria has been a challenge to development and democratic gains. It is essential that governments at the federal and states be able to respond effectively to people's basic needs for food, water, healthcare, education, jobs, and security. But persistently, these needs cannot be met because the conflicts displace people, making them migrants and refugees. These challenges if not addressed in a timely and effective manner, can affect or compromise long-term development. Again, the lack of credible elections and good governance contributes to conflicts and development in Nigeria.

Findings

The finding shows that democracy particularly in the fourth republic has not yielded the desired peace and enabling environment for development in Nigeria. It is also found that Nigerians are convinced that the current democracy can resolve the incessant conflicts in the country and ushered in development. Nigeria lacks good governance which will lead to development in all facets.

Conclusion

It is concluded that what is taking place is democracy of intrigues, discordance corruption which breeds conflicts that are violent and affects the economy. The government is always distracted by one conflict or another instead of development stride. This paper also notes that Nigeria is blessed with both human and natural resources, yet Nigeria refused to develop simply because of lack of effective leadership, corruption, and bad democratic principles. All these vices have contributed to the persistent internal conflicts in Nigeria's fourth republic thereby undermining the development of the country despite its resources. Ethnicity and religious bigotry has played prominent role in Nigeria's polity. The effect is manifest in the mutual suspicion among the various nationalities in the country. Those at the receiving end of the intrigues, suspicion are the Nigerian masses that live in abject poverty, insecure and unjustifiably suffering displacements from their homes, farms and villages as a result of the violent conflicts. On the other hand, the beneficiaries are the leaders, the ruling elites who nourish and nurture conflicts for their political agenda and also as a way of enhancing their participation in the sharing of the national cake.

Recommendations

Dialogue is therefore recommended with various factions and ethnic groups to take in their demands and promote development. Justice and fairness in the polity is also a panacea for moving the country forward and to achieve the much needed development in Nigeria. More so, Nigeria needs a more coquet in development strategy using its indigenous technology and economic resources.

It is recommended that the country require selfless leaders that can bring the situation under control, peace is needed for any meaningful development to take place. Dialogue is therefore recommended with various factions and ethnic groups to take in their demands and promote

development. Justice and fairness in the polity is also a panacea for moving the country forward and to achieve the much needed development in Nigeria. Moreso, Nigeria needs a concrete development plan using its indigenous technology and economic resources.

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Nigerian newspapers' coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency: peace or war journalism?

By

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Abstract

This is the report of a study which analysed how Nigerian newspapers in their coverage framed the Boko Haram insurgency: whether as peace or war journalism. The study, a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of four newspapers (*Daily Trust, Leadership, The Guardian and ThisDay*) in the year 2012, found that the newspapers covered the insurgency extensively. Frames suggesting war journalism dominated the coverage. Conclusion based on the findings was that Nigerian newspapers operate along the path of war journalism in their coverage of violent conflicts and activities. This underscores the need for peace journalism. The study recommends the training and re-training of journalists in the practice of peace journalism as well as the strengthening of ethical and professional journalism practice.

Key words: Boko Haram, Coverage, Journalism, Newspapers, Peace, War

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Introduction

The sect, *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad* (people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teaching and Jihad) popularly referred to as Boko Haram has unleashed violence and terrorism in Northern Nigeria in a magnitude and direction never imagined. The exact date of the emergence of the sect is an issue of debate. While Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme (2012), Onuoha (2012a), Onuoha (2012b), Eme and Ibietan (2012), and Popoola (2002) trace the origin of Boko Haram to the period between 2000 and 2002, Loimeier (2012) and Ahokegh (2012) maintain that Boko Haram originated in the 1980s when elements of state fragility began to manifest in Nigeria. What matters most is not the date of origin, but the factors that gave rise to the insurgence. These factors include political, economic, social, and religious dynamics in the Nigerian society.

Political factor, as a cause of the Boko Haram insurgence, finds explanation in bad governance and corruption, which has rendered many Nigerians extremely poor. Ahokegh (2012) writes in this regard that the mal-administration of both the military and civilian governments in Nigeria contributed to build up disaffection and frustration in the people, which they express in violent demonstrations. Another political angle to the emergence of Boko Haram is the poor implementation of power sharing between Northern and Southern Nigeria in the fourth republic. With the emergence of the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, of Southern Nigeria extraction, some schools of thought are of the view that the North has been short-changed. Beginning from 1999 when the fourth republic commenced, a Southerner (Chief Olusegun Obasanjo) ruled up to 2007. Late President Umaru Musa Yar'adua, a Northerner took over the rule of the country for another eight years just as Obasanjo did. But Yar'adua died in 2010, ruling for only three years. Yar'adua's vice, Goodluck Jonathan, a Southerner, took over as required by the constitution. The expectation of many Northerners was for President Jonathan to hand over power to a Northerner to complete the complete Yar'adua's eight years before another power shift to the South. President Jonathan did not respect this arrangement, which is a policy of the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) (Ahokegh, 2012). President Jonathan decided to contest in the 2011 Presidential election and was elected. Many Northerners were aggrieved. In some states in Northern Nigeria, violent protests erupted immediately President Jonathan was announced winner of the 2011 presidential election (Akhaine, 2011). This political factor contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram.

The immediate cause of the Boko Haram insurgence however is traced to religious factors. In 1995, Abubakar Lawan operated an Islamic religious sect by the name *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* at the University of Maiduguri in Borno State. This Muslim Youth Organization was non-violent until 2002 when Lawan left for further studies in Saudi Arabia and Mohammed Yusuf took over leadership of the sect (Onuoha, 2012b). Under Yusuf, the sect began to propagate on Islamic teaching that criticized the system of western education in Nigeria. The group also frowned at the weak administrative institutions in Nigeria, especially the Police force. It also rejected the Sultan of Sokoto as the supreme leader of Muslims in Nigeria, but said the Sultan is the leader of Muslims in Sokoto State only and not elsewhere (Loimeier, 2012). This group, under Yusuf, also commenced violent attacks in North-east Nigeria. As a result of its mode of operation, philosophy and teaching, it earned the following nicknames: Muhajirun, Yusufiyah, Nigerian Taliban, and Boki Haram, which is the most popular of all the names and a media

creation (Onuoha, 2012b). The official name of the sect, however, is *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati wal Jihad*.

Major violent activities of Boko Haram took place around June and July 2009. These activities were brutally responded to by Nigerian security forces that killed about 900 members of the sect including their leader Muhammed Yusuf (Ahokegh, 2012; Loimeier, 2012). The group was saddened by the killing of their leader and reacted with further and more violent attacks on the security forces (who carried out the killing of Muhammed), government authorities (who ordered the killing), and places of worship especially churches, mass media establishments, educational institutions, and private homes of their perceived enemies.

A compilation of Boko Haram attacks by Okpaga, Chijioke and Eme and Ibietan (2012), shows that between July 27, 2009 and February 17, 2012, the sect carried out a total of 53 violent attacks, killing over 1,500 persons and destroying property worth millions of dollars. Destruction of life and property as a result of Boko Haram activities is drastically affecting the economic fortunes of Nigeria; it is discouraging foreign investment, and causing mass exodus of productively active people from Northern Nigeria, the major area of Boko Haram targets. Eme and Ibietan (2012, pp. 21-22) observe rightly that:

The empirical evidence, most analysts said, means that the human capital/entrepreneurship drain is crippling the Northern economy and there are concerns that it is being transmitted to the Nigerian macro-economic environment. This is because apart from attacks on churches, the sect have (sic) also attacked commercial hot-spots like markets, parks, government agencies and even banks in one of which they harvested N41 million, as recently revealed by the sect's top shot, Abu Qaqa, currently in detention.

Apart from the human and material losses, the Boko Haram insurgency has created serious security challenge which is threatening the unity of the country. Boko Haram attacks on the Southern people of Nigeria residing in Northern Nigeria are already fuelling feelings of disintegration (Okpaga, Chijioke, & Eme & Ibietan, 2012).

So far, all attempts by the government to address the Boko Haram challenge are failing. The government has largely relied on brutal military action, sometimes illegal, on the sect (Walker, 2012, United States Department of State, 2013). This approach, however, is not yielding the expected result; it is rather encouraging the sect in their violence as aptly noted by Walker (2012, p. 12).

Tactics employed by government security agencies against Boko Haram have been consistently brutal and counterproductive. Their reliance on extrajudicial execution as a tactic in "dealing" with any problem in Nigeria not only created Boko Haram as it is known today, but also sustains it and gives it fuel to expand.

Government's declaration of state of emergency in three states (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa), considered the main operational bases of Boko Haram, analysts say, is not enough to effectively manage the insurgency (Mudashir, 2013). In principle, what appears to be the government's best approach in addressing this challenge is the constitution of a committee to work out the possibility of a dialogue with the sect, which may possibly lead to the granting of amnesty to members of the sect, as done with militants in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. But the difficulty in getting the sect members for a round table dialogue is a serious setback to this approach. However, there is the need to urgently address this national challenge facing Nigeria for peace to reign.

Newspapers, as a form of mass media, are an important agent of social change. They play a mediating role which shapes perception of issues (Kur, Orhewere, & Melladu, 2013). In other words, they perform an important function of correlation, which is explained to mean consensus building (McQuail, 2005) for the attainment of peace. This functional role of newspapers is part of what is referred to as peace journalism. Similarly, newspapers have the tendency to discharge dysfunctional roles, which instead of unifying the society, contribute to dismember the society. This dysfunctional role is known as war journalism. Did Nigerian newspapers, in their coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency, exhibit more of peace or war journalism tendencies? Finding answers to this question is the thrust of this study.

Objectives of the Study

1. To ascertain the amount of coverage given to the Boko Haram insurgency by Nigerian newspapers.
2. To identify peace journalism frames in newspaper reports of the insurgency.
3. To identify war journalism frames in newspaper reports of the insurgency.
4. To make a comparison of peace and war journalism frames in the reports.

Peace and War Journalism

The term peace journalism was first used by Johan Galtung, a Professor of Peace Studies in the 1970's. Galtung (2002) explained peace journalism to mean journalists' contribution to the peace process. This contribution is in the form of giving voice to all parties in a conflict, exposing lies, reporting the atrocities and the sufferings of people in a conflict, and discouraging cover-up attempts that would negatively affect the outcome of a conflict (Hanitzsch, 2007). With peace journalism, journalists are part of the solution and not a problem in a conflict situation. McGoldrick and Lynch (2000, p. 24) offer a clear understanding of peace journalism when they noted:

To follow the peace journalism approach, journalists should avoid focusing entirely on what divides the parties involved in certain issues, and on the differences between what they say and want. In order to have a more positive influence on the situation, journalists could ask statements, which may reveal areas of common ground, for example, and lead their reports suggestions of shared or even compatible goals.

The 17 basic rules of peace journalism enunciated by Galtung (2002) have become very popular and useful to journalists covering conflict with the aim of contributing to the peace mechanism. These rules are as follows: (1) A peace journalist should avoid portraying a conflict as consisting of only two parties contesting one goal. (2) A peace journalist should avoid accepting stark distinctions between 'self' and 'other.' (3) A peace journalist should avoid treating a conflict as if it is only going on in the place and at the time that violence is occurring. Instead, a peace journalist would try to trace the links and consequences for people in other places now and in the future. (4) A peace journalist should avoid assessing the merits of a violent action or policy of violence in terms of its visible effects only. (5) A peace journalist should avoid letting parties define themselves by simply quoting their leaders' restatement of familiar demands or positions. (6) A peace Journalist should avoid concentrating always on what divides the parties, the differences between what they say they want. (7) A peace journalist should avoid only reporting the violent acts and describing 'the horrors.' (8) A peace journalist should avoid focusing exclusively on the suffering, fears and grievances of only one party. (9) A peace journalist should avoid blaming someone for "starting it". (10) A peace journalist should avoid

“victimizing language like “destitute”, defenseless”, “pathetic”, “tragedy” which only tell us what has been done to and could be done for a group of people. This dis-empowers them and limits the options for change. (11) A peace journalist should avoid imprecise use of emotive words to describe what has happened to people. (12) A peace journalist should avoid using demonizing adjectives like “vicious”, “cruel,” “extremist”, “terrorist”, “fanatic”, or “fundamentalist”. (14) A peace journalist should avoid focusing exclusively on the human rights abuses, misdemeanors and wrongdoings of only one side. (15) A peace journalist should avoid making an opinion or a claim that seem like an established fact. (16) A peace journalist should avoid greeting the signing of documents by leaders, which bring about military victory or ceasefire, as necessarily creating peace. Instead of doing this, he should try to report on issues which remain and which may still lead people to commit further acts of violence in the future. (17) A peace journalist should avoid waiting for leaders on “our” side to suggest or offer solution. Instead, they should pick up and explore peace initiatives wherever they come from.

War journalism on the other hand is opposed to peace journalism. It is violent, propaganda, elite, and victory orientated (Galtung, 2002). To have a clear understanding of war journalism, it is pertinent to compare it with peace journalism. This comparison has been done by Galtung (1998) and is as follows:

Table 1: Johan Galtung’s Scheme for Peace/War Journalism

PEACE/CONFLICT JOURNALISM	WAR/VIOLENCE JOURNALISM
<p>I. PEACE/CONFLICT-ORIENTATED Explore conflict formation, x parties, y goals, z issues. General “win, win” orientation. Open space, open time; causes and outcomes anywhere, also in history/culture. Making conflicts transparent. Giving voice to all parties; empathy, understanding. See conflict/war as problem, focus on conflict creativity. Humanization of all sides; more so the worse the weapons. Proactive: prevention before any violence/war occurs. Focus on invisible effects of violence. (trauma and glory, damage to structure/culture)</p>	<p>I. WAR/VIOLENCE ORIENTATED Focus on conflict arena, 2 parties, 1 goal (win), war general zero-sum orientation. Closed space, closed time; causes and exits in arena, who threw the first stone. Making wars opaque/secret “Us-them” journalism, propaganda, voice, for “us”. See “them” as the problem, focus on who prevails in war. Dehumanization of “them”; more so the worse the weapon. Reactive: waiting for violence before reporting. Focus only on visible effect of violence. (killed, wounded and material damage)</p>
<p>II. TRUTH-ORIENTATED Expose untruths on all sides / uncover all cover-ups.</p>	<p>II. PROPAGANDA-ORIENTATED Expose “their” untruths / help “our” cover-ups/lies.</p>
<p>III. PEOPLE-ORIENTATED Focus on suffering all over; on women, aged children, giving voice to voiceless. Give name to all evil-doers. Focus on people peace-makers.</p>	<p>III. ELITE ORIENTATED Focus on “our” suffering; on able-bodied elite males, being their mouth-piece. Give name to their evil-doers. Focus on elite peace-makers.</p>

<p>IV. SOLUTION ORIENTATED Peace = non-violence + creativity. Highlight peace initiatives, also to prevent more war. Focus on structure, culture, the peaceful society. Aftermath: resolution, reconstruction, reconciliation.</p>	<p>IV. VICTORY ORIENTATED Peace = victory + ceasefire. Conceal peace-initiative, before victory is at hand. Focus on treaty, institution, the controlled society. Leaving for another war, return if the old flares up again.</p>
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Source: Galtung (1998)

The Media and Boko Haram: Review of Opinions and Empirical Studies

A number of media scholars have expressed opinion on what should be the role of the media in the Boko Haram insurgency. Ekwueme and Obayi (2012), drawing from *The Six Rules for Government and Press on Terrorism*, developed by the Kathleen Hall Jamieson and Martin E.P. Segliman Committee on the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, suggested the following as central to the role of the media in the Boko Haram insurgency: Reduce helplessness, don't glorify Boko Haram attacks, reframe the insurgency in terms of gain and not loss, tell the story of survival, preach courage, and use safety signals. Ekwueme and Obayi are also of the opinion that the media should not emphasize on objectivity in the coverage of the Boko Haram assault; rather, the media should be concerned with patriotism, public and national interest. Ekwueme and Obayi's opinion on objectivity is contrary to the principles of peace journalism, which strongly advocate for objectivity.

The media, it appears, have been reporting the Boko Haram insurgency without the principle of objectivity. The spokesperson of Boko Haram, Abu Qaqa, has accused the media of bias against Boko Haram. He cited three instances of this bias: (1) media rumour that he (Abu Qaqa) was captured by the security forces; whereas he was not captured; (2) media reports of the kidnapping of some Europeans in Northern Nigeria, whereas it was not true, and (3) media reports that an Imam sympathetic to the cause of Boko Haram said he was going to crush President Goodluck Jonathan, which was a lie as shown by a YouTube video post. Abu Qaqa observed that many newspapers in Nigeria carried wrong and mischievous headlines about those three instances with the aim of putting Boko Haram in a bad light (Isola & Akintayo, 2012). Abu Qaqa goes further to say that some media houses in Nigeria have come under the attack of Boko Haram because of bias media coverage given to the sect. It could be recalled that on September 28, 2011 Boko Haram threatened to deal with media reporters. It carried out this threat by killing Isah Zakari, a reporter with Nigerian Television Authority (NTA); and Bernard Akogwu, a photographer with Channels Television. It also bombed the offices of *ThisDay*, *The Moment* and *Daily Sun* newspapers in Abuja and Kaduna on April 26, 2012 (Ekwueme & Obayi, 2012). Abu Qaqa justified attacks on the media houses in the following words:

We have repeatedly cautioned reporters and media houses to be professional and objective in their reports. This is war between us and the government of Nigeria; unfortunately the media have not been objective in their reports and fair of the ongoing war, they chose to take sides. It is not only *ThisDay* that has engaged in negative media campaign...but the sins of *ThisDay* are more. They once insulted Prophet Mohammed in 2001 and we have not forgotten. Nigerian media would not be a problem if they do their job professionally without taking sides (Ekwueme & Obayi, 2012, p.5).

Apart from the issue of objective reporting of Boko Haram activities, it is observed that media coverage of the activities of the sect has reflected the geo-political undertones inherent in media operations in Nigeria. In this regard, Isola and Akintayo (2012) observe that while the Northern

Nigeria Press, specifically the *Daily Trust* newspaper, advances a strong voice for negotiation with Boko Haram, the Southern Nigeria Press, particularly *ThisDay*, is against such negotiation, arguing that Boko Haram is a faceless group and one cannot negotiate with a faceless group (Isola & Akintayo, 2012).

As rightly observed by Isola and Akintayo (2012), media organizations in Nigeria have exhibited a lack of conflict analysis and investigative skills to unveil and demystify the sect. They rely on few sources, particularly those of security operatives put on ground by the government to checkmate the activities of the sect. Isola and Akintayo (2012) therefore suggest media coverage approaches that could be effective in managing the Boko Haram insurgency. These approaches which are in consonance with peace journalism strategies include: (1) The media should focus attention on humanitarian consequences of the activities of Boko Haram and other armed terrorist groups and to de-emphasize the political implications of their operations; (2) less media attention should be given to individual members and utterances of the leaders or spokespersons of terrorist groups; instead, the attention should be on the social consequences of their acts as well as give more voices and platforms to victims; (3) and the media should be involved more in investigative journalism.

The issue of the coverage of Boko Haram activities along geo-political undertones was subjected to empirical examination by Alao and Uwom (2012). This study had two objectives: (1) To compare amount of coverage given to Boko Haram terrorism by the Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria newspapers; and (2) to compare the level of objectivity displayed by the Northern Nigeria Newspapers (tilting more towards Islam) and Southern Nigeria newspapers (tilting more towards Christianity). The study adopted the content analysis. Three newspapers published in Northern Nigeria (*Daily Trust*, *Leadership* and *New Nigerian*) and another three published in Southern Nigeria (*The Guardian*, *The Punch*, and *Vanguard*) were analysed. The units of analysis were activities of Boko Haram within the period November 2011 – March 2012. The finding revealed that the Southern Nigerian Newspapers gave more coverage to Boko Haram activities than the Northern Nigerian newspapers. The two set of newspapers to a large extent were not objective, with the Southern Nigeria newspapers exhibiting this tendency more than the Northern Nigeria newspapers.

What is clear from the above review on mass media coverage of Boko Haram activities is that the coverage does not meet the standard of peace journalism. Hence, it could not be said to be contributing to peace process as expected of the mass media within the premises of peace journalism. All the opinions and empirical studies reviewed in this study did not attempt to clearly identify frames of peace journalism and those of war journalism and compare the two to come up with a more categorical statement that the media in Nigeria are involved in peace or war journalism in their coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency. The present study closes this gap; it investigates, on a comparative basis, ingredients or frames of peace and war journalism prevalent in newspaper coverage of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Method of Study

The study adopted the content analysis method. Newspaper contents on the activities of Boko Haram were subjected to quantitative and qualitative analysis. Four out of the 14 national daily newspapers published in Nigeria in 2012 (Bashir, 2012), being the period of study, were

examined. The four newspapers were purposively selected to cut across Northern and Southern Nigeria. They were *Daily Trust* and *Leadership*, from the North; and *The Guardian* and *ThisDay*, from the South. All editions of the four newspapers including weekend ones published in 2012 were examined. The period of study (2012) was purposively chosen because it witnessed very many violent activities of Boko Haram. The units of analysis were every straight news report, feature article, editorial comment, letter to the editor, signed opinion, and supplement report about Boko Haram published in the four sampled newspapers. These units of analysis were categorized into two frames along Galtung's (2002) scheme of peace/war journalism – peace journalism frame and war journalism frame. For the ease of coding, these categories were defined as follows:

Peace journalism frame:

Newspaper presentation of Boko Haram issues in a manner that indicated the following: (a) Focus on visible effects of violence: Revealing long term impacts speculated to result from the violence (such as threat to national integration and security, threat to human rights, threat to corporate existence of Nigeria, etc). (b) Focus on causes and consequence: Explaining the formation of the violence; when it started, why, what parties are involved, their goals, their positions towards resolution, etc. (c) Focus on multi-party orientation: Giving voices to all parties involved in the conflict that led to the violence, i.e. to Boko Haram sect and the Government of Nigeria, Northern and Southern Nigeria. (d) Focus on the violence as a problem: Criticizing and qualifying the violence as bad. (e) Non-partisanship: Not providing support to one side more than the other; being balanced by providing relatively the same amount of factual statements, for and against alike, concerning parties and interests involved in the violence. (f) People-oriented: Giving more attention to the voices of ordinary people directly affected by the conflict and/or independent researchers as well as students, intellectuals, etc more than government or official sources. (g) Agreement and or negotiation-oriented: Focusing on the willingness of the parties to discuss peace, friendship and co-operation and suggestions for amicable resolutions to avoid violence and maintain peace. (h) Avoiding the usage of the following types of language: (1) Demonizing language (derogative labels such as extremist, fanatic, irate youth, traitor, assassin, aggressor, etc; demonizing adjectives like cruel, vicious, brutal, blatant, aggressive, etc). (2) Victimized language (nouns, verbs, adjective and adverbs that are used intentionally to exaggerate and sell pains or damage inflicted on either party to the violence such as victims, defenceless, pathetic, desperate, etc). (3) Emotive language (nouns, adjectives and verbs that are subjectively used to describe what happened in an exaggerated manner in order to intrigue strong feelings of readers such as sympathy, pity for a particular side of the conflict and/or fear, hate, anger against a particular party in the conflict).

War Journalism Frame:

Newspaper presentation of Boko Haram issues in a way that include the following indicators: (a) Focus on visible effects and violent details: Description of the violence in details, showing gory scenes of the violence. (b) Focus on here and now: Explaining who did what, who struck first or started the violence without little or no explanation of the remote consequences of the violence involving more parties than just the ones in the violence at hand. (c) One-party orientation: Giving voice to only one party to the violence without presenting the positions of the other party to the violence. (d) Seeing a party as a problem and or/threat: Blaming a party to the violence as

starting the violence and being a problem or a threat. (e) Partisanship: Showing more support to one side of the conflict by exposing the side's wrongdoings and scheme while not mentioning the wrongdoings of the other side. Partisanship is also seen in evaluative statements that show journalists' subjective opinions or even through factual statements in favour of a side to the violence. (f) Elite-orientated: Quoting only statements of government or official sources or giving more space in a news story to their positions than to the voices of ordinary people, students, researchers or intellectuals. (g) Differences-oriented: Focusing on the differences between what parties to the violence say they want. (h) Use of demonizing, victimizing and emotive types of language (described above under peace journalism frame indicators).

Findings and Discussion

Amount of Coverage Given to Boko Haram

Table 2: Amount of Coverage given to Boko Haram issues by Newspapers in 2012

Month	Newspapers				
	<i>Daily Trust</i> F (%)	<i>Leadership</i> F (%)	<i>The Guardian</i> F (%)	<i>ThisDay</i> F (%)	Total F (%)
January	56 (30.1)	50 (26.9)	42 (22.6)	38 (20.4)	186 (100)
February	52 (28.9)	47 (26.1)	40 (22.2)	41 (22.8)	180 (100)
March	46 (27.1)	40 (23.5)	42 (24.7)	42 (24.7)	170 (100)
April	40 (24.8)	42 (26.1)	41 (25.5)	38 (23.6)	161 (100)
May	46 (28.8)	38 (23.7)	36 (22.5)	40 (25.0)	160 (100)
June	35 (26.5)	37 (28.0)	28 (21.2)	32 (24.2)	132 (99.9)
July	30 (25.6)	32 (27.4)	26 (22.2)	29 (24.8)	117 (100)
August	32 (27.6)	34 (29.3)	26 (22.4)	24 (20.7)	116 (100)
September	30 (28.0)	26 (24.3)	28 (26.2)	23 (21.5)	107 (100)
October	26 (29.5)	24 (27.3)	20 (22.7)	18 (20.5)	88 (100)
November	46 (29.9)	40 (26.0)	36 (23.4)	32 (20.8)	154 (100)
December	40 (26.5)	44 (29.1)	38 (25.2)	29 (19.2)	151 (100)
Total	479 (27.8)	454 (26.4)	403 (23.4)	386 (22.4)	1,722 (100)

Source: Content analysis, 2013.

Data in Table 2 above reveal the amount of coverage of Boko Haram issues by the four selected newspapers within the year 2012. The data show that the four newspapers, collectively and individually, gave high amount of coverage to the Boko Haram saga. The four newspapers collectively produced 1,722 news items about Boko Haram. Individually, *Daily Trust* produced the highest number of stories (479 or 27.8%) followed by *Leadership* (254 or 26.4%), *The Guardian* (403 or 23.4%), and *ThisDay* (386 or 22.4%). With the exception of *ThisDay*, all the other three newspapers produced an average of one story on Boko Haram per day. The months of January, February, March, April and May produced the highest number of stories on the saga. A likely reason for this is the event of the first major violent attack of Boko Haram, which was the suicide bomb explosion inside the church building of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, on Christmas day during mass. The explosion killed about 50 worshippers and left many others wounded. This attack attracted wide attention by both local and foreign media, and for the local media, this attention continued for about five months before it died down. Apart from the Madalla bombing, other bombings by Boko Haram took place in Kano, Bauchi, Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, Niger, and Kogi States within the first four months of 2012, giving the newspapers an issue to give extensive coverage.

Peace Journalism Framing of Boko Haram Insurgence

Table 3: Peace Journalism frames of Boko Haram in the newspapers

Frames	Newspapers				
	<i>Daily Trust</i> F (%)	<i>Leadership</i> F (%)	<i>The Guardian</i> F (%)	<i>ThisDay</i> F (%)	Total F (%)
Invisible effects of violence.	48 (29.4)	40 (24.5)	42 (25.8)	33 (20.2)	163 (99.9)
Causes and consequences of violence.	64 (30.2)	72 (34.0)	40 (18.9)	36 (16.9)	212 (100)
Multi-party orientation.	40 (26.5)	47 (31.1)	38 (25.2)	26 (17.2)	151 (100)
See violence as a problem.	76 (38.8)	50 (25.5)	32 (16.3)	38 (19.4)	196 (100)
Non-partisanship.	36 (30.0)	22 (18.3)	30 (25.0)	32 (26.7)	120 (100)
People-orientated.	49 (31.0)	42 (26.6)	37 (23.4)	30 (19.0)	158 (100)
Agreement/negotiation.	62 (31.2)	71 (35.7)	42 (21.1)	24 (12.1)	199 (100)
Non use of demonizing, victimizing and emotive language.	70 (30.3)	60 (26.0)	56 (24.2)	45 (19.5)	231 (100)
Total	445 (31.1)	404 (28.3)	317 (22.2)	264 (18.5)	1,430 (100)

Source: Content analysis, 2013.

Table 3 above is data on how the four newspapers studied framed the Boko Haram saga to suggest peace of journalism. According to the table, the four newspapers collective produced 1,430 frames that suggest peace journalism. The frames were identified under eight categories as follows: (1) invisible effects of BoKo Haram violence ,163 frames; (2) causes and consequences of Boko Haram violence, 212frames; (3) multi-party orientation, 151frames; (4) see violence as a problem, 196 frames; (5) non-partisanship, 120frames; (6) people-orientated, 158frames; (7) agreement/negotiation, 199 frames; (8) non use of demonizing, victimizing and emotive language, 231frames. For the individual newspapers, *Daily Trust* carried more frames suggesting peace journalism (445 or 31.1%). This was followed by *Leadership* (404, 28.3%), *The Guardian* (317 or 22.2), and *ThisDay* (264 or 18.5%).

Excerpts from the newspapers buttress the above peace journalism frames. *Leadership* newspaper of Monday, October 8, 2012 on page 7 writes under the head line: “Nigeria Won’t be Turned to War Zone – Tukur,” In this story, the National Chairman of the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Bamanga Tukur, is reported to have seen Boko Haram killing of students in Adamawa State as a national problem, which requires collective efforts to address. Excerpts:

....According to him, the new measures by the Federal Government for containing insurgence in all parts of Nigeria was quite re-assuring as he enlisted the support of all Nigerians in fighting homicide crimes in all parts of the country. The PDP chairman described the killing of defenseless students in Mubi as heart-breaking, stating that, “I am sad that a generation of promising Nigerians and the country’s future leaders could be wiped out by thoughtless and heartless individuals.”

Another story published in *The Guardian* newspaper of Thursday, August 23, 2012 under the headline: “Northern govns ask panel to dialogue with Boko Haram” points out the call for dialogue as a measure for addressing the Boko Haram saga. This is peace journalism. Excerpts of the story suggesting this peace journalism goes:

The Northern Governors’ Forum yesterday in Abuja inaugurated a 40-man committee to check the security challenges in the Nigerian region. Chairman of the Forum and governor of Niger State, Babangida Aliyu, said the leaders were ready to restore the lost values of the North....He, therefore,

urged the panel to look at issues of religious extremism, intolerance and mutual disrespect, which are creating more ethnic and religious cleavages and further separated the people.

The last part of the foregoing report also went beyond the issue of Boko Haram to cite religious extremism, intolerance, and mutual disrespect as other causes of violence in Nigeria. This is a frame of peace journalism. The report is also non-partisan since it makes a case for the well-being of the entire country and not just Northern Nigeria that is the centre stage of Boko Haram attacks and consequences. Other stories emphasized the need for proper investigation before coming to the conclusion on the causes of violent attacks. This is the case with a report in *Daily Trust* of June, 22, 2011 entitled: “Police response to Abuja bombing inadequate – Fashola.” This is a peace journalism frame. Excerpts

Lagos State Governor, Babatunde Raji Fashola, yesterday said the alleged suicide bomb attack at the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters raise more questions than answers and that the responses so far by the police authorities have not provided the needed background to the root of the problem. ...He said the conclusion that the dastardly act was carried out by a suicide bomber was too hasty.

When it became clear that the Federal Government’s approach of military action against Boko Haram was not yielding the desired result, some groups began agitating for the withdrawal of the military action. The newspapers reported such agitations. This is in the spirit of peace journalism. An example is the report by *Daily Trust* of July 13, 2013, on front page captioned: “Elders demand end to military action.” Excerpts:

Prominent citizens of Borno State under the aegis of the Borno Elders Forum yesterday rose from an emergency meeting in Maiduguri where they called on President Goodluck Jonathan to order the immediate withdrawal of uniformed men from the streets of Maiduguri, saying peace has remained a mirage following the military’s intervention in order to quell the Boko Haram insurgency.

The report goes on to say that the uniformed men, rather than keep peace, were burning down cars, harassing and killing innocent passerby, looting private property, and rapping young girls. It also appealed to Boko Haram members, whom it called “friends,” to stop the killings and adopt non-violent approaches in pressing home their demands. Two other stories in the same newspaper edition on page three captioned: “Boko Haram accuses army of genocide in Maiduguri” and “Boko Haram, product of political thuggery – ACF,” point out measures that would contribute to peace initiatives in the Boko Haram insurgency. The measures are frames of peace journalism.

War Journalism Framing of Boko Haram Insurgence

Table 4: War journalism frames of Boko Haram in the newspapers

Frames	Newspapers				
	<i>Daily Trust</i> F (%)	<i>Leadership</i> F (%)	<i>The Guardian</i> F (%)	<i>ThisDay</i> F (%)	Total F (%)
Invisible effects & violent details.	56 (22.9)	52 (21.3)	64 (26.2)	72 (29.5)	244 (99.9)
Blames particular people.	57 (24.2)	55 (23.3)	60 (25.4)	64 (27.1)	236 (100)
One-party orientated.	44 (22.6)	46 (23.6)	48 (24.6)	57 (29.2)	195 (100)
Blames but offer no solution.	32 (21.1)	32 (21.1)	40 (26.3)	48 (31.6)	152 (100)
Partisanship.	38 (20.4)	36 (19.4)	44 (23.6)	68 (36.6)	186 (100)
Elite-orientated.	70 (24.6)	68 (23.9)	72 (25.4)	74 (26.1)	284 (100)
Differences-orientated.	40 (20.4)	32 (16.3)	54 (27.6)	70 (35.7)	196 (100)
Use of demonizing, victimizing & emotive language.	50 (20.7)	48 (19.9)	61 (25.3)	82 (34.0)	241 (99.9)

Total	387 (22.3)	369 (21.3)	443 (25.5)	535 (30.9)	1,734 (100)
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Source: Content analysis, 2013.

Table 4 above contains data on the framing of the Boko Haram insurgence, which suggests war journalism. The data reveal that the four newspapers put together generated a total of 1,734 frames suggesting war journalism as defined in this study. The war journalism frames are categorized into eight groups as follows: (1) visible effects of violent details, 244 frames; (2) blaming particular people, 236 frames; (3) one party orientated, 195 frames; (4) blames but offers no solution, 152 frames; (5) partisanship, 186 frames; (6) elite orientated, 284 frames; (7) differences orientated, 196 frames; and (8) use of demonizing, victimizing and emotive language, 241 frames.

For the individual newspapers, *ThisDay* newspaper exhibited the tendency for war journalism more than the other three newspapers by 535 or 30.9 percent war journalism frames. This is followed by *The Guardian* with 443 or 25.5 percent war journalism frames. *Daily Trust* and *Leadership* had 387 (22.3%) and 369 (21.3%) war journalism frames respectively.

What is the nature of these war journalism frames? A few excerpts cited below are incisive. *ThisDay* newspaper of November 3, 2012 on page two carries a story about Boko Haram captioned: "...govt ponders Buhari's choice as mediator. CPC: It's PDP's ploy to link him with terrorism." When the idea of dialogue with Boko Haram became popular, some people suggested to the Federal Government to include Muhammadu Buhari in the mediation team with Boko Haram. The report expressed government's unwillingness to use Buhari for that assignment. Buhari on his part also rejected the assignment and went to accuse the government of attempting to link him with terrorism. Thus, a serious national challenge was reduced to party and personality politics pitching the ruling PDP with the opposition party, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), at war with each other. With this kind of politics, a solution to the Boko Haram saga was far at sight.

Another story which suggests war journalism is published by *The Guardian* of August 12, 2012 on page two, and is captioned: "How we're talking to Boko Haram, by presidency. Gov't states its stand as sect dismisses peace moves as false." In this story, differences orientation, as a key frame of war journalism is portrayed. Excerpts:

The presidency is insisting that it is in talks with the fundamentalist Islamic sect Boko Haram, contrary to the reports of the group's denial of such moves. Besides, the presidency argued yesterday that the refutation (sic) might be coming from one of the group's factions....But Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa, in an e-mail statement last week, denied that the group had been meeting with government officials as widely reported in the media.

A very disturbing report that qualifies as a war journalism frame is published in *ThisDay* edition of June 12, 2012 on page 6. The story, captioned: "Bomb attacks: S'East CAN issues final warning," is highly partisan and uses demonizing, victimizing, and emotive language. Excerpt of the story goes:

Christians in the southeast have threatened to attack mosques and places of Islamic leaders in the zone in retaliation of incessant bombings on Christians and churches in the North by Boko Haram. They made this resolution yesterday through the zonal Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) chairman and Bishop of Enugu Anglican Communion, Rt. Rev. Emmanuel Chukwuma...Bishop Chukwuma said that Christians are now ready for war....Boko Haram should be warned.

This kind of story cannot make for peace; rather it can only instigate more violence.

Peace Vs War Journalism Frames: A Comparison

Table 5: Peace Journalism Vs War Journalism frames of Boko Haram in the newspapers

Newspapers	Frames		
	Peace Journalism F (%)	War Journalism F (%)	Total F (%)
<i>Daily Trust</i>	445 (53.5)	387 (46.5)	832 (100)
<i>Leadership</i>	404 (52.3)	369 (47.7)	773 (100)
<i>The Guardian</i>	317 (41.7)	443 (58.3)	760 (100)
<i>ThisDay</i>	264 (33.0)	535 (67.0)	799 (100)
Total	1,430 (45.2)	1,734 (54.8)	3,164 (100)

Source: Content analysis, 2013

Table 5 above has data which compares peace with war journalism frames of Boko Haram reportage by the four newspapers studied. It is clear from the data that for the four newspapers put together, war journalism predominates by 1,734 or 54.8 percent frames. Peace journalism accounted for 1,430 or 45.2 percent frames. This trend is the case for the individual newspapers of *The Guardian* and *ThisDay* but not for *Daily Trust* and *Leadership*. *The Guardian* attracted 443 (58.3%) frames of war journalism and only 317 (41.7%) frames of peace journalism. For *ThisDay*, there were 535 (67.0%) frames of war journalism and 264 (33.0%) peace journalism frames. Similarly, *Leadership* garnered only 369 (47.7%) war journalism frames and as many as 404 (52.3%) peace journalism frames.

The picture suggested by this finding is that the Northern Nigeria based newspapers (*Daily Trust* and *Leadership*) exhibited more tendencies for peace journalism than the Southern Nigerian newspapers (*The Guardian* and *ThisDay*). The case of *ThisDay* is not surprising since it has come under the violent attack and criticism of Boko Haram for bias coverage (Ekwueme & Obayi, 2012).

On the whole, the findings of this study have shown that the practice of war journalism dominates the reporting of conflicts in Nigeria. This finding gives support to many other studies conducted on the issue of mass media coverage of conflicts in Nigeria. Orhewere and Kur (2004) found in a study of audience perception of the role of mass media in the coverage of the Tiv-Jukun ethnic conflict that media reports of the conflict were inaccurate, unbalanced, biased, stereotyped, and failed to focus on the mechanism of conflict management. Thus, the media were involved in war journalism more than peace journalism. Similarly, in a study of newspaper coverage of ethno-religious conflicts in Lagos and Osun states between January 2000 and February 2002, Igboeli (2006) found that the newspapers studied (*New Nigeria*, *Daily Times*, *The Punch* and *The Guardian*) did not focus much on the process of conflict management. This rendered the reporting more of war journalism.

In essence, the findings of this study suggest a need for strong emphasis on the application of the peace journalism theory in covering conflicts. This is a theory which does not discourage the reporting of violence, but emphasizes that the reporting of violence should be framed in such a manner that encourages peaceful resolution of the violence (Verhoeff, 2006). Galtung (2002, p. 16) stresses the basic principle of this theory in the following words: "By taking on advocacy,

interpretative approach, the peace journalist concentrates on stories that highlight peace initiatives, tone down ethnic and religious differences, prevent further conflict, focus on the structure of society; and promote conflict resolution, reconstruction, and reconciliation.” In other words, the theory of peace journalism, as aptly noted by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), concerns the choices reporters and editors make of what stories to report and the manner to report them so as to create opportunity for society at large to consider non-violent response to conflicts.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study set out to examine the nature of coverage Nigerian newspapers gave to the Boko Haram insurgency; whatever of peace or war journalism. The main objective was to identify the peace and war journalism frames prevalent in the coverage. The study adopted both the quantitative and qualitative content analysis. Boko Haram content in four purposively sampled newspapers within the year 2012 was analysed. The newspapers included: *Daily Trust*, *Leadership*, *The Guardian*, and *ThisDay*. Findings revealed that the four newspapers gave a high amount of coverage to the Boko Haram insurgency and most of the coverage was framed to suggest war journalism.

On the basis of the findings, the inescapable conclusion is that the tendency for war journalism is more with Nigerian newspapers in the coverage of violence. This tendency is influenced to some extent by the negative dichotomy between Northern and Southern Nigeria. The Boko Haram insurgency is taking place in the Moslems-dominated Northern Nigeria and the main targets are perceived to be the Southern Nigerian Christians resident in Northern Nigeria. The findings of this study indicated a sharp difference between the Southern Nigeria based newspapers (*The Guardian* and *ThisDay*) and the Northern Nigeria based newspapers (*Daily Trust* and *Leadership*) in their coverage of the insurgency. The Southern newspapers were more harsh and bias on the Boko Haram sect and its activities, making the papers to carry more frames of war journalism. It is therefore recommended that Nigerian newspapers in particular and the mass media in general should consciously adopt the practice of peace journalism. To effectively do this, it is expedient to include peace journalism as a specific course in the journalism training curriculum. The current approach of exposing journalism students to peace education in general studies is inadequate. Similarly, it is imperative to re-train practicing journalists in this form of journalism. Peace journalism is simply good journalism. It is therefore incumbent on all stakeholders in the practice of journalism (professional and regulatory bodies, civil societies, journalism organizations, training institutions, etc) to work towards addressing the numerous ethical and professional challenges facing journalism practice in Nigeria.

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Employing an African Solution to African Problems

By
Bernard K. Malakwen*

Abstract

The greatest challenge that still faces the human race today is to live in a peaceful world; a world devoid of endless conflicts and a world that is secure to all. People are either worried of neighbours who rise against neighbours or are worried of being attacked by criminal gangs. Conflicts and insecurity have been on the rise. The African continent has for many years fallen a victim of a variety of conflicts. Decades ago, conflict was mainly among nations, but as the number of interstate conflicts decreased, there has been an upsurge of inter-society conflicts such as ethnic cleansing, politically related violence, cattle rustling, pastoralists fighting for resources, just to mention but a few. A lot of information has been written and spoken about mutual co-existence but it seems that the more we talk about peace, the more things remain the same. Many peace actors have proposed the so called “African solutions to African problems” as opposed to “Western solutions to African problems” but conflict still persists. The prevalence of armed violence Africa has often been blamed on injustice, unequal distribution of resources, poverty, lack of cultural integration, marginalization, external support from the West – especially in the supply of ammunition, among other factors. It is amazing how modern day conflict involves sophisticated ammunitions that are not manufactured in Africa. Thus, as a way of employing an African solution to African problems, the paper suggests factors such as diplomatically engaging the conflicting parties, deep analysis of the exacerbating factors, focusing more on preventive measures rather than curative ones, and the media reportage of the conflict. The paper will discuss the importance of peace especially in regard to the socio-economic development of the African people and the African continent. It looks at peace as not just the mere absence of conflicts but rather the presence of firm structures that ensure the cementing of proper, realistic and genuine relationships and interactions that ultimately leads to comprehensive peace-building process. It will also look at the trigger factors and prescribe the way forward to amicable resolutions of conflict; and how the African continent can be secure to all without relying on idealistic prescriptions from the West – who are largely perceived as part of the problems than the solutions.

Key words: ammunitions, conflict, ethnicity, media, Peace building, violence,

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Introduction

The greatest challenge that still faces the human race today is to live in a peaceful world; a world devoid of endless conflicts and a world that is secure to all. People are either worried of neighbours who rise against neighbours or are worried of being attacked by criminal gangs. Conflicts and insecurity have been on the rise.

The African continent has for many years fallen a victim of a variety of conflicts. Decades ago, conflict was mainly among nations (such as Uganda-Congo, Rwanda-Burundi, Somalia-Ethiopia, Angola-Mozambique, among others) but as the number of conflicts between states decreased in the 90s, there has been an upsurge of society conflicts such as ethnic cleansing, politically related violence, cattle rustling, pastoralists fighting for resources, just to mention but a few.

Sadly, a lot of information has been written and spoken about mutual co-existence but it seems the more we talk about peace, the more things remain the same. Many peace actors have proposed the so called “African solutions to African problems” as opposed to “Western solutions to African problems” Rafael Grasa and Oscar Mateos (2010). A lasting solution is yet to be found.

This paper discusses the importance of peace especially in regard to the socio-economic development of the African people and the African continent. It looks at peace as not just the mere absence of conflicts but rather the presence of firm structures that ensure the cementing of proper, realistic and genuine relationships and interactions that ultimately leads to comprehensive peace-building process.

The prevalence of armed violence in Africa has often been blamed on injustice, unequal distribution of resources, poverty, lack of cultural integration (read intolerance or inability of African societies to adapt to the context of globalization), and external support from the West – especially in the supply of ammunition. It is amazing how modern day conflict involves sophisticated ammunitions that are not manufactured in Africa.

This paper looks at the above trigger factors and prescribes the way forward to amicable resolutions of conflict; and how the African continent can be secure to all without relying on idealistic prescriptions from the West – who are largely perceived as part of the problems than the solutions. The paper acknowledges that as long as poverty and marginalization exists, the twin problems of lack of peace and insecurity will prevail.

Thus, as a way of employing an African solution to African problems, the paper suggests factors such as diplomatically engaging the conflicting parties, deep analysis of the exacerbating factors, focusing more on prevention measures rather than curative ones (such as military disarmament) i.e. being more pro-active than reactive, discarding retrogressive cultural practices that promote violence, curtailing corruption in government, formation of all-inclusive government and ensuring equitable distribution of resources and sensitizing the people on the importance of sharing the little that they have.

Background

For many decades, the African continent has been home to numerous forms of conflicts that are fuelled by various factors that include disagreement over borderlines, unequal distribution of resources, scramble over meager resources, lack of cultural integration, marginalization, ethnicity, historical migration patterns and settlement, land tenure systems, poor conflict resolution strategies among other related variables which affect stability and sustainable development.

Issues related to conflicts, peace and security in Africa have generated such a constant international debate in recent decades that other important political, economic or social aspects also taking place in the continent since its independent processes have been marginalized and obscured as opined by Mateos O. and Grasa R, (2010)

Several debates have emerged, with some arguing that much of the global conflict can be attributed to the existence of an oppressive social system of power that reinforces differences between groups and allows one group to have power or privilege over another group. Once a particular group feels marginalized or not involved in a decision making process, peace is threatened.

Conflicts in Africa dates back to pre-colonial days when several communities fought for control of certain territories either for settlement purposes or acquisition of natural resources that was beneficial for human existence and trade. Pastoral communities fought to capture huge chunks of land (rangeland) and water for their animals; whereas agriculturally oriented people wanted to acquire more land for cultivation.

Furthermore, most clashes were meant to create a semblance of 'ethnic sovereignty and independence' where communities may have thought that failure to guard their space would lead to being probably overpowered, assimilated and governed over by other communities.

This view is summed up by Querol R and Besley T. (2012), who said that Prior to the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century culminating in the Berlin conference of 1884, Africa was characterized by a patch work of heterogeneous political systems. Some of these were organized authority structures of long-standing including a number of historic kingdoms. Other areas were governed in a relatively stateless fashion. Just as in Medieval Europe, the conflicts were a reflection of the process of indigenous state building."

Types of Conflicts

Africa's postcolonial wars are mainly intra-state and inter-state. In this paper we focus on five types of intra-state wars as explained by Adebajo et.al (2001). They include secessionist wars, wars of devolution, wars of regime change, wars of social banditry, and armed inter-communal clashes.

Secessionist wars are fought by groups that seek to secede from a given state and establish own independent state. The most famous example is the Igbo-dominated provinces in south-eastern Nigeria that proclaimed an independent republic of Biafra, which triggered the civil war that cost

Nigeria dearly in terms of the numbers of people who died – up to a million – not to mention the destruction of material resources.

Devolution wars are spawned by attempts by marginalized ethnic, religious and regional groups to renegotiate the terms of incorporation into the state and the national political space and their objective is decentralization rather than outright secession. This is simply a war where people fight for their rights.

Zezeza further explains that wars of regime change are those often engineered by self-described revolutionary movements that seek to overthrow the existing government and establish a new socio-economic dispensation, including conditions and content of citizenship. He gives an example of the National Resistance Movement - Army (NRM-A) of Yoweri Museveni, which captured power in Uganda in 1986, after a protracted battle with government forces allied to the late Idd Amin.

Wars of social banditry include widespread acts of violence that are socially organized against the state and other social institutions, with the objective not of capturing state power as such but of creating chaotic conditions that are conducive to predatory accumulation. Examples include rebel activities of Kony in Uganda, Al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko-Haram in Nigeria, Shifta war in Kenya in the late 80s and early 90s, among others.

For their part, armed inter-communal insurrections are often episodic eruptions of violence, sparked by specific incidents that stoke long simmering antagonisms, anxieties and aggressions. They can lead to great loss of life and if unchecked can mutate into prolonged warfare between ethnic communities. Examples include the Rwanda genocide (where Hutus and Tutsi rose against each other), Kenyan post-election crisis in 2008, the current Tana River crisis in Kenya, among others. After independence, many African nations degenerated into civil wars that pitted communities against communities, religions, etc. According to Lindemann (2008), since the 60s, a total of 24 sub-Saharan African countries (*i.e.*, almost 50% of African states) have suffered war.

The mostly documented clashes include Rwanda genocide that pitted Hutus and Tutsi communities, Angola civil war, Sudan inter-faith war that lasted over 20 years and killed over 2 million people (arguably the most devastating in Africa), Uganda civil war (during Idd Amin regime), Somalia clan conflicts (and the Ogaden war) that have hardly been solved for decades.

We have witnessed other wars in Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ivory-Coast, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali (Tuareg rebellion) Mozambique, Namibia (Herero genocide) Sierra-Leone, Kenya's inter-tribal clashes and the 2007 post-election violence, South Africa's xenophobia, just to name a few. These examples depict Africa as a continent riddled with all manner of clashes; literally a continent that has hardly witnessed real peace and security. Inter-state conflicts witnessed in the past decade include Ethiopia-Eritrea border tussles, Uganda-Congo mineral oriented clashes, Rwanda-Burundi tensions, Sudan-Chad clashes, Mauritania-Senegal border wars and Chad-Libya conflict etc.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

As Paul Tiyambe Zeleza explains, there can be no singular explanation for or solution to Africa's conflicts. At best, one can only say that these conflicts are rooted in the complex constructions and conjunctures of Africa's political economies, social identities, and cultural ecologies as configured out of specific local, national, and regional historical experiences.

In order to get proper solutions to specific problems, the peace actors must first strive to understand the above mentioned complexities. It must be understood that not all prescriptions may apply to all forms of conflicts. Various conflict resolution strategies have been attempted to restore calm in Africa, but none of them seems sustainable in creating an atmosphere for peace, security and inter-ethnic as well as intra-ethnic co-existence in Africa. Sometimes it seems the more people talk about peace, the more things remain the same. Even as the inter-state conflicts subside, there are no signs that suggest robust integration among nations. An un-easy calm exists.

The West, specifically, appears to have responded with what looks like a genuine humanitarian intervention attempt. Yet, when looked at a bit more deeply, there are many murky — often contradictory — issues coming to the fore that complicate the picture. Unfortunately, the African governments have been quick to adopt these forms of conflict resolutions that often do not give desired results.

It has been observed that most peace actors prescribe their so-called 'elitist resolutions' that are normally drafted in hotels while they endeavour to do little to understand the real cause of tensions. Most of the prescriptions given on creating peaceful co-existence are based on external assumptions. These include forceful disarmament by use of military, peace keeping missions in troubled areas, threats to conflicting parties, prosecution of perpetrators of conflict, sanctions, espionage, among other things. (Wepundi et.al 2012)

These methods have been employed in many instances to resolve conflicts, but all in vain because they do not address the causes of conflicts and often do not bring the warring parties into an amicable resolution of conflict. In such cases peace is forced on to the people, instead of creating an environment where people embrace peace themselves.

Diplomatic Approach

The human nature has tendencies of rebelling against forceful systems. It has been observed that the more force one applies the more rebellion they create. Nations have created rebellious groups because of attempting to use force in solving conflicts. Hunting down dissenting parties with heavy ammunition instead of listening to their grievances has often been counter-active.

For example, the devastating inter-faith war in Sudan (that led to eventual split of the nation) started after the government used force to subdue what was considered as a 'small group' of Christians who were protesting against having the Sharia (Muslim) Laws imposed on them. The 'small group' later armed itself and soon the country was on fire (IFAD Report on Sudan, 2007). This counter-active method eventually led to over 2 million deaths. Western oriented interventions such as deploying peace keeping troupes, imposing sanctions or warrant of arrests on personalities, etc, could not help the situation.

Secondly, in 1984 the Kenyan government deployed the military to use force in disarming the Pokot and Turkana communities who were believed to own illegal guns that were regularly used in cattle raids. In the process, hundreds of people were victimized, others were killed, animals were confiscated, people were beaten to confess gun ownership, but the method did not yield much; if anything, it led the targeted pastoralists into rebellion and eventual acquisition of more guns. As the army departed, the cattle raids intensified. The desired results were not achieved. (Nation Media)

Thus, imagine in the above two examples, what would have happened if the Sudanese government came down and engaged Christians in open and diplomatic dialogue on Sharia Laws? What if the Sudanese government listened to the Christians' grievances? Could we have seen 2 million deaths? How would the peace situation be in West-Pokot today if the government agitated for voluntary disarmament and engagement of the local residents in dialogue?

Through dialogue one is able to understand the real cause of the conflict and be in a position to not only heal the situation but also prevent any similar occurrence in future. The African solution entails involving elders, sitting at a round table, talking with each other (not to each other) and genuinely voicing one's concerns. In the end, as it is done in pastoral communities in Kenya, the warring parties share a meal – a sign of friendship. Furthermore, it is a taboo amongst the pastoralist to attack someone you shared a meal with. This eradicates conflict.

Inclusiveness

As earlier mentioned, peace is threatened in a society when particular group of people feel marginalized and excluded from decision making process and sharing of the national cake. Thus, it is possible to solve conflicts in Africa by enabling each and every defined group to be part and parcel of the society.

In Galtung and Jacobsen's book; *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend*, a country cannot develop until all sectors of its society (including minority groups) are involved in the decision making bodies and get equal opportunities in all of the spheres of society. As economic growth cannot be achieved without peace and security and vice-versa, women's equality, in addition to being relevant for economic growth, is also crucial for peace and security building.

Peace Races and Meetings

In her quest for peace in West-Pokot, former international athlete Tegla Loroupe has deliberately used diplomatic means in resolving the twin problem of cattle raids and ethnic clashes. Through her foundation – Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation – she uses sports as a way of creating a forum for warring communities to engage in dialogue. (Tegla Loroupe Peace Foundation report, 2012)

Her philosophy is "If you intend to move a mountain, you must start by carrying away small stones." Through sports and local peace meetings, she slowly and patiently carries away small stones by engaging people in constructive dialogue; and eventually succeeded in moving the mountain that is violent conflicts.

Her foundation reaches out to the pastoralists through sports. She organizes an annual peace race where pastoralists come together to compete in various track events. This enables them to

understand and appreciate each other. They run together, eat together, mix freely and get to socialize.

Since inception, the Foundation has successfully conducted over 22 peace races that have brought together thousands of pastoralists from Pokot, Turkana and Samburu (from Kenya), Karamojong and Sabiny (from Uganda), Toposa (Southern Sudan) and Merrille from Ethiopia, among other warring communities, to foster peaceful co-existence and explore alternative forms of livelihood. The races were mainly held in Kapenguria, Moroto (Uganda), Turkwel (along the Turkana-Pokot border) Maralal and even extended all the way to Tana River in Coastal Kenya.

This race is about running, certainly, but not running for money. It is not a race for the elite; it's a race for the local communities to compete with each other, show-case their talents, have fun and bond. The race is about the quest for peace. It seeks to create the gradual appreciation of each other and the knowledge of negative effects of violence in the society. At the end, armed warriors often surrender their illegal arms and pledge to live in peace with each other.

Giving an example of Ethiopia, Galtung and Jacobsen explain that opportunities for intervention to improve human security of the pastoral communities include communities meetings to enhance community participation. For example, during July 2006, there was a very important regional pastoralists gathering which was held in Ethiopia's Borena Zone.

The regional pastoral gathering (RPG) consisted of 300 pastoralists from 18 different groups that came together to discuss issues related to pastoralist livelihood. Participants discussed four major issues: the need to eliminate conflict; to increase the productivity of pastoralists; to increase pastoralist access to the market; and to develop governance structures to support pastoralism. Important peace talks were also held between several pastoralists including those in the Guji and Borena zones of Ethiopia.

The participants agreed that in spite of such obstacles as impediments to cross-boarder trade and prevalence of conflict in the Horn of Africa region, pastoralism remains a viable livelihood capable of making a significant contribution to the national economy.

Sensitization

Pastoralists depend almost entirely on livestock for livelihood. However, when water and pasture resources diminish, the animals eventually die. As a result, the herdsmen end up raiding their neighbours as a restocking strategy. Peace actors observe that this is the reason why many cases of cattle theft occur during the dry season. Retaliations by the attacked communities to defend or recover their stolen animals often leads to further deadly clashes, and the circle violence goes on and on. (Tegla Loroupe Peace foundation Report, 2012)

Although several people have come up with various factors which they consider to be the main causes of cattle rustling among the pastoralists, poverty and the livestock monoculture are the key factors that influence cattle rustling. Many pastoralists often believe that without a cow they are as good as dead. They believe in nothing other than cattle raring. Essentially, it is the number that matters but not the economic value. Such people will do anything to acquire as many animals as possible, including stealing and killing.

Furthermore, the easy availability of guns makes everything worse. It is not easy for un-armed people to go for raids, but an armed raider is a bold raider. Thus, without a gun, incidents of cattle rustling would be very minimal. In fact, without a gun there will be no cattle raids. That's why sensitization and advocating for peaceful disarmament is the best way to go. The day the pastoralist region will be free of illegal guns, the threat of cattle rustling will become history.

Basically, the advent of armed cattle rustling is the most unfortunate thing that has ever happened to pastoralists. However, through sensitization, positive results have been witnessed after it emerged that the levels of interaction between the warring communities has drastically improved. People who never talked to each other before – and only met at battlefields - are currently doing business with each other. Numerous weapons have been surrendered and cattle raiding activities have reduced drastically. Notorious crooks who were once a thorn in the flesh of the police and local residents have surrendered their guns and are now clean citizens conducting honest business

Rehabilitation program

Most cattle rustlers often leave home and hide in the bush as they carry out such heinous crimes. Thus, it is important to rehabilitate them fully into the society and prevent them from degenerating back into lawlessness.

Tegla Loroupe Foundation has a warrior rehabilitation program aimed at according reformed people a soft landing. Some people could have stayed in the bush for over 10 years. All they know is life with a gun. But after they surrender their illegal weapons, they are initiated back into the society by boosting them to begin small income generating activities.

This could be through getting them engaged in modern livestock keeping projects or engaging them in sports, music, among other talents. For instance, one of the reformed warriors discovered that he had a talent of singing. He was helped to record several songs. He now earns a living from music. Others have gone back to school, some into farming, transport business and even sports. These reformed men and women are later engaged in advocating for peace where they give personal testimonies on the importance of living in peace. This motivates others.

Truth Justice and Reconciliation

This is based on the concept that let the truth be told, let people own up, let them take responsibility and above all, let them forgive each other and forget the past . This is in tandem with African traditions where people owned up to wrong-doing and essentially were forgiven and the society was united once again. This is contrary to modern courts where owning up to having committed an offence leads to sentencing.

According to Ogot (2008), several countries have had their truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Chile, Salvador, Argentina, and above all South Africa. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up in 1993, and which reported in 1998, has been the most ambitious and far-reaching of the attempts at catharsis and justice, in all these processes. The essential problem is how to balance peace and justice, forgetting and forgiving, healing and punishment, truth and reconciliation. But truth, reconciliation are mere words: to have reality they have to become deeds and these deeds must be undertaken by individuals scarred by the

past and corroded by mistrust; individuals above all, who refuse to live with silence, with lies, with equivocations and excuses. But Truth and Reconciliation is not an individual process: The country must first of all accept that such a process is necessary if the country is to have any kind of future at all. Of course, there are those people who would argue that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a waste of time and money, especially if it is to be accompanied by amnesty, as was the case in South Africa. We should however remember that such commissions usually lead to one important result: they narrow the range of impermissible lies that one can tell in public.

In Argentina, for example, the truth Commission revealed that the regime had taken drugged prisoners and thrown them out of helicopters to drown in the sea. In Czechoslovakia, it discovered that large numbers of eminent Czech citizens had betrayed their neighbours, spouses, children, to the secret Police. Perhaps the answer lies in revisiting the past. There is an urgency to talk about the past among many of those who have suffered gross violations of human rights. The success of Spielberg's world-wide drive to have the survivors of the Holocaust tell their stories is a living example of the truth of this statement. But if urgency to recount the past exists, so too, does its opposite. Some victims and survivors have ambivalence in the way they approach the past: a strong pull towards forgetting, or rather a denial of memory co-existing with a need to recall the details of the trauma.

According to Murithi (2008), the importance of these initiatives (truth and reconciliation), as opposed sometimes to the exogenous mechanisms not rooted in the local world view, lies in their internal legitimacy, their inclusiveness and their ability to reach a consensus. This issue has led to debates on reconciliation processes in countries like South Africa, Rwanda or Sierra Leone, where transitional justice measures of different kind have been put in place. As part of Truth, Justice and Reconciliation, it is important that a nation addresses the historical injustices that happened in the past so that they can move in future on a clean slate.

Prevention of Arms Supply

Conflicts in Africa have entirely been aggravated by the presence and mis-use of small arms. It can be argued that without a gun in the conflict equation, the degree of devastation could greatly be reduced. In Kenya, there are possibly 50,000 guns in civilian hands.

A United Nations conference in Kenya (in 2006), dubbed the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa acknowledged that that the problem of proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in the region has been exacerbated by internal political strife, terrorist activities and extreme poverty.

Furthermore, according to a Special Report on Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya, 2012 (Wepundi,E. et al) Kenya has experienced the effects of small arms availability and misuse for many years, but the unprecedented violence that erupted after the December 2007 general elections placed the issue of small arms reduction higher on the national agenda.

The government of Kenya started a number of important initiatives, such as the establishment of the Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) as an interagency directorate within the Office of the President, Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security. Despite significant progress, law enforcement efforts to control the proliferation of small arms still face significant challenges.

Various sources of arms have been addressed including the 1979 collapse of the Idi Amin regime which led to vandalism of armories in military barracks in northern Uganda, feeding small arms proliferation in North Rift. Similarly, the overthrow of Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile Mariam contributed to increased small arms flows to northern Kenya (Mkutu, 2006), but the supply from European manufacturers remains the key source.

It's in this light that the **UN Nairobi Protocol (2006)** called for the urgent need to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of, excessive and destabilising accumulation of, trafficking in, illicit possession and use of small arms and light weapons, ammunition, and other related materials, owing to the harmful effects of those activities on the security of each state and the sub-region and the danger they pose to the well-being of the population in the sub-region, their social and economic development and their right to live in peace. It was agreed that there shall be strengthening of regional and continental cooperation among police, customs and border control services to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. These efforts should include, but not be limited to, training, the exchange of information to support common action to contain and reduce illicit small arms and light weapons trafficking across borders, and the conclusion of necessary agreements..

This resolutions are yet to be seen working, considering that arms still reach African countries like Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, DRC, Somalia, Sudan, etc, with ease. Thus, in order to achieve peace, we must start by ensuring that illegal guns no longer find their way to Africa. This can be done through creating an effective inspection process at the manufacturing and importation stage.

Voluntary Disarmament

It is important that the government and other peace stakeholders talk to illegal gun owners to surrender voluntarily. This involves getting to understand why they own guns and making deliberate attempts to solve their problems. It should be understood that most pastoralist in the North Rift Kenya for example own guns as a way of protecting themselves from attackers (Mkutu, 2006)

In 2005, the Government of Kenya initiated a disarmament process. The first phase of this initiative began in 2005, and by 2006, 2,298 firearms and 4,418 rounds of ammunition had been recovered (KNFP, 2010). The first phase did not achieve the targeted 50,000 firearms, and so a second phase began in 2010 with a voluntary phase in February of that year (Ndung'u, and Rynn, 2011).

Between February and August 2010 the operation had recovered 1,201 firearms, 1,665 rounds of ammunition, and 201 heads of livestock (KNFP, 2010). The persisting concerns about the

inadequate provision of security and underdevelopment account for communities' unwillingness to surrender all of their firearms.

Whereas the government embraced the disarmament and development approach to firearms collection, it implemented two forced disarmament exercises in Mt Elgon district, in Bungoma and Mandera counties. The one implemented in Mt Elgon was codenamed Operation Okoa Maisha (Save Lives), whereas the initiative in Mandera was dubbed Operation Chunga Mpaka (Guard the Border). The former netted 103 assorted firearms and 1,155 rounds of ammunition, while the latter recovered 48 weapons and 1,200 rounds of ammunition. For Voluntary disarmament to succeed those who own guns should be provided with alternative livelihood as a way of compensating them.

Conclusion

In the African society, violence exists literally everywhere: in homes, schools, public places and the communities. Relationships between people are often strained; they are ready to fight at the slightest provocation. Thus, it is paramount that the society fully engages in peace-building efforts to sensitize the people on the importance of living in peace with each other.

Many problems facing Africans today result from lack of peace and insecurity; while the rest is caused by ignorance. We have largely remained underdeveloped because of the unnecessary burden of the many senseless wars that we fight. We spend a lot of time and resources running around with guns aimed at our fellow brothers and sisters.

It is unfortunate that Africans have not even utilized one-third of their potential because they have engrossed themselves so much in violent conflict, something that has not given them time to nurture their talents, exercise creativity, explore various forms of development and be able to make a difference in their lives and the society.

If we can stop armed conflicts in Africa, this continent will not have people begging for food, people living in refugee camps, people with virtually no sources of income, destitute children, among other forms of suffering. Violence makes people live in fear, and not engage in anything meaningful development.

There is need to start at the grassroots level and preach peace all the way to the top so that people can embrace each other (and forget about violence) despite the magnitude of provocation. We need to tell people that violence is not a solution to anything.

As indicated by Grasa (2010), the emergence of the concept of "peace building" must be understood as a comprehensive framework for the peace, security and development agendas. This in other words implies that comprehensive peace can only be built on the foundation of development, good security, among other issues.

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Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: Challenge to Development, Peace and Security in Africa

By

Esther Chelule*

Abstract

The United Nations General Assembly defines “small arms and light weapons” as any portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive (Heinrich,2006).United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research describes small arms to include: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine-guns; assault rifles; light machine-gun; heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-craft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of antitank missiles and rockets system; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missiles systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100mm (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2006: 1). According to Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, small arms are weapons which are designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles and semi-automatic rifles (Best Practice Guidelines, 2005). A light weapon, Man-portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) is referred to as shoulder-fire anti-aircraft missile is used by terrorists to attack aviation anywhere in the world. Globally, it is estimated that over 6400 million small arms are in circulation, stockpiles, and private possession, and over 50% of these do not belong to the government, 100million are also reported to be in Africa (Africa Union (2012). It is also reported that there are half a billion military small arms around the world; that each year some 300,000 to half a million people around the world are killed by these weapons; 90% of civilians are casualties by small arms, and that every minute someone is killed by a gun. It is also reported that 1,134 companies in 98 countries are engaged in the production of small ammunition and black market trade ranges fromUS\$2-10 billion a year. In East African region the availability of small weapons has contributed immensely to insecurity in the region especially Kenya where there has been cattle rustling and armed criminals. In Nairobi suburbs an illegal pistol sells at less than US \$80, while ak-47s for under US\$140. Small arms pose a great challenge to the governments despite several international and regional conventions that have been signed, among them is the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. Mazrui noted how proliferation of small arms put it

Keywords; small ammunition, United Nations, governments, Disarmament Research, civilians

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Introduction

The United Nations General Assembly defines “small arms and light weapons” as any portable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive (Arms Survey 2013; Heinrich,2006).United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research describes small arms to include: revolvers and self-loading pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine-guns; assault rifles; light machine-gun; heavy machine-guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-craft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of antitank missiles and rockets system; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missiles systems; and mortars of calibers less than 100mm (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR,2006). Firearms incorporates barreled and lethal weapon that expels, which is specifically designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of burning propellant. An Antique firearms and their replicas are defined any device which may be readily converted to a weapon as referred to above or destructive for instance explosive bomb, incendiary bomb or gas bomb, grenade, rocket launcher, missiles, missile system or mine (controlarms,2005;Sunday ,E.,2011). Ammunition is the complete round or its components, parts or replacement parts of a small arm or light weapon, provided that those components are themselves subject to authorization of the respective State party.

The definition of “Small arms” refer to weapons meant for individual use, including revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns. Light weapons on the other hand are portable weapons designed for use by several persons serving as a crew: heavy machine guns, automatic cannons, howitzers, mortars of less than 100mm caliber, grenade launchers, anti-tank weapons and launchers, recoilless guns, shoulder fired rockets, anti-aircraft weapons and launchers, and air defense weapons (SADC Firearms Protocol, 2003: Article 1.2).According to Best Practice Guidelines (2005)for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons, small arms are weapons which are designed for personal use and shall include: light machine guns, including machine pistols, fully automatic rifles and assault rifles and semi-automatic rifles . A light weapon, Man-portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) is referred to as shoulder-fire anti-aircraft missile which the terrorists use to attack aviation anywhere in the world. Small arms and light weapons are a subcategory of conventional weapons and range from pistols and rifles to mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and man-portable air defense systems, or MANPADS (**Conventional Weapons Destruction (CWD)**)



Grenades

Source: Religions for Peace, 2004

Global Small Arms and Light Weapons

Globally, it is estimated that there are approximately 875 million small arms in circulation, stockpile and private possession, produced by more than 1,000 companies from nearly 100 countries, and authorized trade exceeds US\$ 8.5 billion (Arms Survey, 2013); of these 200 million belong to the government and state militaries, 26 million are in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The bulk of the global small weapons, which is estimated at two thirds are held by civilians and non-state actors, and 100 million are reported to be in Africa (Africa Union, 2012; Shah A., 2006; Stohl. R., et al (2010). There are also half a billion military small arms around the world; that each year some 300,000 to half a million people around the world are killed by these weapons; 90% of civilians are casualties by small arms because the civilians get access to purchase more than 80% of the arms produced in the world and that every minute someone is killed by a gun. It is also reported that 1,134 companies in 98 countries are engaged in the production of small ammunition estimated 5 to 8 million small arms being produced per year and black market trade ranges from US\$2-10 billion a year (UNODA() Arms Survey 2009; Shah., A.2006). Indeed as Ali Mazrui put it:

"In a technologically underdeveloped society, in the twentieth century, ultimate power resides not in those who control the means of production (as postulated by Marx), but in those who control the means of destruction (captured by the soldier/bandit with an AK47)." Ali Mazrui (1986)

Africa


Sources of SALW

There is an estimated 2,100 million Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa (Africa Union). An estimated 70 million to 100 million AK-47 assault rifles have been produced and are found in the national inventories of at least 58 states. According to the Small Arms Survey (2009), at least 38 companies produce small arms in sub-Saharan Africa, with the largest production facilities located in Africa, the leading being South Africa. Europe is known to have been the chief producer of small arms and light weapons flowing into Africa. There are however other various sources of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation in Africa which include the manufacture and supply of new weapons both inside and outside the continent, adding up to the remnants of weapons, which are shipped into Africa in the 1970s and 1980s and early 1990s by the former Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies to facilitate different interstate and intra-state proxy wars, or the Cold War (Abdel-Fatau, 2011). An estimated 79% of small arms in

Africa are in the hands of civilians and if they get lost or stolen, the same weapons find their way back into the black market adding to the number of weapons in illegal possession. When the Cold War ended, the flow of free highly subsidized arms have continued to pour into the region from numerous legal arms producers such as China, Iran, Russia, and Ukraine, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the US are known as the major legal sources of weapons to African. The flow of small arms into the Horn of Africa where there has been conflicts has been a ready market for the arms, is responsible for the devastating impact on the governments such as in Ethiopia (1991), Rwanda (1994), Somalia (1991), and Uganda (1979 and 1986) ,among others. Some African countries that have added to the supplier of weapons to rebels and private dealers in countries include such countries as Sudan which supported insurgents in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda; Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia which supported the Sudanese opposition in the South; and Eritrea and Ethiopia, due to their border conflict supported the opposition groups in Somalia and rebel groups operating in each other's countries. There is illicit trade in small arms in Africa and the main suppliers are known to be Russia and China (WCC, 2012; Stohl, 2010; African Union, 2001).

In South Africa, although it is not possible to know exactly the number of illegal weapons that are in circulation in, it is estimated that it ranges between 400,000 to eight million. The years between 2004 and 2006, it is reported that over 15 000 registered firearms were reported lost or stolen each year, which further contributes to illegal weapons. The South African Police Service reported the loss or misplacing nearly 4,000 firearms and only about 10% of these weapons are recovered between 2006 and 2007 (Oosthuysen, G., 1996). The South African arms industry perpetuate the presence of weapons and militarization of the Southern Africa , and the other African countries in the continent which is a ready market for the commodity, which is manufactures by the industries such companies as the Reutech, Cape Armoury, Tressitu Ammunition, Aserma, Republic Arms, Musgrave, Pretoria Metal Pressings and Littleton Engineering Works. These companies do not satisfy the demand for the commodity in Africa, so others are sourced from outside the continent like the US, where in 2006, transferred over US\$8.5 million worth of small arms into African countries. The value and sources of small arms trade is not possible to quantify because of its lack of transparency, however, the production of crude weapons adds to the supply of weapons to Africa, increasing the insecurity and conflicts. According to Schroeder, M.et al (2009) craft production in Ghana has the potential of yielding up to 200 000 new weapons a year that could fuel criminal violence within Ghana, or be used in other regional conflicts and crimes

The weapon held in the photograph was made in China



Source: Conflict Trends, 1, 2009

Small arms in the hands of rebels, fighters, war profiteers, which are often recycled from one country to another in Africa has been responsible for conflicts in such countries as Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and others (Religions for Peace. source: Conflict Trend: 1, 2009; WCC, 2012). There are also other sources of small arms such as black market where there are arms brokers, individuals or companies who evade international guidelines and national legislation to supply weapons to governments and armed groups, hence contributing greatly to criminality in Africa. They are able to work in the margins of national and international regulation, and face little regulation themselves. Unregulated brokers have been blamed for providing weapons for some of Africa's bloodiest conflicts, in Sierra Leone, Uganda, Congo and Sudan.

The intra-state armed conflicts in West African countries, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria's Niger Delta region, have however exacerbated the demand as well as the expansion of gun trade in Africa. The conflicts in the Niger Delta which emerged in the 1990s was a result of conflict over oil which is mined by the multinational corporations and has given rise to bitter opposition from local community groups who engage in conflicts and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. In East African region the availability of small weapons has contributed immensely to insecurity in the region especially Kenya where there has been cattle rustling and armed criminals. In Nairobi suburbs an illegal pistol sells at less than US \$80, while ak-47s for under US\$140. The "leakage" of weapons, that are sneaked into Kenya and the neighbouring countries from Somalia, a country ruled by warlords, has spread insecurity all over to Kenya leading to underdevelopment of most of the northern part of Kenya. The availability of illegal arms also exacerbated urban crime and political violence. The smuggled weapons are secretly sold in the black market the proliferation of small arms and light weapons is evident among the pastoralists, who are in possession of sophisticated weapons in North and North-Eastern Kenya has also increased insecurity and conflicts in the cattle-rustling region, and loss of lives. Arms Survey found out that the price of an AK-47 in Kenya costs Kshs. 25,000 or (\$385) in the North Rift, 35,000 Kenyan shillings (\$540) in Marakwet District, and up to 50,000 Kenyan shillings (\$770) in East Pokot district (Stohl, R., 2010; UNODA).

Factors for Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons has been enhanced by several factors. One of the factors is the fact that SALW are relatively cheap and many people can easily afford to own one. The AK-47 an Kalashnikov family of assault rifles, produced in some 29 countries and cost as little as \$200 new, or the price of a chicken, the second hand is much less after the Cold War (UNICEF, 2007). Ukraine had huge reserves of arms and ammunition, a stockpile of excess weapons of over 2.5 million tons of which were sold off and \$32 billion worth of armaments between 1992 and 1998 were either lost or stolen. According to UNDP (2002) small arms are cheap to purchase. In 1999 it was reported in Uganda that an AK-47 assault rifle was bought for the price of chicken Neild (2002), while at a Russian factory it sells at \$240, The AK-47, much coveted for its firepower and simplicity. In some places of Africa with many suppliers, it can be bought at \$30 (Controlarms, 2006) and Angola could be bought between 13 to 20 USD, according to the UN, it could be procured for as little as six US Dollars or traded for a chicken or a sack of grain (UNICEF 2007). The availability and cheapness of SALW in Africa is due to the fact that at least 12 African countries are low scale producers such as Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Namibia, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Sudan, Tanzania, Guinea and

Ethiopia, which are produced for use by the country's military, police and other security personnel (Bourne, 2007, cited by Ngang, C.K., 2007).The SALW are portable and can be easily carried from one place to another ,even by children. They can easily be disguised as cargo or clothing and not conspicuous; hence can easily pass unnoticed by the police security checks only to be noticed when it is already in the country.

The SALW require little training and expertise to operate it and any individuals, children and combatants who are given to use require no assistance once shown where to start it off (UNDP, 2002, Trend 1, 2009). The porous boundaries which have not fence or wall to separate the countries have contributed immensely to the ease of movement of SALW through countries. The borders were poorly drawn by the colonialists who at some locations separated families to belong to different countries. Some countries have boundaries that are too long for instance the border of Sudan, DRC and Chad, stretch over several kilometres such that a country is not able to man every activity at the border, and therefore SALW are easily smuggled into the country , causing more insecurity boundaries (Controlarms, 2006, Stohl &Hogendoorn,2010). The proliferation of SALW is also due to the fact that they are highly lethal and can operate at a terrifying accuracy even by a single rebel. The automated SALW can release about 600 rounds per minute at a range of 800 to 1,000 meters, causing terror to a wide community. (Controlarms, 2006) Another factor which enhances the proliferations is that there is inadequate security measures in many countries of Africa as well as weak institutions that are responsible for security, have made the environment conducive for the arms to thrive (WCC,2012). The manufacturers of the SALW want a ready market which happen to be areas of conflict, and would like to sell the commodity to a ready market, which can be combatants, rebels or any gang that may want to terrorize the citizens. So the super powers refused to sign convention on prohibition of the sale of SALW, hence more proliferation of arms.

Effects of SALW in Africa

According to UN Security Council “The destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons in many regions of the world increases the intensity and duration of armed conflict, undermines the sustainability of peace agreements, impedes the success of peace building, frustrates efforts aimed at the prevention of armed conflict, hinders considerably the provision of humanitarian assistance and compromises the effectiveness of the Security Council discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (United Nations 2002: 31). Indeed the fact that weapons are available in the hands of rebels and combatants, impedes the alternative conflict resolution strategies and instead, increases insecurity and further protracted conflict in the country as well as frustrating efforts of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations in rebuilding and reconstructing of the societies that have been devastated by conflict (Sunday E., 2011; Stemmet,2001) .Man-portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), which are light weapons that are commonly referred to as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, when in the hands of criminals, terrorists and other non-state actors, also pose a potential danger to commercial aviation around the world. In 2005, approximately 1.4 million people in northern Uganda regions such as, Gulu and its environs , were displaced by war .Many children are also orphaned and forced to work at an early age and become heads of households (Arms control 2006).

Small Arms and Light Weapons that are easily available in the hands of rebels, criminal gangs, and those not legally authorized to possess them, have been a source of insecurity in the civilians in the region. It estimated that more than 1,000 lives are lost each day to violence of SALW (Religions for Peace, 2004) has caused loss of lives to millions of people, injury, maimed individuals and misery to the community. Michael Renner, cited by Sunday E,(2011) small arms alone has caused havoc in Africa where an estimated 5,994,000 suffered fatalities in the last 50 years and another 30,000 people killed each year. This is a violation of human rights, for instance freedom to live and freedom from slavery. The threat of use of small arms economy of the victims lacks far behind because the people are in constant fear and insecurity and therefore fails to engage in economic and gainful activities. Many flee their homes as refugees and internally displaced and migrants crossing the border into the neighbouring countries, as well as interruption of humanitarian assistance. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates that, in 2007, an estimated 12.7 million people were living as IDPs in Africa (Religions for Peace 2004; IDMC <http://www.un.org>)

World Bank found that the use of small arms by rebels and criminals negatively affect the economy which includes the private wealth being divested which doubles during an armed conflict, and that the cost of civil war is approximated at 60% of its annual gross domestic product. An armed conflict is very expensive and drains a country's resources and thus impoverishes the populace. In Africa for instance cost of armed conflicts costs some \$18 billion annually International Maritime Bureau's Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) reported that about 293 incidences of piracy which occurred globally indicated that 111 were experienced at the coast of Somalia especially at the Gulf of Aden, while 40 occurred off the coast of Nigeria (Conflict Trend 1, 2009). The proliferation of small arms has contributed immensely to the rise and effectiveness of piracy which has seriously threatens Africa and the international community as well as the International shipping interests which have been tremendously affected. A study conducted by Oxfam (2007) found out that in the Democratic Republic of Congo during conflicts in the years from 1990 the 23 countries in Africa that were engaged in conflict experienced a sharp drop in their economies by an approximately 15% per year, that is a cost of US\$18 billion annually and the total loss of US\$284 billion to African economies (Stemmet, 2001). Kenya has been a victim of piracy and has lost an estimated US\$150 million in ransoms paid to the pirates off the East Africa coast.

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons due to their availability and ease in operation, maintenance and easy portability has given rise to child soldiers where the rebels give children weapons to carry and use them in fighting. There is an estimated 300,000 children who are involved in more than 30 conflicts worldwide, another two million children have been killed in conflict, over one million orphaned, over six million have been seriously injured or maimed, permanently disabled and over ten million have been left with serious psychological trauma, 40% of these child soldiers are girls who serve as "wives" to the combatant (UNICEF, 2007). The small arms are used in armed criminal violence, for instance in South Africa the criminal armed violence is responsible for injuries from gunshot estimated at 46% of violence related deaths (arms survey, 2012; controlarms, 2006). The small arms which remained after the conflicts in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Liberia, Sudan, Sierra Leone including the licensed weapons that are stolen or lost, have played a major role in exacerbating crimes and armed violence. The

continent is a major trans-shipment point for the international trade, as well as a major producer of local arms.

Challenges to reduction of SALW

Control of SALW in the member countries through protocol has become a challenge (controlarms2006). This is mainly because the Firearms Protocol is inadequate in covering certain small arms or state-to-state transfers if one of the states' national security interests are at stake (UNODA 2006'). Membership to the Protocol is not universal; neither does it concern with the issues of not address small arms in the context of armed conflict and post conflict situations. Many States are not in agreement as to what steps to be taken to counter illicit small arms trade and therefore opposes the UN legal framework on SALW trade because it is their national security. Most of these states would not support arms control, but support mainly the illegality of SALW (Stemmet, 2001; Stohl, 2010; Conflict Trend, 2009). Another challenge to control of SALW is that the UN Program of Action was indeed only a program of action thus weak and unsuccessful, that is, it was politically binding but not legally. The weapon producers like the USA, China, India, Israel, Russia, Egypt did not welcome the idea of arms control because it would interfere with their lucrative business. These superpowers did not agree on interpretation of ammunition possession, "responsibilities of state", prohibition of transfers to those who are not state actors and global guidelines for SALW transfers (UNODA, Stemmet, 2001, controlarms, 2006). The United States opposes the restriction on transfer of weapons because it violates the US "the rights of the oppressed to defend themselves against tyrannical and genocidal regimes.". USA also opposes controls on small arms ammunition as well as of arms possession by the civilians because it may interfere with the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens to bear arms (Religions for Peace, UNODA, WCC, 2012, Conflict Trend, 2009).

Many African countries have supported these international initiatives, compliance is often weak. A lack of resources undermines the response to the small arms problem and the ability to implement international agreements and obligations. Programmatic initiatives – such as DDR, weapons collection, destruction programmes and physical stockpile security management (PSSM) – are expensive, and may require bilateral or multilateral support (Conflict Trends, 2009). Indeed, UN agencies, the European Union and the US are among the largest supporters of African small arms programmes. The US, for example, has provided assistance to 21 sub-Saharan African countries since 2001 by assisting in the marking of weapons, destroying surplus small arms and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), and improving stockpile security. Small arms pose a great challenge to the governments despite several international and regional conventions that have been signed, among them is the 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. In Rwanda, for instance, the former combatants are still undergoing training because there were neither demobilization, nor reintegration in to civil society, hence security threats to the country (arms survey, 2010; controlarms, 2012' stemmet, 2009).



SOURCE: Best Practice Guidelines for the Implementation of the Nairobi Declaration and the Nairobi Protocol on Small Arms and Light Weapons

Andre Stemmed (2001) Small Arms and Light Weapons from other arms control issues, thus complicating their legal regulation: a lack of institutional mechanisms, while the few existing regimes aimed at control are relatively weak the distinction between legitimate users of this category of weapons, the security forces of states, and the illicit proliferation that takes place outside the state system, is a problem that must be addressed; consequently, the solution does not lie in outlawing such arms, as was the case with landmines;

Interventions and Initiatives to control SALW Africa

The UNITED NATIONS General Assembly (April 2013) approves the first world body that regulates the multi-billion international arms trade, which will help keep illicit weapons out of the hands of terrorists, insurgent fighters and organized crime. Many countries, including the United States, control arms exports, approved for the first time an international treaty regulating the estimated \$60-billion global arms trade. The treaty prohibits exports of conventional arms if used to attack civilian, schools and hospitals (www.un.org).



SOURCE <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/faq.html> 30may 2013

In 2001, UN Program of Action (PoA) to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was the largest UN initiative, the program does not define the “illicit” arms trade, although most understand it to refer to trade that is contrary to the law of states and/or international law. The UN Instrument on Tracing Illicit Small Arms, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2005, builds on the minimum standards on marking, record-keeping, and cooperation in tracing of small arms that are contained in the UN Firearms Protocol and the program of action. It appeals to the states to mark all legally produced small arms with a code containing a unique serial number and information that identifies the country of manufacture and the manufacturer as well as keeping adequate records on small arms production and transfers and to cooperate in the tracing of illicit small arms recovered outside their country of production (controlarms2006; Conflict Trend January 2009).

In May 2001, the General Assembly adopted the UN Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, known as the Firearms Protocol the legally binding Firearms Protocol entered into force in July 2005, and 60 states are party to it at present. It stipulates measures such as the criminalization of the illicit manufacturing of or trafficking in firearms and the strengthening of capacities to detect and investigate illicit transfers in the context of transnational organized crime. However, The Firearms Protocol does not include some small arms or state-to-state transfers if one of the states’ national security interests are at stake and also membership of the protocol is not universal, and it does not address small arms in the context of armed conflict and post conflict situations(arms survey, 2012;controlarms 2013)

The Bamako Declaration is an Africa-wide consensus which addresses the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and Light Weapons. It is a politically binding control instrument which was adopted by the ministerial conference of member states of the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU, now African Union (AU) in December 2000. The aim is to develop an African common position where all members agree on its terms on the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of SALW and of the AU, to encourage the codification, marking, record-keeping and harmonization of legislation which governs the production, trading, brokering, importation, exportation and the licit possession and use of small arms and ammunition in the country governing imports, exports and the licit trade (Stemmet, 2001; conflict Trend 2009).

The African Regions have also developed their own plans to address their domestic and specific small arms challenges where in East Africa is the Nairobi Protocol on the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa is legally binding, was adopted in April 2004 and entered into force in May 2005, which provides a framework for national small arms legislation and in the West African states, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 1998 is a politically binding Declaration of a Moratorium on the importation, exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons, which was made legally binding in 2006.

The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials is a regional and legally binding instrument to increase control over the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa (Ngang, 2007). This addresses the problem of proliferation of SALW include the Operation Rachel for collecting weapons and also Programme for Action which aims at combating illegal arms trafficking in Southern African states as well as the Southern African Development. Its main objectives are to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacturing of firearms, ammunition and other related materials, to promote legal uniformity and minimum standards in the manufacture, control, possession, import, export and transfer of firearms and ammunition and facilitate cooperation and exchange of information and experience on SALW issues in the Region and to ensure the standardized marking of firearms at the time of manufacture (Nairobi Protocol, stemmet 2009; UNODA).

Conclusion

The Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) has placed Africa an arena of warfare, insecurity conflict and destruction. It has led to underdevelopment of Africa's economy, rendered people homeless and refugees and loss of millions of lives. Many countries are still counting their losses even with the many protocols and conventions signed to prevent the proliferation of SALW. Some producers of the weapons are making business out of other peoples' suffering and therefore are not willing to stop the use of SALW. The international conventions are being negotiated and several steps towards agreement on the provisions of the protocol is bearing fruit so that the world can be arms free, a place worth living without a threat of insecurity.

The African problems are left for Africans to solve for themselves yet the cause may not have been solely African. The companies that produce weapons know very well that the arms are used to destroy lives, yet they want to continue making profits. Many countries in the horn of Africa have been a region of restlessness and conflict, mainly because the arms are sneaked through some avenues from the manufacturers outside the continent. To stop war, we must stop the

production of SALW, destroy all the stockpiles and make plowshares instead. There is need to take the African problems as our own in need of immediate attention so that our neighbours, the Sudan, Somalia, DRC, CAR, among others can live peacefully with the rest of the world and build a continent, develop our continent, make peace with the world.



Source: Conflict Trend, 1.2009

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SOURCE: Conflict Trends 1, 2009: In September 2008 approximately 50 gunmen boarded and captured the *MV Faina*, a Ukrainian ship loaded with tanks, small arms and light weapons

The Challenges to the Channels for Conflict Management and Resolution among the Tiv of Nigeria

By

Andrew Philips Adega*

Abstract

Conflict is inevitable in human societies and in human relationships. This is because the society is made up of people with different shed of opinion ranging from religious, political, social and otherwise. Owing to this diversity, conflict becomes inevitable. The Tiv explain the phenomenon of the inevitability of conflict in human relationships with the cliché *anyi wa ndor vea nombor kpa ka u nyima nombor* meaning even though the teeth and the tongue are good neighbours they often clash resulting in the teeth biting the tongue. Conflicts could sometimes begin as mere misunderstanding and then degenerate into violent confrontation involving the use of arms. This invariably leads to the loss of lives and property on both sides of the divide. Societies across the world have employed different ways through which peace is restored in the event of any conflict. Among the Tiv of Nigeria, conflict management is hierarchical and begins from the YA (compound) unit to the *INGYOR* group (members of this group share a common grandfather). If the *ingyor* group is unable to resolve the conflict, the *ITYO* (patrilineage) group wades in. Where the *ityo* also fails to resolve the matter, it is referred to the *TAR* (comprising the lineage segments). The *ityo* is the highest decision making body in Tiv society comprising elders from the different clans and kindred. As a matter of clarity, each community or clan in Tiv has an *ityo*. Significantly the elders of the *ityo* possess both physical and metaphysical powers and could bring this to bear on an errant kin either negatively or positively. The Tiv are afraid to get entangled in the web of the *ityo*; therefore, most conflicts are resolved at this level of arbitration. In matters involving a wife and her husband or ill-health or death of her children, the *IGBA* (matrilineage) group which complements the *ityo* is invited to help resolve the matter. The paper examines these hierarchical channels of conflict resolution among the Tiv. However, modern legal system, inconsistent chiefs who are bribed to divert justice as well as the challenge from educated elites who would always want things done their way; disrespectful youths and the use of the destructive phrases from elders such as *u bume ukpe* (if you joke you will die) and *or hembe ityo ga* (no one is above the kin group). All these factors have significantly contributed in posing a serious challenge to the smooth operation of these conflict management strategies in Tiv society. The paper calls on the Tiv to go back to the drawing board in making this conflict management channels a viable option hence they have the prospects of resolving conflict without recourse to a cumbersome modern legal system that lingers on endlessly. The paper finally draws a conclusion.

Keywords; human societies, legal system, conflict, community, metaphysical powers

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Introduction

Conflict is not a strange phenomenon to humanity. It is a situation whereby two or more peoples are involved in a serious disagreement which sometimes escalates into violence and open confrontation that involves the use of arms. In the view of McLellan and Bartholomew (1998:202) conflict is the conscious opposition to another identifiable group or a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources, in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rival.

A conflict situation may arise when a person or group becomes aware that the other person or group is competing for a common thing of interest as the former at the expense of the other. While it is admissible that tension may exist without active conflict; however a state of tension usually precedes the outbreak of conflict. Most scholars are of the opinion that conflict is inevitable in human and societal relationship. The threat of violence they maintain is essential in order to create stability and maintain peace and adopt compete active interests (McLellan and Bartholomew 203). Nigeria as a pluralistic country comprising people with different religious, political and cultural backgrounds have witnessed several of these conflicts. Jooji (2003:2) mentions some of these violent conflicts to include that between the Urhobo and Itsekiri, Ife and Modakeke, Umuleri and Aguleri and the Tiv and Jukun which have left massive loss of lives and destruction of property in its trail.

The fact of the inevitability of conflict explains why it could take place between friends, family members, between father, son or daughter and wife; or between mother, daughter, son or husband or just between groups, individuals or society at large. Sometimes an individual could experience an internal conflict particularly, when it has to do with the making of a choice or adoption of certain values. The complexity of society containing people of diverse religious, political, social beliefs explains the inevitability of conflict in human relationships. While it is admissible that conflict is inevitable in human societies and relationships it is nevertheless always allowed to escalate and degenerate into wars unabated. This has to do with the level of fatalities, loss of lives and property that normally accompany such conflicts. As a result of this man in his day to day relationships has adopted certain methods and avenues for resolving and managing conflict so that it does degenerate into violence and if it has or does, it is resolved to avert more fatalities and to promote peaceful co-existence between individuals, groups, societies and states. Among the Tiv, conflict management and resolution takes any of five channels for amicable resolution. Thus, conflict management and resolution begins at the *ya* (compound) and moves to the *Ingyor* (members of this group share a common grandfather). If conflict cannot be resolved at the first two stages, the matter is channelled to the *Ityo* (patrilineage) and then to the *Tar* council (Comprising the lineage segments/clans or districts). The *Ityo* is the highest decision making body in Tiv society and in most cases conflicts find a resolution and they are effectively managed at this level. The *Ityo* comprises elders from the different clans and kindred. These elders possess both physical and metaphysical powers and could bring this to bear on an erring kin either negatively and positively.

Most Tiv are afraid to get entangled in the web of these elders for whatever reason which explains why no matter how unpalatable the decisions of the *Ityo* is to a person/group it is binding hence the Tiv say “*or hembe ityoga*” literally meaning no one is above his kin group. The *Igba* (matrilineage) group complements the *Ityo* and is invited to help in settling matters

involving a wife and her husband on issues involving ill-health or frequent death of her children. The *ijir tamen* (supreme council) which is recent development coming on the heels of the creation of the Tor Tiv stool in 1946 handles inter clan and other related issues unable to be resolved by the lower bodies. The paper is concerned with examining the hierarchical channels of conflict resolution among the Tiv noting the merits and demerits of these channels. The paper makes viable suggestion and draws a conclusion.

Conceptualising Conflict Management and Resolution

Conflict management and resolution are aimed at averting the outbreak of violent confrontation and wars involving the use of arms with attendant loss of lives and property. Angler (1998:24) subscribes to the above line of thought where he writes:

In most modern societies the resort to war usually occurs only when other methods of resolving differences have been exhausted. The generally or most preferred means of resolving differences (conflict) among nations, peoples and groups is through: Discussion, negotiation and compromise which is referred to as the tools of diplomacy.

Thus, when diplomacy cannot resolve issues vital to the fundamental interests of the parties involved, war (conflict) the ultimate tool of diplomacy may result. Angler (1998) further attributes the increase in the scope of war paralleled to the growth of political organisations into states, cities, and empires and the concomitant growth of the importance of and reach of economics, religion, nationalism and ideology; factors commonly cited as the cause of the war or conflict. On his part, Dzurgba (2006:133) says management as a concept connotes an act or skill of planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling the administration of a peace process. Administration according to him refers all the activities that are involved in managing a given conflict. Therefore, conflict management requires a strategy in order to achieve set goals through effective actions. He maintains that conflict management strategies are:

linked to specific methods or approaches that are needed for practical application of knowledge, skill and experience in carrying out peace processes which involve preliminary consultations of the parties, convening a meeting, having negotiations, establishing mutual understanding, securing mutual tolerance, making concession, coming to agreement by the parties to the conflict.

Best (2006:95) conflict management is the process of reducing the negative and destructive capacity of conflict through a number of measures and by working with and through the parties involved in the conflict. He further points out that conflict management is synonymous with conflict regulation. Conflict management covers the entire area of handling conflicts positively at different stages, including those efforts made to prevent conflict by being proactive. It encompasses conflict limitation, containment and litigation.

This according to him may include conflict prevention which connotes containment of conflict through steps introduced to promote conditions in which collaborative and valued relationships control the behaviour of conflict parties. He maintains that the term conflict management is a pointer to the fact that conflict is inevitable. However, not all conflicts can always be resolved; therefore what practitioners can do is to manage and regulate them.

The Wikipedia (2012:4 of 29) explains that conflict management and resolution involves the reduction, elimination, or termination of all forms and types of conflict. This involves the use of terms such as negotiation, bargaining, mediation or arbitration. Similarly, individuals, group and

societies manage conflict in three ways viz: domination, compromise and integration. Other scholars list these channels for conflict management and resolution into five namely: forcing, withdrawing, smoothing comprising and problem solving. Furthermore, conflict management channels and procedures aim at minimizing affective conflict at all levels, attain and maintain a moderate amount of substantive conflict and use appropriate conflict management channels and strategy aimed at effectively bringing about an amicable resolution and also to match the status and concerns of the two parties in conflict. Within this framework are time conflict management channels and approaches: integrating, obliging, dominating, avoiding and compromising.

Consequently, integration involves, openness, exchanging information, looking for alternatives and examining differences to solve the problem in a manner that is acceptable to both parties. Obliging has to do with attempting to minimize difference and highlight the communalities to satisfy the concern of the other party. The dominating channel is an avenue where by one of the parties involved in the conflict goes all out to win his/her objectives, thereby ignoring the needs and expectations of the other party. An opposing party fails to satisfy his/her own interest or concern as well as the concern of the other party.

Compromising as a channel for conflict resolution and management is perhaps the most viable channel. It involves give-and-take in which the conflicting parties give up something to make a mutually acceptable decision (Rahim 2002:206 – 235). It is to be noted that for conflict management strategies to be effective, certain criteria must be satisfied. These criteria are particularly useful not only for conflict management, but also decision making in management. They include:

Organisation learning and effectiveness: In order to attain this objective, conflict management strategies should be designed to enhance critical and innovative thinking to learn the process of diagnosis and intervention in the right problems. Needs of the stakeholders: Sometimes multiple parties are involved in a conflict in an organization and challenge of conflict management would be to involve these parties in a problem solving process that will lead to collective learning and organizational effectiveness.

Ethics: A wise leader must behave ethically and to do so the leader must be open to new information and be willing to change his/her mind. By the same token other stake holders in the conflict have an ethical duty to speak and against the decisions when consequences of these decisions are likely to be serious. This means that “without an understanding of ethics, conflict cannot be handled (2012:6 of 29). By its nature therefore, conflict is unstable; thus one party to the conflict must always win and the other party most always lose in the end.

Tiv: The name Tiv conveys a triple meaning; first and foremost, it is the name of the progenitor or ancestor of the Tiv. Secondly, it refers to an ethnic group and thirdly, it is the language spoken by them. The Tiv are of the semi-Bantu linguistic affinity. The name Tiv therefore represents the sum total of the Tiv personality, his ways of life, religious beliefs and culture (Adega 2004: 59). According to Hembe (2003:28) about 3 million of the approximately 5 million Tiv people live in Benue state. The rest of them are scattered in parts of Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa and Cross River state. There are also Tiv farmers in Niger, Ondo, Ekiti states as well as Abuja and the Republic of Cameroon.

The Tiv occupy the Northern and Southern parts of the middle course of the Benue River and its tributary the River Katsina-Ala. Gerna (1995:1) explains that Tivland lies between the latitudes of 7⁰ and 8⁰ north and between longitudes 8⁰ and 10⁰ east. However, Shishima (199:57-59) puts this at approximately 6⁰ – 30⁰ north and from 8⁰ – 10⁰ east longitude. Tivland covers an area of 29,300 square kilometres which covers the 14 local government areas, (in Benue state alone). The Tiv share boundaries with Anambra and *Cross River* states on the south and with Taraba and Nasarawa in the North; in the West by Otukpo, *Apa* and *Oju* local government areas of Benue state and in the East by the Republic of Cameroon.

Occupation wise, the Tiv are predominantly farmers thereby requiring plenty of land to till and cultivate series of crops such as yams, rice, beniseed (sesame seed), soya beans, maize, guinea corn, millet, potatoes, cassava, pepper as well as citruses such as oranges, mangoes, pears etc. This has earned them the appellation “*Food Basket of the Nation*” in the comity of states in Nigeria. Furthermore, Makar (1994:14-17) points out that this Tiv also engage in animal husbandry with the rearing of goats, cows, chickens, sheep etc. They also engage in industries such as pottery, mining, brewery and carpentry.

The Channels for Conflict Management and Resolution in Tiv Society

Conflict is inevitable in human societies and in human relationships. This has to do with the composition of the society with people of diverse socio-political and religious interests. Despite the fact that conflict is inevitable, measures are taken to prevent, manage and amicably resolve conflicts so that they do not escalate into full blown wars; and where it does resort to wars measures are taken to bring the conflicting parties from the verge of self destruction.

Among the Tiv, a hierarchical channel exists through which conflicts are managed and resolved. These hierarchical channels include: The *Ya* (compound unit), *Ingyor* unit (members who share a common grandfather), *Ityo* (patrilineage), and *Tar* council (comprising the lineage segment). The *ijir tamen* resolves issues not resolved by the *tar* referred to it. Sometimes the complementing institution to the *Ityo* i.e. the *Igba* (matrilineage) is invited to help in the resolution of conflicts involving the wife and her husband.

Conflict resolution and management among the Tiv begins from the lower rung of *Ya* (compound) to the highest point of *Ityo*. Therefore, if conflict is not resolved at a particular level or unit, a solution is bound to be found in the next because one could always appeal to the higher channel for the resolution of a matter. Thus, conflict necessarily finds a resolution in one of these channels. Sometimes a higher channel like in the modern judicial system could order a lower channel to reconsider a case it had settled earlier but which a party to the case was not satisfied with the decisions reached and had therefore appealed for a re consideration to the higher channel. We shall in the succeeding discussion examine these hierarchical channels of conflict resolution and management among the Tiv beginning with the *ya* (compound) council.

(A) *Ya* (compound) Unit: *Ya* refer to compound in Tiv and are the smallest social unit in Tiv society. It comprises members who have the same father. Conflict management and resolution begins from the *ya* (compound) unit. Yuhe (1978:15) posits that the *ya* (compound) is occupied by the man, his brothers, their wives, their children and dependants. Since compounds vary in size, it could harbour between ten to two hundred persons.

A compound is called after the name of its head who also sees to the welfare and represents his members in external discussions. The *or-ya* (compound head) is consulted in almost all matters and guarantees safe conduct in the compound. Most importantly too, conflicts between members of his compound and outsiders are referred to him for arbitration. However, Tseayo (1974:29) points out that despite having the powers and influence mentioned above, the compound head acting in this capacity was never an executive official but simply a spokesman; for whatever his prestige, he is granted influence only, not authority. This means that the *or-ya* must consult the other members of the compound before taking any decisions.

Atel (2004:15) explains that the problems or conflicts dealt with at this channel include cases of theft of small amount of money or property and adultery. The *ya* unit or council also settles cases of misunderstanding between individual members of the compound. The *or-ya* aided by other elderly members of the compound presides over problems brought to him and his council. Culprits of these offences are punished by the council after trial. A youth culprit is publicly flogged, and if his or her offence involved theft, restitution is made.

A culprit may be fined to bring a goat, chicken for the council members in what the Tiv call (*tia wuan/tia yan*) as a sign of reconciliation. Cases of adultery attract the performance of religious rituals on the women involved for their purification. Moti (1984:100) maintains that the motive for the fine and rituals:

... Lies in the Tiv understanding and belief that an offence committed in society violate both the traditional codes of good behaviour and the traditional beliefs. And as a celebration reconciles the members of the community just as the religious ritual restores the harmony of natural order.

Any issue that does not find a solution at this channel of conflict resolution is referred to the next level, which is the *Ingyor* group or unit.

(B)*Ingyor* Unit: The *Ingyor* unit or group comprises members who have a common great grandfather. As Atel (2004:16) further explains members of this unit share common benefits accruing from marriages of their daughters. The membership of the *Ingyor* unit is drawn from elders of the various *ya* units. The unit is headed by the eldest of its members. The *Ingyor* unit deals with issues which could not be resolved by the *ya* council. The matters and issues treated at the *Ingyor* unit include family farmland disputes, fighting, thefts, sickness and deaths of children, adultery involving members of different compounds, the giving of girls into marriage as well as divorce and the recovery of bride wealth.

(C)*Ityo* (Patrilineage) Unit: *Ityo* refers to patrilineage. According to Makar (1994:13), the *Ityo* consists mainly of people of common descent, with the same great-great-grand father. The average size of *Ityo* ranges between five hundred to one thousand people. Members of the *Ityo* cannot marry within but outside of it only. The *Ityo* has a council whose head is the eldest member of the extended family groups. The council ranks higher than the *Ingyor* council. The membership of the *Ityo* council comprises elders of the several *angor* (plural of *Ingyor*) groups that form the *Ityo* unit.

Atel (2004) maintains that the *Ityo* is the most effective body in Tiv traditional government. It has the highest political and religious powers and exercises the responsibilities of settling problems brought to it by the *angor* groups. The disputes include cases of theft, debts, and land

disputes among *kwav* (age grade). The *Ityo* council is responsible for decisions involving communal projects and labor. Most conflicts brought to the *Ityo* for adjudication are resolved at this level. This has to do with the fact that the elders of the *Ityo* possess physical and metaphysical powers and could bring any of these to bear on an earring kin either negatively or positively. Since, no one would want to be labelled a deviant and witchcraft used on him/her, most matters reach their terminal end at this channel for conflict management and resolution; hence the supremacy of the *ityo* epitomized in the Tiv dictum *Or hembe Ityo ga-* meaning no one in above the kin group.

(D)Igba (Matrilineage): The *Igba* is the complimentary institution to the *Ityo*. *Igba* offers the individual spiritual and social security against the malice of his *Ityo* (patrilineage/paternal kinsmen). Adegba (2004:84) explains that the Tiv hold the belief that only someone from your agnostic lineage segment can bewitch you. Thus, when this occur the *Igba* (maternal kinsmen assisted by the *kwav* age grade) intervene and demand the withdrawal of the evil. As a result of the above scenario, when an individual feels uncomfortable in his *Ityo* , he/she can go to his/her *Igba* and establish his/her self amongst them. This explains why the *Igba* is very important and plays a very crucial role in the lives of their daughter/sister and her children. Therefore, when a woman begins to have problems and conflict in her husband's place regarding constant illness and children (*u tseen*) or omens and death, the *Igba* becomes the last resort for arbitration and settlement of the misunderstanding. Sometimes, the issue could be a problem between her and her husband. What is to be noted however is that, the *Igba* is not invited in the first instance when there is a problem between a woman and her husband, the problem is first of all handled in the immediate family of the woman's husband? In playing their role therefore, a particular *Igba* could evacuate their daughter/sister and her children for protection in their own place till such a period they are convinced that the security of both is guaranteed before allowing them to return to their *ityo*.

(E)Tar (Land): *Tar* primarily refers to an area containing a group of people bound together by kinship. This is anthropologically referred to as lineage. When taken as a descent group, the land which the Tiv occupy and till is called *Tar* Tiv (Tiv land). However, in relation to Tivland as a whole, *tar* is internally divided into lineage segments of varying depth or number of generations. Atel (2004) also points out that the British colonialists referred to *tar* as a clan and that it has a great membership whose ancestor is nearer in generation of Tiv, the founder of the ethnic group himself. Each *tar* unit holds a group consciousness based on a common experience of difficulties and sufferings its founding members may have encountered in their efforts to settle in the present Tiv land. Furthermore, the *tar* unit is held together by a council made up of elders from the *ityo* units. The *tar* council is the absolute administrative body in the Tiv traditional system of governance. The *tar* council takes decisions on matters affecting the whole *tar* unit. When inter-ethnic conflicts and wars were fought, the *tar* council sought to restore peace by deliberating on the conflicts. At the end of such wars the *tar* council performed religious rites to mark the end of hostilities. The *tar* council also met for discussion on unusual and unexpected calamities and epidemics and famine. It is worthy to note that the *tar* unit as a larger unit deliberates on matters affecting one *tar* and the other i.e. inter-*tar* (clan) conflicts. However, this does not mean that conflicts within a particular *tar* which defy a solution at the lower channels for conflict management and resolution are not handled by the *tar* unit. Thus, the lower four channels of

conflict management and resolution among the Tiv deal mostly with intra-clan conflicts within a particular *tar*; while the tar council handles mostly inter clan conflicts.

(F)Ijir Tamen (supreme council): The *ijir tamen* which is the supreme council of the Tiv meets at Gboko the administrative headquarters of the Tiv under the leadership of the Tor Tiv. It is a recent channel which came about with the creation of the Tor Tiv stool in 1946. The council is composed of the *Tor Tiv*, the *uter* (2nd class chiefs), the *utyo mbaiorov* (clan heads), *mbatarev* (kindred heads), *ati a tor* (chieftaincy title holders). While attendance at the *ijir tamen* is open to all Tiv sons and daughters, decisions are taken by the aforementioned beaded chiefs and traditional title holders. The *ijir tamen* like the Jewish Sanhedrin handles all the cases unresolved by lower levels of conflict resolution; these are mostly matters affecting one *tar* and the other, mediation in conflicts affecting Tiv sons and daughters. It is at *ijir tamen* that decisions are taken on who to confer Tiv chieftaincy titles on in recognition of their achievements and contribution to the development of Tivland in particular and Nigeria at large. The *ijir tamen* also enacts policies and take far reaching decisions on matters affecting Tivland and its development.

The effects of the channels for conflict management and resolution in Tiv Society

The effects of the use of the hierarchical channels for conflict management and resolution among the Tiv cannot be over emphasised. This can be seen in the positive and negative perspectives. With reference to the positive effects therefore; the hierarchical channels ensures that peace reigns supreme in Tiv society. The promotion of peace does ensure that conflicts are brought to the lowest minimum and where such conflicts could not be averted earlier strenuous efforts are made towards resolving same quickly to avoid escalation.

This further protects lives and property and encourages fraternal love between members of a community. The implication of the above is that rather than resort to violence and war; the path of dialogue is properly explored and followed. Similarly, the hierarchical channels make it possible for aggrieved persons in the community to pursue justice to a logical conclusion which can be likened to the observance of the rule of law in modern societies. Thus, if a matter could not be settled to the satisfaction of an aggrieved party at a particular channel such a party has the opportunity of appealing to the next channel until the matter reaches the *ityo* or *tar* for amicable arbitration and resolution.

The rest of Africa can learn from the experiences of the Tiv and adopt these hierarchical modes of conflict management and resolution strategies. It is observable that Africa is bedevilled by several conflicts ranging from religio-cultural, political, geographical, economic and social conflicts. A look at the African continent would reveal several conflicts spanning several decades such as the one in Congo Democratic Republic (DRC), Sudan and South Sudan, the Saharawi conflict in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt Mali and the Islamic insurgence in northern Nigeria, The Boko Haram etc. These conflicts undoubtedly have affected the development of Africa in all ramifications. Thus, if the continent adopts the Tiv modes for conflict resolution and management strategies, most of these conflicts that besiege it would be resolved amicably instead of the resort to wars and social strives at the slightest provocation. It is our belief that these when adopted would create a peaceful environment that will spur the continent on the threshold of development which has eluded the continent right from independence. However, there are always two sides to a coin; thus good as the channels for conflict management and

resolution among the Tiv are, they also have their flaws which pose a serious challenge to their successful operation. This is what will preoccupy our attention in the next sub-theme below:

The Challenges to the Channels for Conflict Management and Resolution among the Tiv of Nigeria

Though the hierarchical channels for conflict management and resolution among the Tiv appears to be ideal and perfect, there are several factors which pose serious challenges to the realization and smooth operation of these conflict management strategies. These challenges include:

Corrupt Traditional Institution: Corruption refers to an unethical behaviour by a person in authority. It is also seen as wrong doing by those in special position of trust. This behaviour is commonly applied to self-benefiting conduct by public officials and others dedicated to public service (Encarta 2007). In this respect, corruption is synonymous with dishonesty, exploitation, sleaze, bribery, fraud and venality. With reference to this, the traditional institution in Tivland has become very corrupt. This has made traditional rulers saddled with the dispensation of justice in their domains to engage in unwholesome practices the taking bribes from persons with interests in conflicts. It is a common phenomenon to note the fact that corruption breeds inconsistency in a person's behaviour as the person is no longer firm in his/her decision. As a result, when these traditional rulers take bribe they alter the course of justice thereby. This trend has made the traditional institution to lose their integrity. This has made many a Tiv lose interest in the traditional institution which is often seen as being part of the problem rather than a solution and no one would therefore listen to them or take them seriously.

Thus, in total agreement to the above, East(1965:401) maintain that in order to enhance their source of income the chiefs (Traditional Rulers) collect large sums of money from the guilty party at night. Sometimes when the chiefs collect bribes from both parties to a conflict, they find it difficult to settle the matter the natural way and this result in a protracted and prolonged adjudication of cases and the desperation of justice is delayed and in legal circles justice delayed is justice denied. As Adegba (2011:71-74) observes, this unethical behavior of the traditional institution in Tivland has only succeeded in making it a titular institution without authority, love and respect as it is often flouted with a wave of the hand by the Tiv. This has no doubt posed a serious challenge to the channels for conflict management and resolution in Tivland. Corruption is the end product of greed and greed breeds conflict in society. The behaviour of the traditional institution poses a serious challenge to the channels for conflict management and resolution among the Tiv.

Vile Threats from Elders: Leadership among the Tiv rest squarely in the hands of elders (gerontocracy). The *Ityo* is therefore led by the eldest person whom Agaku (2010:106) notes must be physically, mentally and spiritually strong. Therefore, elders in possessions of these Trinitarian powers especially the spiritual powers of witchcraft could either exercise same positively or negatively. Being conscious of their powers they sometimes issue vile threats to litigants using destructive clichés such as *u bume u kpe* (if you joke you will die). Naturally, the Tiv are afraid to entangle themselves in the web of elders who using the powers of *tsav* (witchcraft) could threaten them with or even cause their death. Abeghe (n.d:11) Subscribes to this when he wrote that:

The fear of Mbatsav (witches) silently settles almost all quarrels, political decisions and subdues discontent and raging revolt. The naked fear of death dominates every body's life, distorts characters, robs a firm man of his will, an honest man of his fortunes, a free man of his independence, a sincere man of his love for truth, a proud man of his dignity, an intelligent man of his logic and conscience.

As a result of this scary use of intimidation by the elders who are ever conscious of their powers, especially when they want a case settled in their favour most Tiv abandon the quest for justice mid-way even though the hierarchical channels gives room for appeal to a superior or higher channel should a litigant be unsatisfied with decisions take by a lower channel. This issue also poses a challenge to the channels for conflict management and resolution among the Tiv.

The 'Or hembe Ityo ga' Phenomenon: Literally meaning no one is above his/her clan or lineage; the cliché demands total acceptance, submission and adherence of to decisions taken by the *ityo* (patrilineage) on issues brought to it for adjudication. Thus, hiding under the guise of the powers of *ityo* Tiv elders in the different clans often tell an unsatisfied litigant *or hembe ityo ga*. Thus, whether a person is satisfied with decision taken in a matter or not, he/she is expected to take the decision reached in good faith, hence that is the way the *ityo* feels the matter should end in the interest of the clan or lineage. However, we feel that this is not right as the elders and *ityo* could collectively err in their decision, and as such a person could appeal further in his/her quest to get justice. Most often, when the *ityo* reaches this decision they withdraw their support for the unsatisfied party and would in extreme cases denounce such a person as not belonging to their lineage. For the African nothing can be more disheartening than the threat of losing one's clan or lineage by way of ostracization. The most common thing that happens is for such a person to quietly withdraw from the matter. This Phenomenon is tantamount to truncating justice and it is a serious challenge to the channels for conflict management and resolution among the Tiv.

Modern Legal System: The Tiv refer to this development as *tar u ainge ka tar u uke* that is the modern word is a legal world. This means that the modern legal system supersedes the traditional judicial system. As a result of this phenomenon, conflicts which ordinarily could be managed and resolved by the *ityo* (patrilineage) traditionally are taken up by the modern legal system under the guise of *tar u ainge ka tar u uke*. As a result, Tiv litigants report cases to the police which are filed in the courts of law with the engagement of lawyers. This does not only prolong the issue but similarly brings in confusion into such conflicts as most often than not the lawyers have no knowledge of the problem as such cases could occur outside their localities where they may never have been to. This becomes a problem not only for those involved in the conflict but the whole clan particularly when it has to do with land issues that could best be adjudicated by the traditional rulers who are on ground and know their areas very well (Akasi 2012: 3-4).

Several traditional rulers interviewed on this issue in Ukum Local Government Area of Benue State during a field study including: Tyoor Dooti Azande (*Tyulugh* District), Tyoor Teran Kwaghbo (*Lumbur* District), Tyoor J. Alabaa (*Kundav* District), Tyoor Mtindian Abaivo (*Borikyo* District), Tyoor Angenyi Ikpavungu (*Kendev* District) and Tyoor D.I. Koosu (*Azendeshi* District) Vehemently decried the modern legal system and the interference of lawyers in cases adjudicated by the traditional institution in Ukum particularly and Tivland in general (oral Interview).

According to them as the custodians of the people's culture they have general information concerning their subjects regarding family history and ownership of land. However, when disputes arise and are brought before the traditional institution, no sooner are lawyers who have no knowledge of the dispute and the disputed land brought in to confuse issues. They maintained that most often than not the lawyers are not even of their ethnic group (Tiv) and wondered why they accept to handle cases they have little or no knowledge of. They therefore, opined that for land disputes to be solved amicably, the traditional institution aided by the *Ityo* and not the government represented by the modern legal system should adjudicate and resolve such conflicts (oral interview). This issue as we can see poses a great challenge to conflict resolution among the Tiv who are traditionally farmers and depend so much on land for their subsistent farming.

Tiv Elites: This group is made up by the educated, wealthy and influential Tiv sons and daughters occupying affluent positions in government and the private sector. These because of their affluence in society would always want things to go their way irrespective of where the truth of the matter really lies. Thus, making use of their wealth they thwart the course of justice. This is the group which is responsible for land seizures and grabbing in Tivland thereby creating conflicts.

These are seen amassing land everywhere they can get. The irony is that having acquired the land, it is fenced and left to rodents and reptiles which pose a serious threat to the health of members of the community. This behaviour by the elite no doubt creates tension and sometimes violent conflicts in Tiv land. The fact is that land is precious to the Tiv hence their very existence as an agrarian people rest squarely on the cultivation of land. Tseyo (1973:19) was therefore right when he observed that: Every adult member of the family has the agnatic right to sufficient land to farm for his wives and children. As a result of its all important functions the Tiv do not sell land as it is communally owned – a sacred community given to them by Aondo (God) the Supreme Being. Land as a sacred commodity to the Tiv is capable of evoking emotions which not properly handled could result into violent conflict in defense by its owner(s).

Partisan Traditional Institution: Another issue which poses a challenge to the effective operation of the channels for conflict resolution and management among the Tiv is the problem of partisan traditional institution involving all category of traditional rulers in Tivland. It is not an exaggeration to infer that some traditional rulers and chiefs in Tivland are card carry members of the various political parties in Nigeria. Thus, they openly identify with such political parties and politicians. This has ensured that such traditional rulers lose their respect among the Tiv; but they are equally not taken seriously. It is no gain stating the obvious fact that this posture is quite dangerous to conflict resolution when those saddled with this responsibility traditionally become partisan and are not taken serious by their subjects. The common name the Tiv ascribe to these Traditional rulers is '*ator a patii*' (partisan chiefs).

Hundu (2013:9) decried this change of event when he lamented that the traditional rulers in Tivland are no longer pro people nor do they maintain the truth in the adjudication of cases brought before them but are openly partisan. Their main concern he maintain is the acquisition of wealth. The partisan nature of the traditional institution was responsible for the near collapse of law and order in Tivland during the national elections in Nigeria in 2011. There is the need for the traditional institution to be a partisan as fathers of the people hence by virtue of their royal

and sacred positions they are the ones to settle the political crises between their subjects and not being neck deep in such issues.

The Way Forward

The paper has examined conflict management and resolution in Tiv society with particular reference to the issues which pose a serious challenge to the actualization of this hierarchical system for conflict management. Having examined these obstacles it is observable that the traditional institution has received a substantial portion of the blame. While part of the blame could also go some Tiv persons; it is obvious that the traditional institution has come under criticisms not for any reason other than the fact that conflict management and resolution among the Tiv rests squarely within their jurisdiction. Therefore, if they for any reason engage in unethical behaviours which threaten the smooth operation of the conflict management strategies; then they should take the blame with the view of looking inwards and taking a pro people stance in handling their affairs. We therefore, seek a way forward out of these challenges and obstacles in the following ways:

1. We suggest that the traditional institution with due honour and humility must maintain its integrity and honesty, virtues seen in them which earned them their exalted positions in the first place. They must resist all the temptations accruing from greed to take bribes to enhance their economic and social status. When the traditional institution becomes too corrupt and scandalous it loses its respect and authority over the subjects.
2. Tiv elders/chiefs must also rescind the idea of using vile threats and witchcraft to intimidate litigants seeking justice in their courts. The constant use of the cliché “*u bume u kpe*” which scares the people amounts to the mis-use of the sacred powers conferred on them to help them govern and lead the Tiv in the fear of *Aondo* (God).
3. Also, the Phenomenon of “*or hembe ityo ga*” should be discouraged. This is because while not necessarily being confrontational to the Tiv traditional philosophy and beliefs; it is obvious that sometimes a person could feel he/she has not been treated fairly in a case and would want to appeal to a higher channel which is guaranteed and it is a right the person is entitled to. However, when the retrogressive cliché “*or hembe ityo ga*” is employed; the dis-satisfied party to a conflict is cajoled into lame submission as he/she would not want to be portrayed as working against the wishes of his/her people.
4. In the same manner, while the modern legal system is indispensable in resolving conflicts in a modern world; it should also have its boundaries particularly on sensitive issues such as land. This is because some of the lawyers who are invited to handle cases in Tivland are often from different ethnic groups. The obvious question is how can they say the exact thing when they are not from such places?. The use of legal terminologies and technicalities to win such cases often breed long lasting conflicts spanning several generations. It is our candid opinion that, while lawyers and the modern legal system can be engaged, they should work in conjunction with the traditional institution and *ityo* for amicable resolution of such conflicts. Might is not always right and so is money not everything.

Having said the above, influential Tiv elites who use their affluence and wealth to perpetrate land speculation and land grabbing in Tivland must note that one day they would leave this world which is only a transitional home. Then they would only need a small rectangular piece of land less than 20 metres wide and six feet deep. That would be their permanent portion as they would

need nothing more than this. So why would they cause conflict on a commodity given by *Aondo* which is not even sold if not for modernity and its encumbrances?

Finally, the key to a peaceful Tiv society and to an extent Nigeria and the world large does not rest with a selected few either for their positions or their roles in breeding certain conflicts in their communities. This means that all Tiv and Africans must put hands on deck to ensure that peace reigns supreme in their various communities. Only then would Tivland in particular and Africa in general would start thinking of development, if not development will continue to elude the continent amidst the various socio-cultural, religious, political and geographical conflicts that surrounds it.

Conclusion

The paper has examined the channels for conflict management and resolution in Tiv society and the challenges inherent in the actualisation of these hierarchical channels. It established that the hierarchical channels begins from the *ya* (compound), *Ingyor*, *ityo* (patrilineage), *igba* (matrilineage) and the *tar* which handles very serious matters such as wars and epidemics affecting one *tar* and the other. Where a conflict is carefully managed and the issue resolved, the conflicting parties engage in the ritual performance of *Ifan i gberen* or *ifan i hamber* or *mngerem ma gberen* which is the pouring of libation and dispelling of the effecting influence of curses pronounced during the conflict. This was symbolically done by sipping water from a calabash and spurting it out to signify that *ndorough ku gba-* peace would reign supreme and that the water would put out the heat occasioned by the conflict. Also, the conflicting parties could *kuve* (embrace) as a sign of peace and fraternal love between them. This is followed by the eating of *kwagh yan man man sorom ma himen iyongo* – which is the food and beer of reconciliation indicating that conflict and differences are over.

Thus, as can be seen from the discussion, the various councils/channels for conflict management and resolution are inter-connected in the way they seek to deal with matters of concern to them. As Atel (2004) correctly observes, the councils or units to an extent carried out their operations based on what is known as the “principle of subsidiary”. Matters which involve members of a particular unit are dealt with by the council of that unit, just as matters which intra-units involving two units of the same are ranking. The elders who constitute and preside over the various channels/units or councils are assisted by men of influence, prestige and affluence. They are expected to have knowledge of their lineage. Their field of knowledge is intimately connected with the elders. That means they have a good knowledge of the genealogical history of the lineage, and customary laws. They therefore possess in addition to the above, great oratorical skills, ability to discuss and persuade wisdom in settling matters and conflicts.

However, the channels have certain challenges which pose a challenge to their actualisation. These challenges amongst other include: corrupt traditional institution, vile threats from elders and chiefs of the various clans in Tivland, the *or hembe ityo ga* phenomenon which emphasises the supremacy of the clan over the individual no matter his/her social position. The other challenges to the smooth operation of the channels of conflict management and resolution among the Tiv can be seen in the roles of the modern legal system and Tiv elites as well as the issue of partisan traditional rulers. All these have pooled a combined force to pose a threat and challenge to the smooth operation and actualisation of the channels for conflict resolution and management

among the Tiv. Despite these challenges however, the paper notes that the creation of peace and its maintenance is the a prerogative of a few, it therefore calls on all Tiv of good will to work towards making peace a reality in their communities. This is the only way through which Tivland and Africa in general could overcome the challenges of development which stares at the continent amidst the various conflicts that becloud it.

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The Failure of Nation State Building and the Development Crisis in Africa

By
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Abstract

Fast developing countries have invested heavily in security while those emerging from bloody civil wars, mostly inter-ethnic in nature; have embraced transitional justice approaches to reconcile warring parties. Globally, economic development is predicated on a peaceful environment. Africa ranks poorly in realizing these drivers of development and thus features as one of the poorest continents. Unresolved violent and structural conflicts dampen the possibility of African countries, Kenya included, joining the league of developed countries despite being endowed with natural resources and high skilled human power. The unresolved structural conflicts which manifest in violent ethnic conflicts during elections also make regional efforts by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda to make the East Africa Community (EAC) a thriving economic bloc and a political federation a pipe dream. Proponents of regional integration assume that intra-state relations are highly consensual and fail to appreciate that most states are not cohesive entities and are ravaged by deep-seated ethnic animosities. Reconciliation at the national level, therefore, should be of priority before venturing into regional and global integration. The main concern is that unless reconciliation is addressed satisfactorily to root out structural conflicts, violence will continue to recur during elections. This paper will attempt to show that there is a nexus between peace and development and at the same time review reconciliation efforts in Kenya. It will also point out areas where there is need for further research. The paper will use contemporary examples from Africa and elsewhere to enrich its content and provide clarity on salient issues in peace and development. Mainly Truth and reconciliation initiatives in African countries like South Africa, Rwanda and Liberia will be compared and contrasted with the approach taken by the Kenya's Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission. The main objective of the paper is to show that there is a nexus between peace and development. The paper specifically analyses the centrality of reconciliation in attaining enduring peace.

Keywords: Ethnic Conflict, Reconciliation, Development, bloody civil wars, and Reconciliation

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Introduction

Fast developing countries have invested heavily in security while those emerging from bloody civil wars, mostly inter-ethnic in nature, have embraced transitional justice approaches to reconcile warring parties and guarantee enduring peace or positive peace as opposed to negative peace which is short-term (Galtung, 1969). Globally, economic development is predicated on a peaceful environment. Peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are prerequisites for sustainable development (Salih, 2008). Africa ranks poorly in realizing these drivers of development and thus features as one of the poorest continents. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2007), majority of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the world are in Africa. At the one extreme, the LDCs will remain trapped at a low level of economic development and by 2015, they will be the major locus of extreme dollar-a-day poverty in the global economy. They will continue to fall behind other developing countries and be obliged to call on the international community for aid to tackle humanitarian crises and for peace-keeping missions to deal with recurrent conflicts (UNCTAD, 2007).

Historical Paths to Ethnic Disintegration

In realist view, the world is anarchic and has no world government to ensure there is international order (Morgenthau, 1985). States are in constant pursuit of power disguised as national interests (Morgenthau, 1985). In seeking to dominate the world, the Western powers sought to expand their sphere of influence by having colonies. Colonialism was the genesis of national disintegration. Africa's security problems and the failure of nation-state building can be traced to the 1884-85 Berlin Congress where the political map of Africa was drawn, not by Africans, but by Europeans intent on staking claim on Africa's natural resources. Many violent conflicts in the Third World illustrate difficulties in the political integration of diverse ethnic groups into the same territorial boundaries. In much of Africa nationhood has lost ground to ethnic and sectarian identities and the capacity of states has been eroded by prolonged fiscal crises, corruption, ethno-clientelist politics, and the autocratic manipulation of democratic transitions (Joseph, 2003). State failure is not a static concept rather it denotes a continuum of circumstances afflicting states with weak institutions; this continuum extends from states that do not or cannot provide basic public goods through to Somalia-style collapse of governance (Thakur, *et al*, 2005).

The 1884-85 Berlin Congress: The Genesis of Ethnic Disintegration

The 1884-85 Berlin Congress bequeathed Africa with at least two legacies which have shaped its security problems. First, is the construction of the nation-state where African states emerged from authoritarian structures of their colonial past unlike in Europe's replacement of older empires with states comprising some combination of cultural, linguistic and patriotic unity (Poku, 2008). The second legacy is the division of traditional ethnic groups among numerous colonial states which led to a number of diverse identities, ethnicities and cultures being grouped into new states while at the same time separating nations with rich and unified histories into separate states (Poku, 2008). Colonial imperialists divided Africa into nation-states without regard to cultural, linguistic, religious or social boundaries leaving out of the over fifty states only Ethiopia and to some extent Liberia and Sierra Leone with clearly defined cultural identity (Nasong'o, 2000). The rest of the countries comprise a mixture of disparate peoples without a

core cultural tradition around which all others may coalesce leading Africa to be a continent laden with ethnic hatred and animosity which renders programmes geared towards national cohesion futile (Nasong'o, 2000).

In Rwanda, the French and Belgian colonial powers in a desperate attempt to divide Rwandese and scuttle nationalism, orchestrated ethnic consciousness and indigenous people started referring themselves as Hutu and Tutsi. Prior to colonialism, the ethnic divisions were non-existent as Batusti, a Plain Nilotic people believed to have been a branch of Banyakole had been culturally assimilated by Bahutu after conquering them and the two speak the same language, Kinyarwanda (Nasong'o, 2000). Colonialism hardened the distinction between the two ethnicities and aroused the possibility of communal action as Hutu or as Tutsi which had barely been conceivable in the pre-colonial situation (Clapham, 1998). The incorporation of the Tutsi monarchy and its ruling group in the structure of colonial rule by French and Belgian colonizers sowed the seeds of discord (Clapham, 1998). Hutu formed a substantial majority compared to Tutsi.

Colonial Divide and Rule Policy along Ethnic Lines

The divide and rule policy practiced by colonial masters catapulted the disintegration of African states. Faced with the threat of being defeated by liberation movements in their colonies, the colonial masters improvised the policy to ensure there was no cohesion among various ethnic groups in a state. The policy which culminated in gross human rights abuses was possible because globally, few states are pure nation-states (ethnically homogenous). Less than 10 percent of the world's states can claim to be true nation-states, and at least 2,000 subconscious ethnic communities exist (Jeong, 2000). For example, in Sudan, the British colonialists (1898-1956) sided with the Northerners who are mainly Muslim Arabs to marginalize the Southerners majority of whom are Christian Africans. This served to further marginalize the South which previously had gone through a series of neglect and human rights abuses including slave raiding by occupation forces like Turco-Egyptian regime (1820-1883), and Mahdiyya (1883-1898), which was an early form of Sudanese nationalism (Holt & Dally, 2000; El-Talib, 2004).

The origin of the Sudan problems predates the unequal legacy of the colonial system in the twentieth century. Tensions between the South and the North have their roots in the nineteenth century after the Turco-Egyptian conquest of Sudan in 1820 (Brown, 1993). The empire which reigned until 1883 exacerbated tensions by conducting massive slave raiding of the South. According to Okoth (2000), the Turco-Egyptian rule over Sudan and some parts of Uganda, was characterized by misrule, oppression and enslavement of Africans in the Southern Sudan and Northern Uganda. The Turco-Egyptian regime was ousted by Mohammed Almed from North who referred himself as Mahdi (saviour) and thus formed a Mahdist state which ruled by decree between 1883 and 1889 and continued slave-raiding Southerners (Okoth, 2000). The British colonial rule from 1889 to 1954 entrenched the impoverishment of Southern Sudanese by concentrating development projects in the North (Okoth, 2000; Meredith, 2006).

Although scholarly literature analyzed in this section concur in tracing the genesis of civil wars to colonial legacy, it does not address the transitional justice system which needs to be put in place to guarantee enduring peace in states with a history laden with historical injustices.

Ethnic Rivalry and Failure of Nation-State Building in Post Independent Era

The ethnic fault lines created by colonialists served as a basis of civil wars in post independent governments. The struggle for independence waged by liberation movements which ultimately became the ruling parties was a struggle to wrest all power from the colonial authorities rather than to share it (Khapoya, 1979). The liberation movements were formed along ethnic lines and each ethnic group championed the interests of its members. The struggle was a zero-sum game whereby the winner takes it all. In the post colonial period, the liberation movements which fought for independence from colonial powers, evolved into armed struggle between rival ethno-political groups over the control of newly independent states (Jeong, 2000; Nyawalo, 2011). As a result, many conflicts especially in Africa have an ethnic dimension (Mudida 2009).

Post independent governments embraced the colonial legacy to consolidate power. The post independent regimes failed to nurture the growth of nationalism by allowing political parties to be formed on ethnic lines rather than on national interests. The regimes turned out to be oppressive and were no better than the colonialists. Coups and counter coups became rampant as disillusioned armies sought to overthrow the oppressive regimes. Civil wars also became dominant as colonial liberation movements turned against the independent governments. The Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union served to heighten the crisis as the super powers aligned with either the oppressive governments or rebels supplying arms and offering logistical support (Ogot, 2000). For example, Angolan conflict which started in 1975 after the country's independence from Portugal, involved 200,000 government forces against 15,000 anti-communist guerillas supported by South African arms and troops (Ogot, 2000). 'The Angolan forces were supported by 20,000 Cuban troops, 1,000 Soviet advisers and 2,500 East Germans' (Ogot, 2000). Countries which have been ravaged by coups and civil wars in the post independent period include Sudan, Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia and Uganda.

The signing of Sudan's 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) which paved way for a process of attainment of independence of the South Sudan in July 2011 ended a protracted social conflict which dates back to the country's independence in 1956. Throughout the colonial period and the civil war that lasted close to five decades, human rights violation was committed especially in the Southern Sudan, now an independent state. The first signs of trouble in Sudan came in the run up to independence when British colonial officials were replaced largely by northerners, enhancing southern fears about northern domination (Meredith, 2006). The independent Sudan government which mainly drew its members from the North was not better than the British colonial masters. The government which was dominated by Northerners continued the policy of politically, socially, economically, and culturally marginalizing the South (House, 1989). In the period preceding independence, Northern politicians promised to consider southern demands for a federal constitution that would protect southern provinces from subordination to northern control. But once in power, northern politicians failed to fulfill their promise arguing that a federal arrangement would be a step towards breaking up Sudan (Meredith, 2006). The two civil wars, Anyanya I (1956-1972) and Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), 1978-2005, were predicated on the need to end injustices committed by the North against the South.

Maluki and Ayom (2011) contend that Sudan requires a post conflict reconciliation framework to address historical injustices. However, in rooting for a transitional justice process in form of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), the two fail to address whether justice should be part of the process and if not why. In Nigeria, ethnicity grew and became strongly entrenched even before independence, particularly among the three populous nationalities; Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba (Chukwu, 2000). Subnational group cohesion among the 250 ethnic and cultural groups overwhelmed national solidarity in 1966 leading to the first coup which overthrew the first Nigerian Republic (Andrian, 1988). As ethnic regionalism became stronger, both Westerners and Easterners opposed northern domination of the central government (Andrian, 1988). Westerners are mainly Yoruba Christians; Easterners are Igbo while Northerners are mainly Hausa-Fulani who are Muslims. Politicians lacked effective control over the military and police; hence from 1966 through 1979, several military governments ruled Nigeria (Andrian, 1988). The polarization of the three main ethnic groups did not take long to yield results. The first civil war (Biafra war) broke out on July 6, 1967 when the regional head of Eastern region Col. Chukwuema Ojukwu declared the region an independent state of Biafra (Atofarati, 1992). The move by Ojukwu from Igbo ethnic group was prompted by President Yakubu Gowon's decision to divide Nigeria into 12 states without consulting him.

Ethnicity in Kenya

In Kenya, ethnicity and human rights violations can be traced to the colonial period (Okoth, 2010). Violence was part and parcel of the colonial state (Anderson, 1993). In the final years of the 19th Century, British colonizers conquered Kenya and in their divide and rule policy, they partitioned the country into administrative provinces and districts that on the whole, coincided with ethnic grouping (Wanyande, 2009). For example, the Kikuyu were placed in Central Province, Luo alongside with Kisii and Kuria communities (Nyanza Province), Luhya (Western Province), and Kalenjin and Maasai (Rift Valley Province) with Kisii, Kuria, Kalenjin and Maasai each given an administrative district (Wanyande, 2009).

The skewed colonial administrative boundaries gave each community a feeling that they were different from the others and the real or imagined unfair distribution of public resources fueled tensions (Wanyande, 2009). Post independent governments retained the colonial administrative boundaries to divide people and cling-on to power. Like the colonial government, successive independent regimes have also used violence to retain power. The regime of the founding President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) subjected opposition parties to political harassment and those individuals who refused to support the status quo experienced various types of repression and even detention without trial (Republic of Kenya, 2008). Repression under the second regime of President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) became more draconian as violence, including detention without trial, routine torture of perceived and real dissenters became the norm (Republic of Kenya, 2008). The development and institutionalization of one-party (KANU) state during the Kenyatta and Moi regime formed one of the many ugly faces of authoritarian rule in Kenya (Mogire, 2000).

The argument against political pluralism was that many parties were divisive and one party was necessary for forging unity. Although Moi agreed to multiparty democracy by allowing repeal of Section 2A in 1991, he was not ready to lose the presidency and thus between 1992 and 2002, violence became institutionalized during presidential, parliamentary and civic elections (Mogire,

2000). Human rights violations were committed by the government against its own people. The ethnic clashes that engulfed the country at the introduction of multipartism were instigated by the state and in some cases, tolerated by the government to cling to power and show that political pluralism was a recipe for chaos (Mogire, 2000).

A parliamentary select committee was established to investigate bloody ethnic clashes that rocked various parts of the country in 1992 and a judicial commission was constituted after the 1997 elections with similar mandate as the select committee. The violence hot spots were mainly cosmopolitan in nature and are found in Nakuru, Uasin Gishu, Trans Nzoia, Mombasa, among other areas. The recommendations of the two commissions, which among other things, called for further investigation and prosecution of top politicians behind the clashes, were not implemented. The argument especially by the ruling elite was that pursuit of justice would negate the realization of reconciliation. In their “wisdom”, and without backing of empirical evidence, they saw it prudent to forgo justice and pursue reconciliation through the provincial administration.

Ideally, political mobilization should revolve around ideologies but in the post independent Kenya, it has been along ethnic lines and political parties draw majority support from the ethnic groups of their leaders (Oloo, 2010). Ethnic-based politics fuels tensions and arouses colonial-old ethnic and inter-ethnic rivalries of unaddressed land problem. These differences lead to ethnic clashes during elections. The violence that was witnessed in 2007 general elections cannot, in any way, be compared with the sense of peace and triumph that greeted the 2002 general elections and there are fears that next elections and future elections will be marred by violence of higher magnitude unless reconciliation efforts are fast tracked to realize national cohesion and integration.

The Genesis of the Land Problem

The root cause of the land problem predates the independence period. The land problem originated in the 1930s when the Kenya Land Commission (1932-1933), popularly known as the Carter Land Commission, made recommendations that planted seeds of discord, among them, rejection of the notion that Africans had any rights in the former ‘White Highlands’ (Oucho, 2010). Before then, Asians had objected to reservation of land in Kenya’s highlands to White settlers who had secured exclusive right to the fertile highlands through a pledge by the Secretary of State, Lord Elgin in 1908 and the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, giving the colonial state the means to maintain the White highlands (Okoth, 2010). The forceful takeover of fertile land by white settlers, mainly from Central and Rift Valley provinces, led to the emergency of „squatters“ who eked a living by providing cheap labour in White Highlands. The colonial administration, through a decree, constrained black African to agriculturally unproductive areas known as ‘native reserves’. In order to guarantee themselves good returns from the world market and stifle the emerging agricultural economy which offered them stiff competition, the settlers prohibited black Africans from growing some cash crops like coffee and tea (Okoth, 2010). In addition to the land alienation, the introduction of individual land tenure in 1950s by colonial government, and which has been embraced by the independent governments, not only created a problem of landlessness for those who did not get titles but also made former tribal or clan land which was inaccessible to outsiders liable to pass by private sales into ownership of people outside the ethnic community (Murungi, 2000).

The Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s against the British colonialists was pegged on, among other things, repossessing land from the settlers and giving it back to its rightful owners. Even before the Mau Mau uprising land question was at the center of formation of organizations like KAU, KCA and YKA which were formed to champion the African cause at the height of colonial oppression. Although land repossession and redistribution was behind the fight against colonialism, independence did not provide solutions. The land settlement programme launched soon after independence (1963) steered clear of resolving the land problem (Oucho, 2010). The „willing-buyer-willing-seller“ approach taken by the Kenya’s founding President Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) was viewed by those whose land had been taken by the colonialist as betrayal as it was the home guards and the elite who were able to buy as individuals and also form land-buying companies to purchase land from the settlers largely from Rift Valley Province. In his 15-year tenure, President Kenyatta allocated chunks of land in Nakuru district (now Nakuru County) to his Kikuyu kinsmen who, in his view, were the landless deserving freely allocated land making the County one of the Kenya’s political hotbeds as the Kikuyu and Kalenjin scramble for land (Oucho, 2010). The second President Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002) was not different from President Kenyatta. He allocated public land in Nakuru County and other parts of the country to his political cronies in KANU to maintain their support and mobilize them to fight the multipartyism.

Search for Long Term Solutions to the Land Problem

The first two presidents, Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi, failed to address the land problem. They concentrated on parceling chunks of public land to their cronies.

In President Kibaki’s regime (2003- to- date) efforts have been made to find lasting solution to the land question. President Kibaki’s first attempt to address land problem came a cropper after the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, popular known as the Ndungu report (Ndungu Report, 2004), failed to be implemented. The report implicated high ranking officials in land grabbing. The Commission was, among other things, mandated to inquire into the legality of allocation of public land to private individuals and/or corporations, collect information on the nature and extent of unlawful and irregular allocations, ascertain any persons or corporations behind the unlawful and irregular allocations, and recommend legal and administrative measures needed to restore such land to rightful owner.

The second attempt was the formulation of the first National Land Policy in 2007 (Policy, 2007). The policy acknowledges that the transfer of power from colonial authorities to indigenous elites failed to bring about fundamental restructuring of the legacy of land instead resulted into re-entrenchment and continuity of colonial land policies, laws and infrastructure. The policy which designates all land in Kenya as public, community or private was formulated to, among other things, define the key measures required to address the critical issues of land administration, access to land, its use and restitution of historical injustice. It also addresses constitutional issues, such as, compulsory acquisition and development control and land tenure. Although the policy spelt out far reaching changes in addressing the land question, there was limited time to implement it before the 2007 general elections and avoid the politicization of the land issue as it had been the case in previous elections.

The 2007/8 post election violence was largely due to the unresolved land problem, and specifically, the failure by the government to implement the Ndungu report and to have the National Land Policy formulated in time to give room for its implementation before the

elections. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008, a legislation which born out of the mediation process to end the 2007/8 post election violence provided for reforms in key sectors, among them land, as a way of addressing the underlying long term issues which led to the violence. The coalition government, which was formed after the post election, violence agreed to enact a new constitution to provide a framework for implementing the envisaged reforms. Earlier attempts on constitutional reforms were unsuccessful. Efforts to enact a new constitution flopped in 2005 after majority of Kenyans voted against it partly because it did not provide a clear mechanism of addressing land problem. The Constitution of Kenya (2010) provided for the establishment of the National Land Commission. Some of the functions of the National Land Commission (Constitution, 2010 & Commission Act, 2012) are to initiate investigations, on its own initiative or a complaint, into the present or historical land injustices and recommend appropriate redress, and to establish and maintain a register of all public land, private land and community land in Kenya. A legislation establishing the National Land Commission was enacted in 2012 and members of the Commission appointed in the same year but were sworn-in in 2013. Literature reviewed in this section has shown that successive governments have failed to address historical land injustices which are the root cause of election violence. The government has also not succeeded in reconciling rival ethnic groups, specifically in Nakuru County, leading to further disintegration.

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC Report, 2013) has recommended for further investigation and possible prosecution for those who have grabbed public land. The report has been received with mixed reactions with those mentioned crying foul for not have had an opportunity to defend themselves while the civil society wants them to returned the land they have stolen in addition to being prosecuted. It remains to be seen whether any action will taken to address the land problem.

The elusive quest for reconciliation

Conflict is endemic and incompatibilities in goals, values and interests, have existed in society since time immemorial. While conflict can ruin much that is valued in life, it can also be beneficial (Mwagiru, 2006; Kamoet 2008). It makes it possible to know what is going wrong in society and provides a chance for warring parties to re-examine their relationship and try and make them better and much stronger (Mwagiru, 2006; Kamoet 2008). The challenge has been mitigating the negative effects of conflict by ensuring that structural conflict does not manifest into physical violence or its recurrence. Failure to address conflict at the de-escalation stage can lead a state to collapse.

Conflict resolution mechanisms such as preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and post conflict peace-building processes are employed in war-torn countries especially in the post-Cold War period to manage conflicts. Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali was the first to use the term post conflict peace-building to refer to actions taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). However, peace-building should not be treated as a post conflict mechanism; rather as a comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships (Lederach, 1998). According to Lederach (2003) conflict transformation is

to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.

The UN Security Council in February 2001 shifted from understanding peace-building as a post-war process (Schirch, 2008). It defined peace-building as aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict (Schirch, 2008) thus embracing conflict transformation as a mechanism of addressing conflict. In 2006, the UN established a Peace-building Commission. Peace-building refers to the full spectrum of interventions designed to facilitate the establishment of durable peace and prevent the recurrence of violence. Such interventions include peacekeeping, peace support operations, disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and re-integration (Karbo, 2008).

Lederach (2003) categorizes peace-building approaches by the type of actors involved in conflict. He argues that high level negotiations should be embraced when top leaders like military personnel, political and religious leaders, and prominent people are involved in conflict. On the other hand, when middle range leaders such as ethnic, religious and humanitarian leaders, academics and intellectuals, among others, are involved, the emphasis should be problem-solving workshops and peace commissions while conflict at the local level involving grass roots leaders need the intervention of local peace commissions (Lederach, 2003). In analyzing the peacebuilding approaches, Lederach does not state whether the interventions at the various levels can be carried out concurrently. There is no gainsaying that the various actors mentioned by Lederach can be involved in a single conflict.

Peace-building encompasses reconciliatory initiatives in form of truth commissions. Reconciliation, a transitional justice process, is the ultimate goal of peace-building. It is aimed at addressing past historical injustices. Transitional justice processes became more popularized as a way of dealing with past political, socio-economic and cultural injustices and ushering in peace in the post Cold War period (from 1990s) due to the high turn-over of countries which were emerging from bloody civil wars. The early 1990s witnessed the occurrence of ethnic conflicts in not only parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but also Africa (Lake & Rothchild, 1996). In societies scarred by ethnic animosity and religious intolerance, and there are many in the post Cold War period, transitional justice can be used to help consolidate democracy by reshaping identities that were the source of violence (Kymlicka, 2011). The identities are replaced with a strengthened sense of shared identity related to common membership in national political community (Kymlicka, 2011). Transitional justice, can therefore, be used as an instrument of forging national cohesion and integration. Transitional justice can take the form of prosecutions, truth, justice and reconciliation commissions, and reparations programmes (Lake & Rothchild, 1996).

The end of Cold War in 1989 and embracing of multiparty democracy provided a reprieve as governments came under pressure from civil society to address historical injustices. The post Cold War era has seen unprecedented resolve by some countries plagued by past historical injustices to embrace transitional justice approaches to offer justice to victims of past human rights violations and reconcile them with perpetrators.

Transitional justice is a response to massive or systematic violation of human rights that aims to recognize victims and to prevent the recurrence of abuse (Arthur, 2011). It can be traced to the

1948 Nuremberg trials. The trials, among other things, sought to secure justice to the victims of the Second World War and reconcile countries involved in the war. The Nuremberg trials culminated in the formation of the United Nations Commission of Human Rights (UNCHR) to spearhead protection of civil and political rights as well as social, economic and cultural rights following the massive atrocities committed in World War Two. The Cold War politics pitting the US against the Soviet Union and their allies stifled the advancement of transitional justice as the super powers were more concerned with meeting their strategic interests through their allies than addressing human rights violations. The objectives of UNCHR remained on paper as colonial powers subjected those they colonized to untold suffering.

Reconciliation is a conflict resolution method whose ultimate goal is restoration of pre-conflict relationship. It is a long term process that ignores strict formal legal processes and embraces cultural approaches to provide fresh impetus for displaced persons to return to their homes (CCR, 2010). Reconciliation is derived from Latin expression *conciliatus*, which means “coming together” and it implies a process, that of restoring the shattered relationship between two actors (Kumar, 1999). According to Miller (2005), reconciliation may involve recourse to justice particularly where one party has suffered egregiously relative to or at the hands of the other party. The process usually involves acknowledgement of guilt and sincere expression of regret and remorse by the oppressor and willingness to forgive on the part of the victims of such acts (Miller, 2005). Reconciliation in the broad sense has four dimensions, namely: accepting the status quo, correlating financial or other kind of accounts, bringing opposites to a common understanding, and setting aside past enmity and creation of emotional space for forging new relationships (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005). Although the first three dimensions fall short of full reconciliation, they are necessary constituent moments in the passage from violence and polarization to the peaceful management of contradiction and on to a final normalization of relations (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2005).


Approaches to Reconciliation

Just as there is no single cause of civil war, there is no universally agreed method of dealing with historical injustices (Misra, 2008). There are three approaches to reconciliation, namely: pardon, punishment, and amnesia. Punishment which is widely believed to have a deterrent effect reduces the likelihood that similar crimes will be repeated in the future, pardoning perpetrators is an insurance to political stability to a fragile democracy while reconciliation through amnesia though unpopular, is applicable in situations where there is no capital to fund commissions established to pursue retributive justice and popular pardon processes (Misra, 2008).

There is no one single prescription for addressing past injustices. Countries emerging from civil wars and a past laden with human rights abuses have embraced one or a combination of these approaches with varying results. For example, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa succeeded in addressing political injustices perpetuated by the white apartheid regime against blacks by popular pardon. The South African case was unlike Mozambique and Sierra Leone which chose reconciliation through amnesia.

Although almost one million civilians died and thousands were tortured after Mozambique’s two decades of civil war (1974-1994), there were neither calls for retributive justice nor truth seeking with intention to forgive (Misra, 2008). According to Lederach (cited in CCR, 210) there are four approaches to reconciliation, that is, truth, mercy, justice and peace, whose pillars have been

constructed in figure 2.2 overleaf. Forgiveness is another approach to reconciliation (Misra, 2008). A country can choose to embrace one or more of these approaches to address past historical injustices.



Source: Adopted from CCR 2010

The South African TRC had little to do with upholding retributive justice; rather, it was geared towards establishing a forum where those who had committed crimes could publicly confess their past crimes and it was up to the victims and their families to decide whether to forgive them (Misra, 2008). The mandate of the TRC was to look into physical violations, namely, killings, torture, abductions, and severe ill-treatment committed by all parties to the conflict between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 1994 (Fullard & Rousseau 2011). The Commission's mandate did not include pursuing justice to human rights violations during the apartheid era. The TRC found the primary perpetrators of gross human rights violations to have been the South African state and its security agencies, followed by an ethnically mobilized traditional organization, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), with whom it also colluded (Fullard & Rousseau 2011). The Commission noted that apartheid was a crime against humanity and although the African National Congress (ANC) and other liberations movements had fought a just war against it, certain limited activities they had taken in the course of the armed struggle had constituted gross human rights violations (Fullard & Rousseau 2011).

In Rwanda, a two-pronged approach to reconciliation was adopted to address human rights violations committed during the 1994 genocide. The transitional government chose to punish, and at the same time, forgive some of those who were behind the genocide. Amnesty was offered to those who volunteered to tell the truth. However, cases of rape and murder were not subject to amnesty. The government expanded the judiciary and incorporated the *Gacaca* system in an adapted form to cope with the high number of cases (Maran, 2008). *Gacaca* was an established

tradition for resolving conflicts and promoting reconciliation in families and local communities (Maran, 2008). The UN also set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) based at Arusha, Tanzania to bring justice to the victims of genocide by trying those who masterminded them.

Despite the UN having a long-standing policy of opposing peace agreements that include amnesties for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, gross violations of human rights, or serious violations of international humanitarian law, some oppressive regimes have denied justice to victims of violence by ensuring amnesty clauses shielding violence perpetrators from prosecution are inserted in peace accords formulated to end violence. This was the case in Uganda in the 1985 peace accord between President Tito Okello's government and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) led by Yoweri Museveni. The two inserted a clause in the 1985 peace agreement granting amnesty for those who had committed human rights violations in the past (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). In desperate attempts to woo LRA fighters led by their leader Joseph Kony, Museveni's government passed an Amnesty Act in 2000 which was seen as the most positive development in addressing the conflict (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). However, the amnesty was given a wide berth after Kony succeeded to convince his fighters that it was a lie and that they will be killed once they handed themselves in (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

The question is why did South Africa deny victims of human rights abusive justice by focusing only on restorative justice through TRC? Was pursuit of justice deemed to cause more division between blacks and whites? For the Rwanda case, justice was served to victims of genocide. Was justice a precondition to reconciliation of Tutsi and Hutu? These are questions which scholars in the reviewed works in this section did not address and are of interest to this study.

Wasted Effort: Reconciliation before Cessation of Inter-Ethnic Hostilities in Uganda

For clarity and to understand better why reconciliation initiatives to end inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya are failing, it is imperative to have a comparative analysis of reconciliation efforts in Uganda and Kenya. The analysis will offer useful insights on what can contribute to failure in national reconciliation. Uganda is appropriate for comparative purposes because it has been attempting in vain, to reconcile warring ethnic groups from 1986. Furthermore, the divide and rule policy by the British colonialists left members of various ethnic groups in the two countries divided and residing mainly in specific areas with varying levels of development.

Uganda has had a history laden with human rights violations. From the colonial period to the first independent government as well as subsequent authoritarian civilian and military regimes, Ugandans' rights have been trampled on (Nyeko, 1987). The colonial regime (1894-1962) ruled with an iron fist favouring the Buganda Kingdom which it used to administer indirect rule in other kingdoms. At independence in 1962, the North lagged behind in development as the British neglected the region only using it as a recruitment zone for soldiers (Mamdani, 1987). The fault lines had already been drawn at independence, like it was in Kenya and it was up to the independent government to rewrite the colonial history by ensuring equal development in all regions in Uganda. Sadly, like in Kenya, there was nothing to celebrate about after independence as civil and military coups and counter coups became rampant.

Milton Obote is credited with sowing the seeds of coups in Uganda. Obote, then the Prime Minister, in 1966 overthrew the Kabaka, forcing him to flee to exile, and orchestrated a constitutional change abolishing the kingdoms (Tindifa, 2006). He unilaterally declared himself the President and unleashed violence to those opposed to his autocratic rule, especially the Baganda, the dominant ethnic group. Obote's repressive regime was cut short by his army chief Idi Amin who violently took over the reins of power forcing him to seek exile in Tanzania, where he was hosted by President Julius Nyerere. Nyerere publicly denounced the presidency of Amin and gave Obote a dubious credential of a president in exile. Amin ruthlessly crushed those who opposed his rule.

In 1978, after Ugandan troops invaded Kagera, Nyerere rallied Ugandan liberation forces to overthrow Amin and reinstate a transitional government. The transitional government was rocked by internal wrangles and the 1980 election of Milton Obote did not offer a reprieve as the violent uprising which marked the 1970s continued unabated. Museveni's capture of state power in 1986 following a protracted armed struggle, was greeted with great optimism by Ugandan scholars and citizens alike (Okoth, 1987) but a quarter a century down the line, it has turned into despair. Kenya has enjoyed relative peace with peaceful transitions from one civilian regime to another. However, there was an attempted coup in 1982 which was crushed by loyal forces (Omasa *et al*, 2006).

There is no gainsaying that Uganda, like any other country faced with past historical injustices, needs reconciliation initiatives. However, the unique manner in which Amin and Museveni governments have attempted to address past historical injustices makes it a perfect study of how governments can use truth commissions to hoodwink citizens that they are different from past repressive regimes yet they are not.

The Amin regime is credited with having been the first in Uganda to initiate a truth seeking process, though not a transitional process in structure and context. Soon after assuming office in 1971 through a bloody coup, Amin unleashed violence to his opponents leading to disappearances and massacre of hundreds and thousands of Ugandans. Faced with public outcry, in 1974 he mischievously instituted a Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances of People in Uganda Since January 25, 1971. The Commission published a report, but none of its recommendations were ever implemented and the four who served in the Commission faced retaliation at the hand of the state in the wake of their revelations of state complicity in disappearances (Quinn, 2001).

The Amin regime was not keen on unearthing the truth but concealing it by appointing the Commission to buy time and appease the angry populace. In Kenya, the government showed first signs of its readiness to address past historical injustices in 2003 when the then National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in its first few weeks in office inaugurated a commission chaired by Prof Makau Mutua with mandate to study and make recommendation on the formation of a Truth Commission (TJRC, 2003). However, the government failed to implement the Commission's recommendation for formation of a TJRC. Parliament rejected Commission recommendation arguing that a TJRC would reopen old wounds that the country may not handle (CCR, 2010). In Uganda, one of the first activities undertaken by Yoweri

Museveni after overthrowing Tito Okello through a coup in 1986 was to establish the Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights.

The mandate of the commission headed by Justice Arthur Oder was to inquire, *inter alia*, into the causes and circumstances surrounding human rights violations, breaches of the rule of law, and excessive abusive of power committed against Ugandans by governments, civil servants and others parties between 1962 and January, 1986 when Museveni and the NRM assumed power (Commission of Inquiry, 1986). Most of its recommendations, which included suggestions for democratic development, human rights education, constitutional guarantees and international treaty responsibilities, prosecutions and legal responsibilities, and the need for reform in military and security sectors, were never implemented (Quinn, 2005 & Makau, 2007).

According to Quinn (2005), the Commission was unsuccessful because its mandate was extremely broad and vague and the government failed to finance it forcing it to finish its work in eight years (1994) outside its three-year time limit. Apart from financial constraints, the Commission was also unable to access certain areas like those occupied by Acholi and Karamojong due to raging hostilities. ‘Very few people ever had contact with the Commission, and many have stated that, although they might have heard about it, they were reluctant to open up to an apparatus of the state – a real concern because Ugandans had been routinely victimized by the state for many years’ (Quinn, 2005). Since the 1990s, Acholis in the diaspora have employed a traditional Acholi system of convening meetings known as ‘Kacoke Madit’ – big meeting or big conference in Dholuo, the language of Acholi – to reconcile warring parties (Mohamoud, 2005).

Kacoke Madit initiatives have helped stimulate support for peace among government and Non Governmental Organizations. The initiatives led to direct contacts between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 2006 though the peace initiative flopped. Two decades after the failed truth seeking process, there is still need to address past historical injustices in Uganda. However, the truth commissions need to be all inclusive. Indeed, it is impossible to run smoothly a truth commission when conflict rages on.

The difficulty in resolving historical injustices in ongoing conflicts like in the case of Uganda, brings to the focus that genuine truth seeking process should be all inclusive. In the Uganda case, first the raging conflict between Ugandan government supported by the US and Joseph Kony’s LRA should come to an end through an enduring peace process. Secondly, all players in past historical injustices whether victims or perpetrators, both within and without Uganda borders including neighbouring states like Sudan and South Sudan, should be prepared to tell the truth, acknowledge wrong doing, face the law for injustice committed and accept forgiveness where necessary. The question, “The Uganda crisis: What next?” posed by Nabudere (1987) in a journal article over two decades ago and aptly titled in the question form stands as relevant today as it was during that period.

The Kenyan Experience in Reconciliation

In Kenya, just like elsewhere in Africa, the first independent government led by Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) failed to overhaul colonial oppressive structures and build a cohesive society guided by equitable resource allocation in all regions. His predecessor Daniel arap Moi (1978-2002)

failed too. President Mwai Kibaki, despite overwhelmingly being voted into office in his first term (2002-2007) on the platform of reforms and more so addressing historical injustices, failed to live to the expectations of Kenyans. There were high expectations in 2003 following the election of President Mwai Kibaki in the 2002 general elections that his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government would address past injustices committed by the past two independent regimes (KEDOF, 2008). The NARC regime which was elected in a peaceful environment failed to live to this expectation through passing specific acts of Parliament that would have created institutions to reconcile, heal and promote national cohesion.

Although the NARC government established a task force chaired by Prof Makau Mutua with mandate to study and make recommendation on the formation of a Truth Commission (TJRC, 2003), it failed to implement the Commission's recommendation for formation of a Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The clamour for the Truth Commission died with the submission of the findings to Parliament where the report was rejected with the argument that the Commission would reopen old wounds that the country may not handle (CCR, 2010).

Like in the Moi regime, the Kibaki government bestowed the responsibility of reconciling warring ethnic groups to provincial administration. Moi and Kibaki governments shied away from undertaking a structured peace-building process and instead tasked District Commissioners, District Officers, Chiefs and Sub Chiefs with the responsibility of holding regular public meetings to reconcile warring ethnic groups in their areas of jurisdiction. This top-down peace-building process failed to ease ethnic tensions and recurrence of ethnic instigated violence especially during elections attests to this. In the period prior to the 2007 elections, the government established District Peace Committees (DPC) at the grass roots level chaired by District Commissioners (DCs) and drawing representatives from the business community, civil society, and faith-based groups.

The evolution and genesis of peace committees can be traced to the local level peace-building initiatives in early 1990s in Wajir culminating in the establishment of the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) in 1995 (Mohamud & Pkalya, 2006). Women in Wajir were the first to embrace community-led peace process after several NGOs withdrew from the area which was rocked by clan conflict which had degenerated into women fighting in the market places (Mohamud & Pkalya, 2006). The Wajir peace initiative borrowed heavily on traditional means of reconciling inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic warring factions where respected elders took the center stage in charting a peaceful path (Shenk, 1983).

The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK), on the other hand, concentrated its peacebuilding efforts on facilitating the establishment of Village Peace and Development Committees (VPDC) in Rift Valley and Western Provinces modeled in line with respective community's traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Shenk, 1983). After the peace committees proved a success, the government and civil society replicated the initiative to other areas. However, the peace committees operated on an *ad hoc* basis and they lacked an institutional frame work and co-ordinated approach. To seal the loophole, the government and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in 2001 established the National Steering Committee (NSC) on peacebuilding and conflict management bringing together representatives from relevant government ministries and departments, civil society organizations, development partners, and

UN agencies. The mandate of NSC is to co-ordinate peace-related activities in Kenya. In 2004, the NSC began the process of developing the national Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management. The final version of the policy was issued by Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security in 2009 (Draft Policy, 2009). The policy roots for establishment of the National Peace Commission, National Peace Forum, Provincial Peace Fora and District Peace Committees (DPCs) were created (Draft Policy, 2009).

The DPC, established by NSC prior the development of the policy, is chaired by the DC and has representatives from government departments, civil society organizations, and faith-based groups. As part of the implementation of Agenda Four of the National Accord which sought to end the 2007/8 post election violence and address underlying issues, the government established the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in 2009 to look into historical injustices from 1963 to December 2008. The Commission was rocked by wrangles over the appointment of its Chairman Bethuel Kiplagat.

Some civil society members argued that Kiplagat was not fit to lead the Commission due to allegations that he took part in some of the atrocities which were to be subject to investigation by the Commission. The government also established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in 2009 to monitor hate speech and champion integration and reconciliation programmes. The Commission has taken a number of politicians to court over hate speech and has also carried several integration and reconciliation meetings in various parts of the country. Despite the concerted efforts in peacebuilding by the government and civil society organizations, various parts of the country have been witnessing ethnic flare-ups. Several institutions have been calling for concerted efforts on the part of the government to ensure successful integration and reconciliation of Kenyans. For example, a report (Chaloka, 2012) by UN Special Rapporteur to the UN General Assembly in February 6, 2012 recommended to the government the strengthening of community peacebuilding and reconciliation initiatives at the national and local level to avert future recurrence of violence like it was witnessed during the 2007/8 post election violence.

A successful national reconciliation process can be informed by policies grounded by empirical research. But to date, not much research has been conducted on the reasons why national reconciliation initiatives fail in deeply divided societies after civil war or ethno political violence. Also not much has been done on the challenges facing national reconciliation (Fischer, 2011). There is need to interrogate these issues.

Inter-Ethnic Conflict as A Catalyst to Development Stagnation in Africa

Unresolved violent and structural conflicts dampen the possibility of African countries, Kenya included, joining the league of developed countries despite being endowed with natural resources and high skilled human power. The unresolved structural conflicts also make regional efforts by Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Rwanda to make the East Africa Community (EAC) a thriving economic bloc and a political federation a pipe dream. Simmering inter-ethnic tensions are rife in each of the five EAC member-states except Tanzania (Mpangala, 1998) which is relatively stable. Functional theorists like Mitrany (1975) have advocated for regional integration arguing that co-operation on political and economic sphere will wean states from the state-centric model which is conflictual. However, the proponents of regional integration assume

that intra-state relations are highly consensual and fail to appreciate that most states are not cohesive entities and are ravaged by deep-seated ethnic animosities. Reconciliation at the national level, therefore, should be of priority before venturing into regional and global integration. Unfortunately national reconciliation did not feature in a report prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to the African Union (AU) member-states on measures which need to be taken to accelerate regional integration (Report, 2004).

There is no gainsaying that peace is a prerequisite to development. Development is used here to refer to advancement in a broad range of issue, that is, political, economic, social and cultural. Inter-ethnic conflicts impede any efforts in overhauling structures responsible for stagnation in political, economic, social and cultural spheres. Colonial-old inter-ethnic rivalry has made Africa to rank behind their peers in Europe in development. Conflicts mostly which takes inter-ethnic character, underdevelopment and lately climate change continue to undermine the people's wellbeing and degrade the human condition in much of the continent making the prototype state dysfunctional, insecure and fragile (Giorgis, 2010). Wars and conflicts of varying intensity plague Africa: from the Maghreb to Zimbabwe, Somalia to Cote d'Ivoire; from Darfur to the Kivus, and from the Ogaden to the Niger Delta. They destroy lives, livelihoods and opportunities for development (Giorgis, 2010).

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Conflicts and the Phenomenon of Child Soldiers in Africa

By

Torese Agena*

Abstract

Since after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s, there has been a radical departure about conflicts in Africa, from interstate conflicts to intrastate hostilities. They are endemic, protracted ethno-religious and political conflicts. Most of these conflicts are traceable to serious economic dislocation caused by high level of unemployment and widespread poverty in the continent. These intrastate (internal) conflicts are essentially directed at the people themselves, and not against the ruling class who should share the blame for the economic pains which the people are experiencing. The conflicts apart from being largely intrastate, one of their major development is the militarization through the use of small arms and light weapons and the struggle and competition for the control of scarce resources. It is estimated that a third of the world's child soldiers are in Africa. Amnesty International and Human Right Watch estimated three hundred thousand (300,000) child soldiers, some as young as seven years old, are actively fighting in forty-one countries, with about one hundred and twenty thousand (120,000) of them in Africa. This paper examines the reasons adduced for the use of children as soldiers and sees it (Child Soldiers) as child labour and child abuse which are all evils against children and infringement of their rights. The consequences of the phenomenon on the child and the African society are also examined.

Key words; political conflicts, ethno-religious, Human Right, unemployment, Amnesty International

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Introduction

Conflicts are largely an inevitable aspect of the healthy functioning of societies. There have always been conflicts in the world and especially in Africa before the era of structural adjustment programme (S.A.P) and globalisation, the twin programmes that have increased the spate of conflicts. In the 1960s, Africa experienced national liberation struggles and wars against apartheid and other racist regimes. Africa also experienced boarder disputes which led to conflicts in some cases. However, the national liberation wars were against colonial powers, while boarder dispute conflicts were largely inter state as opposed to the current wave of conflicts in which are intra state and communal or ethnic.

This paper draws from intra state conflicts which have used or are using child soldiers in the prosecution of those conflicts. The paper, apart from the abstract and the introduction, is divided into five parts. The first part addressees the nature and cause of intra state conflicts in Africa highlighting on the types of conflicts. The second part examines the use of child soldiers, adducing reasons why they are recruited or conscripted. Part three of the paper, examines the consequences or effects of using children as soldiers on the children themselves and on the African society. Part four advocates what African states can do to stem the tide of the evil of using children as soldiers. Part five concludes by way of summary of the paper and the call for the full implementation of suggestions made in the paper.

Conceptual Clarifications

The major or key concepts to be clarified here include: conflicts and child soldiers. According to Louis Coser, conflict occurs when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals¹. He further explained that, conflict emerges whenever one party perceives that one or more goals or purposes or means of attaining goals is being threatened or hindered by the activities of other parties.

In the same vein, Zartman observes that: “conflict is the result of interaction and contact among people; an unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions and an expression of the basic fact of human interdependence. Conflict may also be caused by frustration in a relationship or interaction”. Shedding light further on the concept, Ross Stager observes that, the occurrence of aggressive behaviour always suggests the existence of frustration which always leads to some form of conflict. It goes to show that conflict must occur between two or more groups when one group is dissatisfied or is struggling to gain an advantage over the other. In Africa, conflicts occurred exactly for the purposes of gaining advantage position over political or economic resources, particularly, when one group perceive that one is not carried along. That is why most of the intra-state conflicts were over political and economic resource sharing.

By child soldiers is meant, the forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in armed conflict by either government or rebel movements or private individuals. In other words, it is the active involvement of children, sometimes as young as seven years old in warfare. Sometimes, the children, for reasons of harsh economic circumstance voluntarily offer themselves for use as soldiers. But generally, children in Africa are conscripted to fight wars in which they know little or nothing about. Child soldiers are an abusive practice that is extremely hazardous form of work. It is also a practice that is regarded as the worst form of child labour. Both child labour

and child abuse which child soldiers is, are all evils against the child and the infringements of their rights.

The Nature and Causes of Conflicts in Africa

As mentioned earlier, the paper is focused on intra state conflicts in Africa which dominated African landscape since after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s. These types of conflicts include struggle for political space, access to resources or distributions of resources, identity and citizenship and commercial or ethnic conflicts. These conflicts increased in tempo since the end of 1989 partly because of the structural adjustment programmes in Africa and other economic reforms dictated by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The reforms aggravated the poor economic conditions of the people thereby causing impoverishment and desperation, and thus became a major cause of many of the conflicts on the continent.

Alli explained that, the spate on intra-state conflicts ravaging Africa can partly be attributed to the inadequacies of African governments. He argues that, the structures and institutions of the state have remained relatively undeveloped since the 1960s, that the plans has been on building those institutions that allowed for the exploitation and management of resources rather than on nation-building. Thus, African states are described as rentier states, because they survive largely on rents from naturally occurring resources like petroleum or other mineral resources.

Examples of intra-state conflicts that have arisen because of struggle for political participation are those in Somalia, Rwanda, Chad, Uganda, and Sudan. Those conflicts over access to resources or distribution of resources are those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra-Leone, Liberia and Nigeria's Niger Delta. The examples of identity and citizenship conflicts are those conflicts in Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Sudan. It is explained that identity conflicts abound in Africa partly because of the plural nature of African countries. Atahiru Jega argues that massive mobilisation of identities is made possible because it serves as a basis for contesting hegemonic power which is often used in igniting the embers of negative ethnicity with accompanying violent conflict. It should however not be exaggerated that the plural nature of African states is the source of major cause of conflicts between them. Rather, it is enclave economies¹⁰ (production) and the weak nature of African states as advanced by W.O Alli above that are fundamentally the causes of especially civil conflicts in Africa. By and large, the causes of conflicts in Africa are either one of the factors or a combination of them as generalised poverty, ethnic tensions, corrupt and incompetent governments, mass unemployment, social exclusion, population explosions and competition for scarce resources¹¹.

The Use of Child Soldiers in Armed Conflict

It is now pertinent to explain the use of children in the conflicts we have attempted to analyse above. Children have been repeatedly used in Africa as instruments to fight wars for reasons which they are likely to have only very little knowledge about. In many of Africa's conflicts like those in Liberia, Sierra-Leon, Angola, Mozambique etc, the phenomenon of child soldiering¹² have become a menace that needs to be tackled immediately.

As stated in the abstract, an estimated three hundred thousand child soldiers, some as young as seven years old actively fought in forty-one African states, with about one hundred and twenty of the children in Africa, The reasons given by those who recruit them say that children are cheap,

expendable and easier to condition into fearless killing of opponents and they offer unquestionable obedience. Another reason given for using child soldiers is that some children are abducted into either government or rebel armies, while other children join voluntarily for ideological or harsh economic reasons. Some do, because, viable alternatives do not exist, given widespread socio-economic collapse, non functional schools and broken families. Fighting groups then look more attractive to them, and for reasons of survival.

But when weighed closely, some children who join armed group(s) do not do so as real “volunteers,” but usually, they join under various economic, social and political pressures. Jean Claude avers that some children “just volunteer to get a meal a day. It is a survival strategy, and many of the children are being promised access to education. As this section ends, it is important to state that child soldiering is not a recent phenomenon. Children have been involved in warfare throughout history. The difference is that the scale of the problems has increased and its nature changed significantly in recent period with the transformation of warfare. Honwana argues that the breakdown of societal structures and extreme poverty are the key factors that have made children’s contemporary participation in conflict particularly problematic and distinct from what was obtained from the past.

The Consequences (effects) of Using Child Soldiers

There are negative consequences on the child and the African society at large which poses a great challenge to development in Africa.

On the Child

Child soldiering is a hazardous kind of work and it is a kind of child abuse and child labour. The children are deprived of their education, mental and physical development. They suffer sexual abuse, torture and other atrocities, which the boys experience, perpetrate and witness and which the girls also witness and suffer. The children’s experience is, to say the least dehumanising, and many victims lose their entire families and are often encouraged by their commanders to simply take revenge¹⁶. On the whole, the exploitation, abuse and use of children, is nothing short of a process of self destruction.

On the African Society

The promise of a future of African societies is threatened by the use of children as soldiers. With children imbibing the culture of violence, and mentally and physically underdeveloped, the future is bleak. African societies might, if the trend is not halt, would be dependent on other nations of the world for human resources.

What Can the African States Do, To Reduce Child Soldiers in the Continent?

The causes of intra-states conflict in Africa which have necessitated the recruitment of children as soldiers are already examined. It is therefore necessary that the source of the issues that warranted the use of children as soldiers be tackled for effective results. We suggest that African state governments should provide appropriate remedies such as the improvement in the level of social provisioning for the people as well as reduction of unemployment and poverty. In other words, to break the circle of violent conflicts which has led to recruitment of children in armed conflict, efforts must be made to transform the socio-economic and political conditions that

promote poverty and the provision of security which includes meeting the basic human needs of the people.

When the source of conflict is removed, steps could then be taken to halt the use of children in armed conflicts as discussed below. African governments and rebel movements should adhere to international conventions prohibiting child conscription and rescue the children who are already in uniform as soldiers. That means demobilisation programmes should be put in place to disarm child combatants following cease fires and peace agreements. Legrand of United Nations' Children's Fund says that, programmes must be developed to demobilise and integrate children when war is even still going on. Relatedly, civil-society networks can put pressure on governments and rebel forces to respect and abide by terms of peace agreements in countries that prove to be difficult in demobilising child soldiers.

Once freed, children could be taken to transit centres to create a rupture with military life they have been in. churches, non-Governmental Organisations, Civil society groups etc can play a key role in this regard. For it could be better not to involve military staff, so that the children's psyche could be rehabilitated in such camps. Essential health and basic education and skills training and counselling could also be offered to reduce stigmatisation of the children. The ultimate goal should be to assist reintegrate the children into the main stream of society.

Finally, community re-integration alone will not be enough. The key to fuller rehabilitation, re-integration and satisfaction is education. The best way therefore, will be to support the children to have education and opportunities to earn income through the acquisition of skills, jobs, etc. If not, they would be vulnerable to re-recruitment by armed factions. For example, it is held that, helping provide education to an even younger generation would make them less susceptible to military recruitment. In Sierra Leon, many of those who had been through transit camps were leery of taking up arms again. In 2000, when the R.U.F. restated the war, they met strong resistance when they tried to recruit the children²⁰. Donor agencies are also called upon to assist in the provision of education which will have a long impact on the children. The agencies should prefer the education option rather than preferring to provide emergency assistance in terms of food and basic health only.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the causes and nature of conflicts in Africa. It focused on intra-state conflicts which is a departure in the nature of conflicts since after the end of the cold war in the late 1980s. It emphasised that, it is this nature of conflicts that have employed the services of children in the numerous battles that dominated the African landscape. The paper examined reasons advanced by those who recruit them into warfare and frowned at the practice because it is an abuse and the infringement of the children's rights.

Suggestions especially those that can transform the socio-economic and political spheres of the people were given as to stem the tide of conflicts and child soldiering in Africa offered, with the hope that, the future of the child in Africa will be guaranteed thereby mitigating this aspect of development challenge in Africa.

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‘Do Peace Treaties Work? The Case of Conflict Resolution in Somalia’

By

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Abstract

This paper analyses the peace efforts made in resolving the Somalia conflict. Somalia has witnessed a series of peace treaties over the years aimed at building peace and stability. From the first conference in Djibouti in June 1991 to the fourth conference in Djibouti in 2009, the theme of peace has been the common goal albeit with different results. The central question in this paper is thus; do peace agreements work? The underlying assumptions that undergird conflicts are that there are risks of unsatisfied needs which people fear in their relationships. By agreeing to come together to dialogue, adversaries commit to specific actions that are intended to open doors for peaceful resolution and address their fears. The paper uses John Burton’s basic needs theory. This theory argues that there are universal needs that have to be met or satisfied in society as a pre-condition for preventing and addressing destructive conflicts. It offers a key entry into conflict resolution and peace building. Once the unsatisfied needs are identified, then attempts are collectively made to address them. Essentially, the basic human needs theory enables an objective focus on causation of conflicts and the attendant strategies for peace-building. This implies reconstituting and adjusting social institutions to meet basic human needs. The paper relies on library research and interviews from Djibouti embassy on the peace process. Articles on various conferences on Somalia will also form an important source of data. The study concludes, *inter alia*, the establishment of a framework for strengthening national and sub-regional institutional capacity for conflict mediation and long term peace-building through reinforced governance and development programmes that support reconciliation. The capacity of the Somali people to continue with Somalia’s reconstruction process beyond the peace conferences and humanitarian agencies has to be enhanced as a way of sustaining a self-reliant country. Any meaningful and sustainable peace in Somalia would have to be anchored on a solid community base and involve the population throughout the process.

Keywords: Peace-building; Reconstruction; Peace-Conferences; Reconciliation

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Introduction

Conflict has been witnessed throughout human history. In ex-colonies, colonialism bounded diverse ethnic groups into artificial boundaries. Such coercive measures in the establishment of modern states have been a major cause of conflict in ex-colonies. Upon independence, liberation movements were hurriedly transformed into executive governments with little experience in public management. Post independence Africa has been crowded with elite instability (Fosu, 2003).

Waltz (1959) traces the causes of conflict to the very nature and behavior of man. He posits that war results from the selfishness, misdirected aggressive impulses and stupidity of man. Men, according to Waltz, are guided by their passions and not reason. This draws man to conflict as each seeks to outdo the others even if it means inflicting harm.

Hobbes (1996) believed that people are driven by their passions. The good is what is desired, notwithstanding the many limitations on the extent to which these desires could be achievable. Consequently, in order to 'control peoples' desires, society has enacted a Social Contract that tries to define the relationship between members of a society. The social contract dictates that men have to agree to surrender some liberties to the sovereign power and in return enjoy its security or immunity from aggression. Through this authority, desires and passion are put to check and hence harmonies of interests are maintained. Without it, people will attempt to achieve their desires with whatever means possible, whether through force or fraud. This is a recipe for anarchy.

Marx and Engels (1992) emphasized that material conditions that mobilize particular interests into action provide lines of division. Marx's sociology states that historically, particular forms of property (slavery, feudal landholding, capital) are upheld by the coercive power of the state, hence classes formed by property divisions (slaves and slave owners, serfs and lords, capitalists and workers) are the opposing agents in the struggle for power. He further adds that, material conditions determine the extent to which social classes can organize effectively to fight for their interests. Such conditions of mobilization are a set of intervening variables between class and political power. Other material conditions, like the means of production determine which interests will be able to articulate their ideas and hence to dominate the ideological realm. As such, political institutions are created for sublimating and containing overt conflicts, however opportunity for violence still remains. Conflict is inherent in society and managing it is a central function of political processes. Violence would then become obvious when the established social and political mechanisms for mitigating conflict collapse or when a powerful elite decide to disobey the rules of fairness and justice for all.

The Somalis do share a common history, culture, religion and language as much as they were separated into various kin-based groups with membership based on the claim of descent, the clan. Each of the clans is comprised of sub-clans which are in turn made up of different lineages (Gaylord, et al. 2005). The characteristic relationship between any two of the descent groups was traditionally one of competition for scarce resources, or at best temporary alliances against other groups. Each clan perceived the other as an alien and a potential enemy with kinship being the guarantee of personal and collective security.

The emerging elites became more 'clannish'. They maximized on such clan loyalties to bring them political and material benefits. This contributed to the emergence of clan nepotism immediately after independence. They are these kin loyalties which have been manipulated by political leaders and other elites culminating in the destruction of the Somali state.

This situation is in sync with the instrumentalist theory of ethnicity, in which clan membership and identity become the markers of access to resources. This theory admits that there are ethnic groups per se but that they are used merely as instruments or as tools in fighting for power and accessing resources by individuals, groups or elites in the society (Geertz, 1975).

In the Somalia state, most Somalis continued to give greater political and emotional loyalty to the lineages. The composition of the civilian and military governments that have ruled the country since 1960 reflects the numerical strength and influence of clan coalitions rather than individual merit and proven leadership abilities. This distribution of national resources through clans rather than through an impartial system of selection and distribution is a practice traceable to the colonial period (Gaylord, et al. 2005).

Mazrui (1997) argues that three paradoxes in the Somalia nation have contributed to the Somalia conflict. The three paradoxes that he identified were; first, the tension between the governance systems of an ancient pastoral culture and modern statehood; the second, the tension between tyranny and anarchy and finally, the tension between the high emotions of nationalism and a low sense of nationhood.

He concludes that it is these underlying tensions that led to the explosion of the 1990s in spite of the strong cultural, religious, ethnic and linguistic commonality. Conflict in Somalia arises from problems that are basic to many African countries. These would include the pull and push of diverse identities, unequal distribution of national resources and access to power and the perceptions of what is right, fair and just.

As such, individuals will coalesce around their identity in relation to other identities as they struggle for favourable access to valued opportunities. Hence, conflict reconstruction and peace building becomes a multifaceted response to mitigate the many faces of conflict. The capacity to effectively undertake reconstruction in war torn societies may depend on multiple actors, both the internal and external (Zartman, 1991).

The Somali conflict could thus be summarized as centered on issues of identity, participation, distribution and legitimacy. Identity allows various clans to calculate their interests, needs and behavior. Participation refers to opportunities in political and economic decision making organs, to the extent that each clan struggles to dominate and maximize such opportunities in their favour. Distribution implies how and who gains from the national largesse such as political, economic, educational and other opportunities. Finally, legitimacy refers to the way people perceive public institutions in terms of how fair, right and representative they are. All these parameters have contributed to conflict in Somalia and have reinforced each other from colonialism to post-independence period (Deng and Zartman, 1991).

The Somalia Peace Process

The underlying causes of conflict in Somalia are traceable to numerous factors. Colonialism, clannism, resource scarcity, proliferation of arms and light weapons and dictatorial state has contributed to the Somalia conflict. Colonialism fragmented Somalia into five parts; Britain, Italy, France, Ogaden and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya (Abdi-Elmi and Barise, 2006). Thus colonial occupation destroyed the social fabric of the Somali's thereby sowing seeds of discord.

Secondly, the alienatory, repressive and authoritarian regime of Siad Barre consolidated clan differences. Barre favoured a few clans at the expense of other clans. Thirdly, lack of natural resources has made Somalia quite vulnerable. The country does not have natural resources like minerals that could attract international capital. The only available resources are water and grazing land for livestock. Clans from time to time clashed over access to pasture and water. As such, political leadership became an attractive avenue through which to access government resources (Abdi-Elmi and Barise, 2006).

Conflict in Somalia is characterized by complex and competing personal and clan interests. The clan system defines Somali social relationships and politics. But it has interacted with the structure of internationally-led Somali peace conferences in such a way as to promote factionalism. Reconciliation conferences have failed to address real grievances and have instead been vehicles for furthering these interests. As the number of factions grew in the 1990s, convening a new conference became a goal in itself, rather than consolidating what had already been agreed upon (Cismaan and Ali, 2004). Anyone who has become a prominent leader through a reconciliation conference is seen first and foremost as a representative of his clan. Unfortunately, clan solidarity can be invoked by individuals to gain access to political power for private gain.

Despite an ever-expanding cast of participants, no reconciliation conference has achieved a lasting settlement. The late Mogadishu warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed first coined the expression '*looma dhamma*' – 'not inclusive' (Warsaan and Abdulaziz, 2004). This phrase has been used time and again to dismiss peace agreements and justify a continuation of conflict, although it often means little more than the absence of certain individuals from the negotiating table (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

Earlier Initiatives

The Djibouti Government held its first conference on peace in Somalia in June 1991. It was in preparation for an upcoming conference which was held in July 1991. But neither Aideed nor the leaders of the other armed fronts did participate in the Conference. Indeed, all the participants comprised the "Manifesto" Wing of the clans that had a military front to their name. Thus, the Government of Djibouti facilitated the formation of the first "Manifesto" government, with the support of Italy and Egypt, where Ali Mahdi was elected again as the President (Lortan, 2000).

However, the "Militarists" would not allow the government to function in that political context, especially in Mogadishu, where General Aideed remained an active political actor. Worse even, in November of that same year General Aideed waged war on Ali Mahdi's camp. Because both the "Militarists" and the "Manifesto" elite coalitions used the clans for military manpower and

political support, it has come to be known as the war of *Habar Gidir* (upcountry dwellers) and *Abgaal*, (town dwellers) the sub-clans of *Hawiye*, the two main protagonists who both hail from the same lineage (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

The first two international reconciliation meetings aimed at re-establishing a Somali government took place in Djibouti in June and July 1991. Participation in the conferences in reality demonstrated how clannism served as an instrument to further ambitions of individuals, most of who had held influential government positions in the past and were competing for similar ranks in a possible new administration.

An agreement was signed endorsing Ali Mahdi as president. This deal was immediately rejected by General Aideed, who was from a different Hawiye sub-clan, the *Habar gedir* to that of Ali Mahdi, the *Abgaal clan*, and was contesting Mahdi's leadership of the United Somali Congress (USC). As result a bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the south ensued (Ahmed, 2009).

The second major national reconciliation meeting was organized by the United Nations (UN) in Addis Ababa in March 1993. This time there were 15 parties to accommodate. Some were new clan organizations, including some minorities that had not been present at Djibouti, but many of the new factions were splinter groups aligned with either Ali Mahdi or Aideed. The Somali National Movement (SNM) was invited but did not participate. Only three parties had remained intact since the Djibouti meeting. A process to form a new government was agreed but never implemented due to clan wrangling. By this time faction leaders were now known as warlords.

The UN held another meeting in Nairobi in March 1994. The number of attendees had again increased, but all belonged to one of two alliances, Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). Divided factions carried the name of which grouping they were allied to, e.g. the USC/SSA and USC/SNA, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)/SSA or SPM/SNA (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

In October 1996, Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi hosted the three main Mogadishu leaders, Ali Mahdi, Osman Atto and Hussein Aideed (who had succeeded his father as SNA leader after the latter's death) along with other members of the SSA. Despite agreeing a nine-point peace deal, the initiative failed to resolve anything and the proliferation of parties continued. The international community was unable to persuade the factions to be represented by unified bodies. New breakaway factions of existing groups were always allowed to attend (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

Some twenty-seven signatories were party to the third major reconciliation conference organized in Sodere, Ethiopia, from November 1996 to January 1997, even though Hussein Aideed and four factions allied to him had refused to attend.

A fourth reconciliation meeting in Cairo in late 1997 saw 28 signatories to the ensuing agreement, including both Ali Mahdi and Aideed. But this time faction leaders closer to Ethiopia such as Abdullahi Yussuf withdrew from the talks, which they saw as hostile to the Ethiopian backed Sodere process and also too close to some members of Al Itihad, an Islamist militant group engaged in armed confrontations with Puntland and Ethiopia.

The Arta Peace Process

Djibouti's president, Ismail Omar Guellah, first mooted the idea of a national reconciliation conference in a speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1999. The conference, which began in Arta in early May, drew over 2 000 people from all of Somalia's clans as well as from the Somali Diaspora, which is estimated to number at least one million. Business leaders and Islamic clerics were also present (Lortan, 2000). The intended focus on 'civil society', however, brought with it a new set of problems. Just who or what is 'Somali civil society' and how is it identified? This lack of clarity allowed a number of armed militia groups and leaders to repackage themselves as 'grassroots organizations', thereby earning the right to represent Somali civil society in Arta. Groups such as the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), which controlled the south-central Bay/Bakool since wresting it from Hussein Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) faction in June 1999, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of General Said Hersi 'Morgan', which was fighting for control of the far south around Kismayo, and Ali Mahdi Mohammed were all reincarnated as civil society groups.

Given that there was very little agreement among the participants regarding the nature of civil society, and that the decade-long civil war had destroyed almost all social institutions in Somalia, the conference ultimately had to rely on clan as the only commonly acceptable form of social organization, hence all negotiations regarding the future government and distribution of power were conducted along clan lines (Lortan, 2000).

It took four months of wrangling before agreement was reached on how power would be distributed. Power was distributed along clan lines according to a complex formula. Seats in the new transitional assembly were to be divided between the four main clans, the Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Digil-Mirifle and further among a multiplicity of clans and sub clans. Most importantly, clan representatives were chosen not because of the military arsenal under their control, but because they had won the respect of their clans. Endorsed by neighboring countries as a regional initiative of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), talks culminated in August 2000 with the Arta Declaration and the formation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) led by Abdulqasim Salad Hassan (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

Salad was a member of the Hawiye, the dominant clan in Mogadishu. This was an important factor as it was believed that only a Hawiye would be able to deal with the Mogadishu faction leaders, especially since the momentum generated by the Arta conference and the support it had won inside Somalia suggested that it may be possible to move directly to Mogadishu without setting up a temporary capital in Baidoa.

The faction leaders, who had held sway for so long in Somalia and who had derailed all previous reconciliation attempts, were conspicuously absent (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004). Some of the main leaders of the "militarists" turned down the invitation including Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf and Aideed, the son. Other "Militarist" leaders such as Hassan Mohamed Nur (Shati Gaduud) and others responded and arrived to the conference in a lukewarm attitude. With their influence minimal, the Djibouti Government helped produce a government comprising the technocrats of President Barre, some military officers of that era, but more importantly the conference was visited by many "manifesto" leaders. This explains the Arta conference's (apparent) success and, at the same time, points to its greatest potential weakness.

Nevertheless, the TNG was the first Somali government since 1991 to secure a measure of international recognition, enabling Somalia to reoccupy its seat at the UN and in regional bodies. But the international community failed to provide substantive assistance to the TNG, in part due to Ethiopia's support for Abdullahi Yusuf (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

The Arta Declaration was welcomed and approved in many quarters of the Somalia state and the international community except in Puntland and Somaliland. Initially, the TNG enjoyed limited success in a number of areas; several thousand armed militiamen were encamped in designated areas with the intention of creating a new army; police were deployed in parts of Mogadishu and security briefly improved in much of the capital including major markets. Security on the road linking Mogadishu and Lower Shebelle also improved, easing travel and commerce. The Somali national prestige was revived by the TNG's participation in the international arena e.g. UN, AU and the League of Arab States summits (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

The fact that the Arta conference delegates and the members of parliament believed only a member of the Hawiye clan could handle the Mogadishu warlords was ironic, given that many viewed the Hawiye as the clan responsible for much of the chaos in the city. This was resented by many of the other clans in Arta. However, pragmatism once again ruled, giving further credence to the view that the clan has become less important as a political organising principle in Somalia in recent years (Lortan, 2000).

President Salad appointed Ali Khalif Galeid as his prime minister, with the responsibility of establishing a reconciliation and reconstruction government. Although from the Somaliland territory, Galeid was a member of the Darod clan, coming from the part of Somaliland claimed by Puntland. Galeid was a former minister of industry under Siad Barré, and was a leading Somali businessman. He had business contacts in the Gulf States, having run his telecommunications company from the region. He was viewed as crucial in obtaining desperately needed Arab aid for investment into Somalia.

The transitional government's task was to lead Somalia through a three-year period leading up to elections. This entailed restoring peace and stability to the country, disarming the militias and creating a national security force, creating a government from scratch, rebuilding the economy, and restoring basic minimum services such as education and health care to ordinary citizens. This would be an enormous task for any government, and was made more difficult given that the Mogadishu faction leaders had vowed to prevent the new government from establishing itself. The northern regions of Somaliland and Puntland disputed the new government's authority. In addition, the transitional administration had no money and lacked government offices (Lortan, 2004).

The new government threatened the Mogadishu faction leaders. Consequently, the faction leaders vowed to stop the new government from moving to Mogadishu. Immediately after his election, President Salad paid a visit to Mogadishu, before embarking on an international tour to drum up political and financial support for his government. On his arrival in the city, President Salad was welcomed by more than 100 000 Mogadishu residents in the biggest political gathering since the collapse of the Siyad Barré regime. This was the clearest sign that the power of the faction leaders was waning, and it strengthened the new government's resolve to move

directly to Mogadishu, instead of first setting up a government in Baidoa. Aside from the fact that the faction leaders found themselves deprived of resources and the emergence of alternative centres of power in the business community and among Islamic clerics, the Somali population had grown weary of war and was desperate for some, indeed, any form of government. The massive show of support evidenced in Mogadishu signified less that the population supported the new government *per se*, but more that any government would now be given support (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

The new Somali government offered no posts to any of the main opposition faction leaders, or to the leaders of the breakaway regions of Somaliland and Puntland. Observers, both inside and outside Somalia, had suggested that the government tried to buy off the opposition leaders with senior government posts, and negotiations were held between the various faction and regional leaders. However, with the announcement of cabinet posts this did not materialize. Instead, the Somali government's strategy seemed to have been to incorporate individuals into the new interim government and cabinet who could form serious opposition to the 'dissidents', thereby breaking their power (Lortan, 2000). For example, the government named Abdullahi Boqor Muse as defence minister, a member of the Darod clan dominant in Puntland, and a relative and rival of the Puntland president, Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The new foreign minister is Ismail Hurreh Buba, a member of the Isaaq clan that dominates the Somaliland region, though Buba did briefly serve under Mogadishu faction leader Mohammed Farah Aidid in the early 1990s. Buba's appointment was seen as a direct challenge to Somaliland president Mohammed Ibrahim Egal; they were related and were also rivals for Isaaq clan support.

The dissident factions held a number of meetings in the preceding months, in an attempt to form a united front against the interim government. These meetings included most of the Mogadishu faction leaders, including Hussein Muhammad Aideed, Uthman Hassan Ali 'Ato', Muhammed Qanyare Afrah, as well as Puntland president Abdullahi Yusuf. Significantly, the meetings did not include Muse Sudi Yalahow, the faction leader who controlled south-west Mogadishu and who was regarded by many as the most powerful faction leader in Mogadishu at the moment. But the faction leaders' options were limited, and they were aware that most of their supporters favoured some sort of accommodation with the interim government (Ahmed, 2009).

The dissident faction leaders issued a number of demands, including that an all-inclusive reconciliation conference must be held in Somalia, and that this conference should be spearheaded by the faction leaders. Furthermore, President Salad should be regarded simply as another faction leader. Aideed, Mogadishu's most prominent faction leader came under tremendous pressure from his clan, his political organization, the SNA, and from his supporters, most importantly Libya, to reach agreement with the new government. In late September, Libyan leader Colonel Muamar Ghaddafi organised a reconciliation meeting between Aideed and President Salad, and then issued a statement that the two leaders had reached agreement. Husayn Siyad Qorgab, former vice-chairperson of the SNA, resigned as the deputy head of the supreme committee of the Habr Gedir's Sa'ad subclan (the clan to which Aidid belonged, and which he led), declaring his support for the interim government. The Habr Gedir Council of Elders also voiced its support for the Arta process. Abdullahi Hassan Ganey 'Firimbi', the internal secretary

of the USC-SNA faction headed by Ato, expressed his faction's support for the new government, and repudiated Ato's statements opposing the government (Lortan, 2000).

The Conference held in Djibouti in 2000 and its outcome, the TNG, had a number of pitfalls. (1) The 'Militarists' were still in control of all the regions in the south and Puntland. Of course "Somaliland" had declined to attend the conferences, probably doubting Djibouti's fairness and sincerity, a priori. (2) One should note that these "Militarists" had initially fought Barre's regime. So, a government comprising Barre's technocrats in addition to the civilians of old and the Islamists was a disaster in their thinking. (3) Because of the Islamists' influence, Ethiopia and the West led by the US government of the day were naturally averted to support the new arrangement. (4) Probably, the most drastic among the impediments was the fact that the government of Djibouti alienated all the governments of the region (the IGAD countries), under whose mandate it held the Conference (Warsaan et al, 2006).

The Government of Djibouti had not even spared its old allies, in this case, Egypt and Italy, by not allowing them to participate in the conference, let alone contribute in any other substantive way. That position of the government of Djibouti might have heightened the suspicions of many and propelled the rampant rumors that Al-Qaeda could have been helping the fledgling and poor government of tiny Djibouti to single-handedly shoulder the exorbitant expenses of a five month-long conference.

It was only after the installation of the TNG that the militarists succeeded to forge their first ever alliance, when they took Baidoa as their capital and started a diplomatic and propaganda offensive by literally creating a dissident shadow government. Abdullahi Yusuf met with 17 other Somali political groups and alliances in Awasa, Ethiopia, in March 2001 where the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was formed to oppose the Arta process and the TNG, and to promote the formation of a federal Somali state (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

The Mbagathi Peace Process

The Secretary General of the United Nations declared that there was need for the resumption of reconciliation efforts in Somalia in early September of 2001. This was necessary for a smooth transition as the mandate of TNG was coming to an end. All of a sudden the Representative of the Secretary General visited the dissident "Militarists" in Baidoa to register their grievances on behalf of the international community. The result was the IGAD sponsored Conference (2002 - 2004), hosted by the government of Kenya in Eldoret. IGAD launched a fresh national reconciliation process before the TNG mandate had ended. It took two years to conclude the conference, mainly because of a rift between a "Manifesto" alliance and the "Militarist" alliance (Ahmed, 2009).

The "Manifesto", at this juncture, was being led by Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the former President of the TNG. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the main survivor of the senior "Militarists" was the leader of the "Militarists". This process eventually developed into a sixth major Somali reconciliation meeting. It produced a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction leaders stipulating the need to create a federal structure, reversing the unitary structure established at Arta. The process engaged 300 delegates in lengthy deliberations. This led to an agreement on a Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the selection of 275 members of

parliament, who in turn elected Abdullahi Yusuf as President of the TFG in October 2004 later culminating in Mbagathi, and supported by the UN and all the concerned regional Groups of the world (Cismaan and Ali, 2006).

Both Arta and the federal charter employed the '4.5' power-sharing formula dividing Somali clans into four major ones and condensing all others into the remaining '0.5'. The formula masked the lack of support from the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland. Individuals from the predominant clans of these regions took part in the peace talks but were limited by their inability to represent their own regions on the basis of the 4.5 formula (Lortan, 2000).

The charter provided for a three-year transitional government, based on a federal system, and a transitional national assembly elected on the basis of clan affiliation. The conference also approved the establishment of a provisional capital in Baidoa, which would house the new government until the national capital, Mogadishu, had been secured. A special national task committee was also established to restore security in Mogadishu (Lortan, 2000).

The "Manifesto" side was supported by Djibouti, Egypt and Eritrea. The "Militarists" were also supported by Ethiopia among others from the region. "Militarists" turned out to be the victors after two years of intense deliberations contrived only by the patience of the international community. In the process, the "Manifesto", with the support of Djibouti and Egypt, fought against Ethiopia and its client, the "Militarists". However, after Abdullahi Yusuf was elected President and the cabinet was nominated, even endorsed by the Parliament, the opposition within declared the arrangement unacceptable. All called for the impeachment of President Yussuf, including the speaker of Parliament, Sherriff Hassan Adan. Before the government moved back into Somalia, the Mogadishu warlords, allies of Yussuf until then, perhaps afraid to lose their feudal spoils in Mogadishu and partly for clannish reasons in their agenda, gave a political fulcrum to the opposition in Mogadishu, denying the new government to take seat in the capital (Ahmed, 2009).

The Fourth Djibouti Peace Conference (2009)

Djibouti peace conferences on Somalia have been held in diverse dates back from 1991, refer to earlier initiatives discussed above. As such the fourth conference was just a series of these peace conferences held in Djibouti. It should be noted that since President Yussuf's election, the faces and personalities of both coalitions changed. Indeed, the new Islamic insurgency of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) surprised the world, when it took over Mogadishu's control in June 2006. UIC was founded in mid 1990s with a group of Muslim scholars and business community led by Hassan Aweys. They started with eliminating the control of the warlords of Mogadishu. Then they quickly moved all sides from Mogadishu to control most of the South, down from Dhusamareeb to Kismayo, and finished with an attack on Baidoa to eliminate the 'Militarists' government, the TFG. If it was not for Ethiopia that saved its "Militarists" friends, it would have been the end of the "Militarists".

The fourth Djibouti conference of 2009 went beyond just reconciliation but planned the removal of the most senior "Militarist from power, and replaced him with Sherif Ahmed, a 'Manifesto". With all the negotiators on the same side they added an equal number of seats from the "Manifesto" camp to the TFG Parliament to elect their new President. They persuaded the House

Speaker, Sherriff Hassan Adan and the “Manifesto side and Parliament endorsed the plan, with a so-called majority. The election took place in Djibouti. The additional two hundred members of Parliament, plus Manifesto members from the old Parliament, elected Sherif Sheikh Ahmed as the new President. Djibouti government installed a “Manifesto” government for Somalia for the third time, since 1991 (Ahmed, 2009).

Conclusion

The TNG’s shortcomings cost it both external and internal support, and by the end of its three year term it was yet to accomplish its constitutional responsibilities, becoming increasingly irrelevant on the Somali political stage. The TNG failed to pursue meaningful reconciliation efforts inside Somalia, such as restoring peaceful conditions in Mogadishu and bringing on board the armed political leaders who opposed its authority. It faced resistance from de facto administration in Somaliland and Puntland, as well as from a coalition of faction leaders backed by the Ethiopian government. Some domestic opponents organized attacks on international UN and other staff members in Mogadishu in March 2001, and succeeded both in humiliating the TNG and persuading many international aid agencies to avoid Mogadishu (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

Internal divisions among the various factions of the TNG undermined its effectiveness and resulted in a growing number of defections by cabinet members, senior officials and members of the TNA. TNG operations were characterized by a lack of transparency in the management of financial assistance. The first Prime Minister of the TNG, Cali Khaliif Galaydh, was sacked by the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) on the grounds that his administration had mismanaged public funds. Persistent local press reports of corruption and the importation of counterfeit banknotes by businessmen associated with the TNG, generating rapid inflation and slashing the value of people’s savings by 50%-further contributed to public disillusionment.

The situation in Somalia is further complicated by regional geopolitics. The actions and interests of neighboring states complicate the process of re-establishing a central government in Somalia. The TNG failed to develop domestic or foreign sources of financial support. Businessmen operating the El Ma’an natural seaport in north Mogadishu refused to relinquish control of port facilities to the TNG to generate revenue. Although TNG obtained limited financial support from the Arab governments, it was unsuccessful in securing the support of western donors, despite pledges made during the Arta conference.

By 2002, it was evident that TNG lacked the will, the means, or a combination of the two to advance the process of national reconciliation and pave the way for a stable, permanent national authority in Somalia, the apparent desire of the TNG leadership to entrench itself in power, and its diminishing credibility both at home and abroad, reduced the transitional government to a status roughly on par with other Somali factions and de facto authorities (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

During the height of the Somali civil war and international intervention in the early 1990s, the business community backed the various faction leaders as part of their own business strategy. The business leaders have also undermined the faction leaders by recruiting their militiamen. The faction leaders with their power weakened by the split with the business community, found their

access to revenue curtailed. Consequently, they were no longer able to pay their militiamen who have been defecting to the business community. Many militiamen are believed to have defected in the past two years. All the militiamen currently employed by the business community were once clan militia serving under faction leaders (Lortan, 2000).

The failure of the TNG is attributed to the failure to consider the 'might and influence' of warlords in southern regions back in 2000 but its successor, Mbagathi Conference, had all the characteristics that marred 1991, 1993 and 1998 reconciliation conferences whose participants were selected for belonging to clans with armed militias. Just as 1990s warlords made sure unarmed clans had no say in the future of the war-torn country, the Arta Conference operationalized the power-sharing 'formula' that lumped many clans with no armed militias together as minority clans; Mbagathi conference participants retained the 4.5 formula.

Although Mogadishu was ruled by opposing warlords and forces loyal to the former TNG president, the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia made Jowhar, 90 km north of Mogadishu, its base. Jowhar was under a political committee headed by Mohamed Omar Habeb who was an ally of President Yusuf. Rifts emerged between the President and the Parliamentary Speaker, Sheriff Hassan, in 2005. President Ali Abdalla Salah of Yemen's initiative helped the two leaders to reconcile their differences and work in Baydhabo where the TFG Parliament was based. The same rift emerged in 2006 when the parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan visited Mogadishu under the UIC and signed a unilateral agreement with Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sharif Ahmed, then leaders of the UIC. The anti-Ethiopia rhetoric of UIC and its attempt to capture Baydhabo, the seat of the TFG, led to the intervention of Ethiopia with a view to back the weak TFG and respond to threats of attack made by the former defence secretary of UIC, Sheikh Yusuf Mohamud Siyad Indha'adde (Ahmad, 2005).

Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have armed and supported rival Somali factions in an extension of their border war, exacerbating the fighting in Somalia at a time when the war there showed all signs of burning itself out. This 'proxy war' reached its height in 1999, resulting in a series of defeats for Aideed's forces (which were supported by Eritrea) at the hands of Ethiopian-backed factions. Aideed's most serious setback came in June 1999, when his forces were driven out of Baidoa, a strategic commercial centre in the south-central region of Bay-Bakool, by the forces of the RRA. Aideed's faction had controlled this region since September 1995.

The Somali civil war altered power relations in the southern regions particularly Mogadishu and nearby regions known in the past for the diversity of clans. Many sub-clans such as Digil and Mirifle in the south with no armed clan militias were viewed as minorities but they could have played a bigger role in pacifying Mogadishu and neighboring regions had clans with armed clan militias and traditional leaders supporting them took the southern Somalia regions' diversity in terms of nomadic, agricultural, fishing communities.

Since 1991, every transitional administration was undermined by Mogadishu-based militias. This does not mean Mogadishu people are against law and order but their need for reconciliation locally is unwisely overridden by top-down approach to reconciliation conferences held in a foreign country for Somalis as a nation.

Past reconciliation initiatives have given warlords, failed leaders and extremists an opportunity to advance their interests. Reconciliation is the best way forward to recover from a civil war but the history of Somali reconciliation conferences shows that no attention has ever been paid to Somalia's recent political history. Somalia is unusual in the degree to which its people, or a portion thereof have resisted implementation of nationwide solutions in favor of local or regional arrangements, as well as its failure to produce post-war leadership capable or willing to lead the country out of its crisis. Conventional power sharing approaches to conflict in Somalia have repeatedly come to ruin because of their inability to strike the balance between peace building and state formation. In the absence of reconciliation, state building is perceived by faction leaders and their supporters as a way to wage war by other means; conversely, reconciliation efforts that precede the formation of national government risk being at odds with the new political administration and thus swept away (Ahmed, 2009). The contradiction between representation and participation is another puzzle. In Somalia, few faction leaders exercise real authority on the ground, a factor that raises doubts about their legitimacy and their capacity to fulfill agreements.

The apparent inability of postwar Somali society to produce leaders equal to the task of national reconciliation and reconstruction is also a major impediment to establishment of peace. Almost without exception, the “big men” on the Somali political scene are products of the Barre regime, who share a propensity for centralized, authoritarian government, patronage based politics and rent-seeking economics. A failure to envision models of governance better suited to present realities is one of the reasons numerous governments that have held power since 1991 have been unable to translate intentions into reality on the ground. Failed reconciliation conferences typically lead to more violence and the emergence of new faction leaders. At the same time, repeated failures have engendered a deep sense of cynicism about the value of peace initiatives, the commitment of political leaders to peace, and the sincerity of mediators.

Like many African states decolonized in the mid-twentieth century, Somalia's political institutions were designated to transfer sovereignty from the departing imperial power to a small privileged and largely self-selected urban political elite. In the euphoric drive for independence, considerations of long-term political stability and economic viability were largely overlooked.

Somalia's national institutions were superimposed on a culturally delineated system of governance that had served Somalis well for generations. This traditional system consisted of a set of contractual agreements (*xeer*), which defined the rights and the responsibilities of individuals within a group bound together by ties of kinship, which were based on shared patrilineal descent from a common ancestor. It also consisted of a similar set of agreements regulating a group's relations with other neighboring groups. Socially however, Somali society is highly segmented into clan families, clans, sub clans, lineages and sub-lineages-down to the ‘diya-paying group’ and the individual family. This factitious system is such that the Somalis, despite their cultural homogeneity, never came under the rule of a single political authority prior to the colonial period. The primary functions of government were rarely exercised above the level of clan, where the authority of hereditary elders was recognized (Ibrahim and Yahya, 2004).

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Effect of Remuneration on Employees Performance in the Ministry of Internal Security: A Case of Kisii County

By

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Abstract

Bonus pay is a monetary reward given to employees in addition to their fixed compensation (Milkovich & Newman, 2005). This pay plan is ostensibly based on individual performance, but bonuses do not increase employees' basic pay and therefore are not permanent (Sturman & Short, 2000). Bonus pay also has been widely used in organizations to motivate employees' performance (Sturman & Short, 2000). Bonus pay is attractive from the organization's point of view because the one-time cash reward links pay to performance (Lawler, 1981) but does not increase fixed labour costs (Sturman & Short, 2000). Pay for performance in the form of bonuses was only intended for managers. It has shifted from recognizing the minority groups to addressing everyone in the organization, as success of the organization is dependent on everyone (Flannery, 1996). People need to know how they have achieved their objectives and if the employer appreciates them. Armstrong & Murlis (1994) believe that appreciation can be achieved in various ways such as naming the employees who have done well in the organization's newsletter, awarding employees with cash bonuses, or allowing employees to go on vacation. Bonuses tend to induce the employees to exert a greater effort or develop innovative ways to improve operational efficiency, thereby enhancing not just individual but also organizational performance (Blasi, 1996). The prospect of high future cash bonuses which are dependent on a firm's profitability and stock prices motivates its employees to work harder and smarter (Kruse, 1993).

Keywords: organizations, Bonus pay, performance, stock prices, monetary reward

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Introduction

Bonuses can attenuate agency problems inherent in a fixed-wage employment contract and reduce the impact of any conflict of interests between the employer and the employees (Blasi, 1996). With this realignment of interests, it can be expected that employees become more committed to the firm's objectives and strive to accomplish its ultimate goals, perhaps the most notable of which is higher profitability since, in turn, this leads to higher cash bonuses (Chen & Wang, 2001). When the payment of cash bonuses is an 'add-on' portion of the total remuneration of an employee, this portion may have an 'efficiency-wage' effect that can reduce employees' shirking, decrease turnover problems, attract better qualified job applicants and foster increased reciprocity in social exchanges between the firm and its employees (Akerlof & Yellen, 1986). Collectively, these benefits facilitate the accumulation of firm-specific human capital and organizational competencies, thus improving overall firm performance (Ben-Ner, 2000). Providing cash bonuses can create peer group pressure and motivate employees to monitor their co-workers in order to ensure that high performance standards across the firm are the rule. (Kruse, 1993) Although bonus pay is flexible, it has potential problems (Lawler, 1981). Discretionary payment sometimes fails to provide a strong link between pay and employees' true performance; it is also possible that the difference in rewards between performers may not be very significant (Lawler, 1981). Furthermore, because bonuses are one-time payments, they have less economic value than permanent raises. In short, the effectiveness of the bonuses should also depend on the level of expectancy and valence of the compensation system. Theoretical arguments that are not in favour of the performance effects of bonuses are based on economic theories concerning problems associated with group incentives. For one, it is claimed that such group incentives as bonuses may induce 'free-rider' problems among employees according to which an individual employee may have a tendency to shirk his or her responsibilities, particularly in the event that group incentives are shared equally and the connection between the individual efforts and personal reward is a weak one (Blasi, 1996). If the free-rider problem prevails, then the overall performance of the firm with group incentives could even deteriorate, as participants in the so-called 'Prisoner's Dilemma' game will lead to a sub-optimal equilibrium (Kruse, 1993).

The objectives of this study were based on the effect of bonuses, as part of remuneration, on employee performance and they included the following:

- i) To determine current incentive package in the Ministry of Internal Security and comparing them with other organizations' compensation.
- ii) To research how more fitting incentive packages will help to make the Ministry more efficient.
- iii) To determine factors needed to have a complete incentive package, as well as explore possible ways of implementation of the incentive programs.

Calculating the absolute amount of bonus:

The absolute amount of the bonus depends on individual performance, the individual basic salary, and the performance of the entire organization or department, adhering to the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{Bonus pay}}{\text{Salary}} = \text{Individual performance rating} \times \text{Organizational performance} \times \text{Salary rate}$$

For example, if the individual performance rating is 120%, the organizational performance is 105% and the salary rate 10%, this worker receives bonus pay = $1.2 \times 1.05 \times 0.1 = 12.6\%$ of basic salary. For managers with identical personal and organizational ratings but a higher fixed salary rate of 20%, the bonus would amount to $1.2 \times 1.05 \times 0.2 = 25.2\%$ of the basic salary.

Methodology:

The existing information was gathered from primary data received by use of questionnaires having structured questions or statements distributed to a sample size of 107 respondents and secondary data received from the past annual records; Government publications involving the Ministry's remuneration and performance; periodicals and websites of the Ministry. The data collected was analyzed by using Microsoft Excel. Besides, the descriptive statistics such as frequency, percentage, mean and standard deviation were used to describe the data. To analyze the data collected, the analysis of variance (ANOVA) and bar chart were used. Also, to measure the relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable, the Pearson correlation was used. Two variables were named X and Y. If the correlation, r, was zero, it implied that there was no linear relationship between X and Y. (Sekaran, 2003).

Five-year Projection in Productivity and Bonus:

If an employee had an incentive to remain at the organization, the organization would not have the problem of losing the initial investment. Incentive compensation would also motivate the employee, and hence the income they bring should be higher, making net profit higher.

Below, in Table 1 is a theoretical case, in which the employee, with an incentive compensation package, did 15% more work a year. The bonus in this instance was 10% of their salary. In this instance, the employee was motivated by a possible increase in bonus, and worked only 15% more efficiently, and the organization had already made up for the initial "investment" of the employee in 4 years, rather than the 5 originally without the compensation plan.

Table 1 - Five-year projection with 15% increase in productivity and 10% bonus of salary:

Year	Income	Motivation	Total income	Expense	Bonus	Total expense	Net Profit	If Leave
0	-	-	-	100,000	-	100,000	(100,000)	(100,000)
1	50,000	7,500	57,500	50,000	5,000	55,000	2,500	(97,500)
2	80,000	12,000	92,000	55,000	5,500	60,500	31,500	(66,000)
3	90,000	13,500	103,500	60,000	6,000	66,000	37,500	(28,500)
4	100,000	15,000	115,000	70,000	7,000	77,000	38,000	9,500
5	110,000	16,500	126,500	80,000	8,000	88,000	38,500	48,000

Source: Computed from survey data, 2004

The 15% increase in productivity and 20% bonus of productivity

Imagine if the incentive were directly related to the motivation and extra work performed. In Table 2 is the scenario in which the motivation was still a 15% increase, and the bonus was 20% of the motivation. This might seem like a big motivation, as the bonus was smaller than the example in Table 1, but the organization was still getting a much better return from the employee than without compensation.

Table 2 - Five-year projection with 15% increase in productivity and 20% bonus of salary:

Year	Income	Motivation	Total Income	Expense	Bonus	Total expense	Net Profit	If Leave
0	-	-	-	100,000	-	100,000	(100,000)	(100,000)
1	50,000	7,500	57,500	50,000	1,500	51,500	6,000	(94,000)
2	80,000	12,000	92,000	55,000	2,400	57,400	34,600	(59,400)
3	90,000	13,500	103,500	60,000	2,700	62,700	40,800	(18,600)
4	100,000	15,000	115,000	70,000	3,000	73,000	42,000	23,400
5	110,000	16,500	126,500	80,000	3,300	83,300	43,200	66,600

Source: Computed from survey data, 2004

The 30% increase in productivity and 20% bonus of productivity

Table 3 shows a five-year projection with a 30% increase in productivity, and a 20% bonus of productivity. In this case, it only took 3 years for the employee's initial investment to be erased by profits the employee brought in. The numbers were not close to actual numbers, but rather a representation of how good incentive compensation plan would help the organization.

Table 3 - Five-year projection with 30% increase in productivity and 20% bonus of salary:

Year	Income	Motivation	Total Income	Expense	Bonus	Total expense	Net Profit	If Leave
0	-	-	-	100,000	-	100,000	(100,000)	(100,000)
1	50,000	15,000	65,000	50,000	3,000	53,000	12,000	(88,000)
2	80,000	24,000	104,000	55,000	4,800	59,800	44,200	(43,800)
3	90,000	27,000	117,000	60,000	5,400	65,400	51,600	7,800
4	100,000	30,000	130,000	70,000	6,000	76,000	54,000	61,800
5	110,000	33,000	143,000	80,000	6,600	86,600	56,400	118,200

Source: Computed from survey data, 2004

Analysis and interpretation of the demographic information of respondents:

The purpose for this evaluation was to classify respondents into their respective age groups or categories, in order to obtain the average age of the workforce. The results depicted in Table 4 clearly show that a young workforce existed within this entity, with almost 80% being less than 36 years of age. Most of the respondents were in the age group of 26-30 year with a percentage of almost 50%.

Table 4 - Classification of respondents according to age:

Age (Year)	Number of responses (Frequency)	Percentage of responses %
21-25	12	11.2
26-30	53	49.5
31-35	24	22.4
36-40	10	9.4
41-45	4	3.7
46-50	3	2.8
51-55	1	1.0

Total **107** **100.0**

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012

Gender

The information regarding gender was extracted to determine the ratio of males to females, as depicted in Table 5. The information on the table shows that the number of men outnumbers the female counterparts by a ratio of 2:1. Most employees in positions such as in Administration Police and transportation departments were males. Women were mainly occupying the clerical posts in administration and middle management jobs. The employment pattern may have been influenced by traditional operating systems, where there was more manual labour.

Table 5 - Classification of respondents according to gender:

Gender	Number of responses (Frequency)	Percentage of responses %
Female	35	32.7
Male	72	67.3
Total	107	100.0

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012

Qualification

Table 6 shows that 51% of the respondents had attained tertiary qualifications, while 5% had attained postgraduate qualification and 44% had neither.

Table 6 - Classification of respondents according to qualifications:

Qualification	Number of responses (Frequency)	Percentage of responses %
O-Level certificate	36	33.6
A-Level certificate	11	10.3
Diploma	31	29
Degree	24	22.4
Postgraduate	5	4.7
Total	107	100.0

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012

Figure 1 below shows the cross-tabulation of position held and qualifications obtained. In a fast-paced global economy, more technological changes were ever taking place. This had put pressure on human resource specialists to upgrade the skills level and education of its employees (Flannery, 1996). It was noted from Figure 1 below that 76% of shop-floor workers had not attained any tertiary education, while 51% of the employees in the technical department had attained such qualifications.




Figure 1: Qualifications obtained by respondents' vs position held
Source: Survey data, 2012

Position held

The classification of respondents according to their position within the organization is illustrated in Table 7. The majority of respondents described their position as middle management, thus constituting 38.3%. Employees in the accounting department, statistical as well as procurement departments were classified as middle management. This was indicative of a highly professional environment whose competencies should be rewarded. Competency based pay would be applicable for this environment (Shields, 2007).

Table 7 - Classification of respondents according to position held:

Position held	Number of responses (Frequency)	Percentage of responses %
Shop-floor	18	16.8
Administration	12	11.2
Technical	11	10.3
Supervisors	17	15.9
Middle mgt	41	38.3
Senior mgt	8	7.5
Total	107	100.0

Source: Survey data, 2012

Analysis of current remuneration system:

Perception of the current pay system

Table 8 and Figure 2 give an overview of the employees' perception towards the current pay system. In the graphical illustration shown in Figure 2, statements 1 to 5 show that employees

were not in support of the remuneration system that was in place. Analyzing the responses in statements 1, 2, 4 and 7 from Table 8 show that there was significant correlation between good pay and employees' performance in the Ministry of Internal Security. This agreed with Armstrong (2001) who stated that workers can be motivated through rewards such as pay and increasing pay pockets. The responses to statements 3,6 and 8 show that bonuses had significant effect on employees' job performance in the Ministry of Internal Security. This was in agreement with Needhams (1995) who observed that the more motivated an employee was the better was his/her performance. The response in statement 5 shows that promotion could influence employees' performance in the Ministry of Internal Security. This agreed with Armstrong (2001) who observed that the motivating factor like promotion could influence personnel to perform their duties well.

Table 8 - Perception of the current pay system:

Questions	Strongly Agree	Uncertain	Disagree	Strongly disagree	
1. The basic salary paid to me on monthly basis is inadequate to meet the need for my job performance	46.7%	23.4%	9.3%	13.1%	7.5%
2. I am satisfied with the organization's benefits (pension, medical aid, leave study, etc.)	8.4%	28.7%	18.8%	35.1%	9%
3. End-year bonus paid to me is not enough to meet the needs of my job performance	38.5%	18.5%	7.2%	10%	25.8%
4. The pay I receive is competitive when compared to other organizations	2.4%	36.6%	32.3%	21%	7.7%
5. Hard work does not earn me promotion for my job performance	45.8%	18.7%	7.5%	23.3%	4.7%
6. Christmas bonus paid to me is not enough to my need for job performance	51.4%	18.7%	14%	9.4%	6.5%
7. I am satisfied that my pay is fair in comparison to what I perceive my co-workers in similar position earn	1.8%	25%	27.2%	32%	14%
8. Life insurance paid to me is inadequate to meet the need for my job performance	62.6%	16.8%	7.5%	11.2%	1.9%

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012




Figure 2 - Perception of current pay system

Source: Survey data, 2012

Important factors for evaluating salary increases

Table 9 explains that majority of the responses regarding organization's profitability, employee's job performance and qualifications were neutral, i.e. mean value was less than 3.4. The responses of the cost of living and job title show that employees considered these factors slightly more important than other factors as mean value was greater than 3.4. Qualifications and job title had greater standard deviation which shows that these factors had extensive responses. This was because the selection of the sample was from different departments having different pay packages. Table 9 gives an overview of employees' perception on how salary increases should be determined. It was noted that employees viewed salary increments as entitlements instead of considering their performance and organization's profitability as important factors for reviewing salaries. The use of organization's profitability and employee performance for reviewing salaries makes organization's earning stable because as financial performance falls, variable pay costs fall correspondingly (Schuster & Zingheim, 1992).

Table 9 - Important factors for evaluating salary increases:

Factor	N (Sample)	Mean	Standard Deviation
i) Job title	107	3.99	1.24
ii) Cost of living	107	3.57	0.71
iii) Organization's profitability	107	3.28	0.48
iv) Employee's performance in the job	107	2.95	0.85
v) Qualifications	107	2.91	1.34

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012

Arithmetic means and standard deviations for the independent variables and dependent variables

Table 10 shows that the means for the basic pay, performance bonus, career advancement, recognition, learning opportunity and challenging work ranged from 3.05 to 7.50. The mean values of independent variables and dependent variable show that employees’ performance depends on recognition, challenging work and basic pay compared to other variables. The dependent variable is employee’s performance.

Table 10: Arithmetic means and standard deviations for the independent variables and dependent variables:

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation
Employee’s performance	2.20	126.50
Recognition	3.05	142.50
Challenging work	4.00	190.00
Basic pay	5.25	230.75
Learning opportunity	6.05	330.08
Performance bonus	7.15	331.05
Career advancement	7.50	392.50

Source: Computed from survey data, 2012

Annual performance bonus and employee performance

Table 11 shows that the allocation of the annual performance bonus awards was based on staff level and relative performance rating. The total annual performance pool is based on achieving quality and financial performance goals. The award ranges will increase if the goals are achieved and decrease if they are not achieved. The factors considered during performance appraisal include: customer focus, knowledge of the job, communication, teamwork, time management, proper use of resources and continuous learning. The ANOVA carried out on the annual performance range for different staff levels indicated that the ranges were almost equal. Since the $F_{\text{calculated}}$ ($F = 0.379$) was less than $F_{\text{tabulated}}$ ($F_6^2 = 5.14$), it indicated that there was no significant

difference in the annual performance bonus % used in supervisors, middle managers and senior managers.

Table 11: Annual performance awards:

Staff levels	Annual Performance Bonus Range as % of Basic Salary		
	Top Performer	Outstanding Performer	High Performer
Supervisor	10-12%	6-9%	2-5%
Middle Manager	14-18%	8-12%	3-6%
Director/Senior Manager	15-20%	9-13%	3-6%

Source: Computed from survey data, 2011

Table 12 shows that performance-dependent cash bonus have beneficial effect on employee productivity. Bonuses can be used to motivate managers of charities to increase the efficiency of their fund-raising activities (Baber, Daniel, & Roberts, 2002). Performance-contingent pay such as bonuses attracts higher quality employees since more able employees will benefit more from

cash bonuses than will weaker employees. Higher available bonuses will also change the composition of the workforce in such fashion that more productive employees will join the firm and unproductive workers will exit. In turn, these more productive workers will increase delivered effort and this effort should be more effective. (Gibbs, 1995). The general regression equation between the annual cash bonus range (X) and performance improvement (Y) was as follows:

$$Y = 23.25 + 1.5X$$

This indicated that the independent variable (annual cash bonus) and dependent variable (employee performance) have linear correlation. The Pearson's coefficient of correlation, r, was 1, which indicated that the variables X and Y had linear relationship with perfect positive correlation.

Table 12: General effect of annual cash bonus pay on the employee performance

Annual cash bonus range as % of basic salary (X)	Performance improvement in % (Y)
2-5	26-31
6-9	32-37
10-13	38-43
14-17	44-49
18-21	50-55

Source: Computed from survey data, 2011

Conclusion and Recommendations:

In summary, an effective remuneration, especially the compensation package will result in attracting, retaining and motivating the employees who understand the details of the organization. This allows the organization to compete at a much higher level than it currently does. The right compensation package is different for every organization. For the compensation of an organization to succeed, the goals of the organization must be aligned with the goals of the employees whom the organization wishes to attract. The organization must set goals, and educate employees to understand that proper alignment of the goals of the organization with the goals of the individual can be beneficial to both parties. An organization must constantly reassess its needs, and help the employees reassess their needs to constantly motivate them. Compensation packages should be well thought out before implementation, because a bad or unclear package is perhaps than no package at all. The purpose of the compensation is to drive growth within the organization and make it more competitive, a bad compensation plan may have the exact opposite effect, transforming a once healthy organization to one in financial woes. Regular review of salary and other incentives should be carried out.

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Impact of political crisis on national development in Nigeria: the action group crisis in context

By

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Abstract

In recent times, nearly all the major political parties in Nigeria are faced with internal problems. All minor crises and dissensions in the political arena are allowed to degenerate into serious conflagrations without a major solution in sight. Although no political party is completely free from crisis, the management of this problematic situation is what distinguishes one political party from the other. It is also instructive to note that the internal crisis of any political party may have a number of fundamental effects on the entire political space, particularly if such party is the one in charge of governance, at any of the level of administration. The aim of the paper, therefore, is to discuss the impact of political crisis on national development in Nigeria using the Action Group Crisis of 1962 as reference point. This is to help underscore what crisis in a political party can do to national development as typified in the Nigerian experience vis-à-vis the Action Group crisis. The implication of this is that there are lessons to be learnt from such experience as a guide for the future. Such lessons will be highlighted in this study. Data for this paper were obtained from both primary and secondary sources, and they were critically deployed. This paper argues that there is a near collapse of the in-built mechanism of dialogue and negotiation necessary for the resolution of disagreement and crisis in a political party as witnessed presently in the country. This is underscored by widespread concerns that democratic development could be jeopardized in Nigeria if matters are left in the current state of confusion and confrontations. The paper concludes that a relatively crisis free political party enhances national development.

Keywords: Development, politics, crisis, democracy, political parties, administration, Nigeria.

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Introduction

The pervasiveness of intra party crisis in Nigeria since the commencement of this leg of political dispensation in 1999 shows that parties in Nigeria spend more time on avoidable crisis than carrying out developmental programmes that would benefit the people. The political parties are ridden with one form of crisis or the other; this could spell doom for the nation's fledgling democracy. Therefore, this paper, discusses the impact of political crisis on national development in Nigeria, using Action Group crisis as a reference point. The first part of this paper introduces the essay and gives a background to the Action Group Crisis. The second part is a discussion of the party's problem within the NPC (Northern People's Congress) and NCNC (National Council of Nigeria Citizens) coalition, Awolowo's departure from Western Nigeria and S.L. Akintola premiership in the West. Then the third part is a discussion on the Jos convention and its aftermath; the role of elders and traditional rulers in the attempt to settle the crisis. The final part examines the impact of the crisis on Western Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole.

Theoretical Framework

This work relies on the anomie theory propounded by Emile Durkheim one of the renowned functionalist theorists who took special interest in the workings of the society on how the various societal institutions work independently for the overall success of the larger society. Likening his version of the functionalist theory of the society to biological organisms, Emile believed that institutions (whether political, economic, social, religious, etc.) need to work as unified components for the survival of the society. The thrust of this theory is that no singular institution or component of the society can work in isolation of the others in an attempt to ensure societal bond and progress. The catch word is group cohesion and when this is absent, cleavages thus emerge which if not checked can degenerate into serious crisis situation. The emerging crisis in the various groups or one group of the society can adversely affect the desired result (overall development of the society). (Ogunbameru, 2008; 15&16)

Durkheim theory is concerned with lack of social and moral standard of people in the society. This shows in the way political leaders of the same party based on flimsy reason without taking into cognizance the consequence of their action on the group of people they are supposedly leading and the society at large. The theory draws an analogy between various groups of people working together in order to maintain healthy development in much the same way the various institutions in the society work together to achieve development in all ramifications.

The evolution of Action Group

In order to provide the necessary leadership and organization for the people of Western Nigeria, some members of *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* (the society of the descendants of Oduduwa) like Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Bode Thomas, S.L. Akintola, S.O. Shonibare, M.A. Ogun and M.A. Ajasin (Arifalo, 2001:235) formed a political party on 21st March, 1951 and named the party the Action Group (henceforth referred to in this paper as AG). (Dare, 1989). The party came into being as Western Nigeria's regional political party which would initially capture power within the region (Tijani, 1989:122). Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the brain behind the formation of the party. Before then, he had been credited with the founding of a movement for Yoruba cultural consciousness, known as the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* (Tijani, 1989:122). Between April 28th and 29th 1951, the first general conference of the AG was held at Owo, now in Ondo State. At this

conference the officers of the party were elected, Awolowo serving as its first president (Arifalo, 2001:231). Before the public announcement of its existence, nine secret meetings of the AG had been held between 26th March, 1950 and the 4th March 1951(Awolowo, 1960:219).

The party at first received its strongest support from the Yoruba families and the Yoruba professional class, made up mainly of cocoa traders and chiefs who were patrons of the *Egbe*, of which Awolowo was the General Secretary. The party also got assistance from Yoruba intellectuals who were opposed to NCNC on the ground of principle and from selected leaders of minority groups like the Itsekiri and Edo States in the present Delta and Edo states respectively. Awolowo and other leaders made special efforts to prevent the organization from being stigmatized as a Yoruba dominated party. This was difficult because the Yoruba constituted a vast majority of the population of the Western Region (Coleman, 1986:350).

The AG was a party whose overriding short-term objective was to capture political power in the West in 1951. Generally, the aims of the party were:

- a. to encourage and strengthen all ethnic organizations in the Western Region and cooperate in the formation of a countrywide organization which could work as a united team towards the realization of immediate self-government for Nigeria (Olusanya, 2001:566).
- b. to prepare and present to the public programmes for all departments of government, and to strive faithfully, to ensure that implication of such programmes through those of its members that are elected into the Western House of Assembly and the Federal Legislature (Awolowo, 1960:222). And they must work as a united group, and submit themselves to party loyalty and discipline.

The AG contested and won elections into the Western House of Assembly in 1951 by a narrow margin (Coleman, 1986:351), and consequently formed the government of the Region. Members of the party were appointed to ministerial offices; Awolowo became the Regional Minister of Local Government and Leader of Government Business in the House of Assembly (Falola, 2002:289).

It was the first party to carry nationalist politics and political consciousness to rural areas of the country. This inspired the establishment of rival political parties. Also, in the 1951 regional elections it was the only party that published its policy papers as well as manifesto (Awolowo, 1960:224). Among the party's achievements were:

- a. the announcement of a programme for ensuring the political freedom of Nigeria at its inauguration in Owo in 1951
- b. introduction of a Free Health Scheme in 1953
- c. introduction of a minimum wage for workers in 1954. No industrial strike arose between 1951 and 1959
- d. launching of the first Television Station in Africa in 1959
- e. introduction of Free Universal Primary Education in Nigeria in 1955 and the founding of University of Ife (now Obafemi Awolowo University), Ile-Ife in 1962 (Ogunmodede, 1985:27).

The AG party was in power in the old Western Region from 1951 to 1962 when factional tendencies began to creep into the party's ranks (Akinboye &, 1999:26).

Background to the AG Crisis

Some people in Nigeria are of the opinion that the intra-party crisis that split the AG started in 1962 (Ojiako, 1981:96). This may not be completely true. The crisis had really started before then, as this paper will attempt to show. In preparation for the 1959 election, the AG mounted the most intensive, best organized, and most expensive campaigns that had ever been seen in Nigeria. During the campaigns the Western Region under its control launched the first television

service in Africa. The party's most noticeable campaign strategy, was the use of helicopters to fly party leaders to rallies, to impress it upon the country that the AG was best equipped to deal with the modern scientific and technological world that Nigeria was about to enter into (Schwarz Jr., 1965:103).

The party was seriously criticized by both NPC and NCNC on the issues of its campaigns and manifesto. The NCNC collaborated with the NPC in the running of a national government. By implication as the NPC said, the AG was unable to collaborate with other parties because of its 'rigid intolerance' (Schwarz Jr., 1965:103). This argument cannot now be fully substantiated, because the party had some allies in the Northern and Eastern minorities.

However, voting for the 312 seats in the Federal House of Representatives took place at the end of the second week of December 1959 and this election experienced a turn-out of over 7 million voters. Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Chief Obafemi Awolowo contested and won elections in their respective constituencies. In all, the NPC won with a strong majority of 148 seats. The NCNC-NEPU alliance won 89 seats and the AG and its allies obtained 73 seats (Falola, 2002:291). The voting pattern demonstrated conclusively that the dominant factor was either ethnic or religious. In the East the NCNC won all the 51 seats, in the North the NPC won over 80 percent of the votes in 42 constituencies in Kano and Sokoto provinces and in Borno Division. In the West the AG won 30 of the 35 seats. Though the party obtained slightly more than half its seats outside the west, it won support in the North and East from minority ethnic groups who were expressing resentment for the dominant majority in their region (Schwarz Jr., 1965:111).

Since no party had absolute majority of seats, it was necessary that a coalition government be formed. Sir James Robertson, the Governor-General, gave Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa Balewa the chance to form a government and he proceeded to put together an NPC-NCNC coalition government (Schwarz Jr., 1965:112). According to Onobamiro:

Alhaji Tafawa did not want just a coalition; he wanted a National Government as the only instrument to unite the country and ensure its stability. Hence, on an official visit which he paid to the Western Region shortly after independence, he addressed the Region's full cabinet on its important theme and made an important proposal. He invited the AG to join the Federal Government. He said he would make their leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo the Deputy Prime Minister and give him the important portfolio of finance minister which he said he would take away from Chief Okotie Eboh (Onibamiro, 1983:150).

The AG rejected this offer because they feared that collaboration with the feudalistic and conservative NPC' would compromise their 'socialist stance in the country' (Onibamiro, 1983:150). Nevertheless, the AG proceeded to constitute the opposition in the parliamentary system of government that was adopted on the eve of independence.

The AG Problems with NPC/NCNC Coalition

In Ibadan on Thursday 4th June, 1959 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, National Leader of the AG and Premier of Western Nigeria, presented his party's 14 point programme for the 1959 Federal election. The programme is summarized below;

- (i) Introduction of free education throughout the Federation at primary schools, Secondary schools, Technical colleges and trade centres.

- (ii) Establishment of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity homes throughout the Federation.
- (iii) A scheme to boost the morale and efficiency of the working class, if elected the minimum wage of five shillings will be paid to workers throughout Nigeria.
- (iv) Continual upward review of salaries and wages, since the cost of living has not been static.
- (v) If elected, the party promised to create conducive environment throughout the Federation which would make it possible for every Nigerian citizen to be gainfully employed at all times.
- (vi) Pension would be paid for daily workers, since they formed the axis of our economic and development wheels.
- (vii) The party will develop the rural areas since they constitute ninety percent of our population and produce the bulk of food the people consume.
- (viii) Housing commission will be established, whose task will be to provide very cheap and decent houses, for which they will pay by instalments over a period of years.
- (ix) Old Age Pension Scheme will be established to pay a given sum of money to people of a certain age upwards who are willing to benefit from the scheme and who have no source of income from other forms of pensions, past savings, investments, rents and the like.
- (x) It is the firm resolve of the AG and its allies on assuming office at the centre, to initiate comprehensive and countrywide schemes for the restoration of the blind and the maimed and the like to the full status of self-respecting citizens who will be gainfully employed, either on their own account or by others.
- (xi) Prompt rehabilitation of the ex-service men.
- (xii) The party planned to create three new States before 1st October, 1960, the Cross River, Ogoja, Rivers State (C.O.R) the Mid-West State, the Middle Belt State. If the Middle Belt State is to be created the merging of Ilorin-Kabba Divisions with Western Region is a foregone conclusion.
- (xiii) Liberal democracy will be operated where the Constitution of the Federation is supreme, the fundamental human rights and their enforcement are respected in established courts of law.
- (xiv) Lastly, there will be amnesty to political prisoners. The party and its allies vow that if they win the Federal election, they will on independence day decree free pardon to all political prisoners who have served their sentences and grant amnesty forthwith to all those who may still remain behind the bars on that historic day (Awolowo, 1959:7-30)

Both the NCNC and NPC were envious of the laudable programmes of the AG and they were bent on bringing the party into disrepute, because the AG was viewed as an impediment to their political success, due to developmental projects carried out by the AG in Western Nigeria and part of Lagos (the then Nigeria Capital) was the bench mark for other Region. Hitherto the relationship between the NPC and the AG had become bitterly antagonistic, mainly as a result of the AG's determined campaign for the creation of a new region in the main minority group area of the North and its simultaneous demand for a revision of the North-West boundary, so as to transfer some five hundred thousand northern Yoruba to the Region of Western Nigeria (Falola, 2002:291). At Nigeria's independence the Federal Government was made up of the NPC and the NCNC. The AG led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo was in opposition, as alluded to earlier. The coalition government was led by Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the NPC deputy leader and the first Prime Minister of the Federation in November 1960 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the Leader of NCNC, became the First Nigerian Governor-General. From the beginning the NPC-NCNC coalition was hostile to the AG's opposition which it tried to destroy (Olusanya, 2001:566). This is similar to the hatred the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) demonstrated against the opposition parties Alliance for Democracy(AD) and All Nigeria's Party(APP) between 1999 and

2003. This destroyed unity and cohesion in these parties. The ruling party (PDP) still demonstrates the hatred to opposition parties in Nigeria up till present day.

In addition to being the opposition party at the Federal level, the AG was also leading the opposition in the Eastern House of Assembly. The AG persistently criticised most of the policies of the government that it found not to be in the best interest of the Nigerian masses (Schwarz Jr., 1965:246). When this was juxtaposed with its achievement in the West, the AG succeeded in appearing more nationalistic than the Federal Government. Its continued support for minority movements in the Northern and Eastern Regions also contributed to the governing coalition's desire to destroy it (Post & Vickers, 1973:66). It must be recalled that, while the NPC was resting on its laurels federally and consolidating its position in the North during the first few years of independence, it was the AG which was looking towards future development in federal politics. Failure to win a majority in the 1959 federal election had been a bitter personal blow to Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the National leader of the party (Post & Vickers, 1973:66).

Chief Awolowo and his supporters were determined to give the party a new image. Gathering around Awolowo was one of the younger and more radical AG leaders, S.G. Ikoku from the East, whose own antecedent record included membership of the Marxist United Working People's Party in the early 1950s (Post & Vickers, 1973:67). Also moving close to Chief Awolowo were leaders of the minority ethnic groups, like J.S. Tarka of the Tiv Kingdom, who hoped that AG's victory in the future would lead to the creation of new region in the federation for his own Middle Belt people.

Awolowo's Departure from the West

As stated earlier, Chief Awolowo as leader of the party stood for election to the Federal House, announcing that he would give up his position of regional premier. This is because he began to be more and more convinced about the futility of remaining perpetually excluded from the benefits of participation in power at the Federal level and was beginning to urge a rapprochement with the NPC (Balogun, 1973:16). Before the election, Chief Awolowo resigned as the Premier of Western Nigeria. He was replaced by the Deputy Leader, Chief S.L. Akintola, who had been the party's Federal Parliamentary leader and also a Federal Minister in the National Government between 1957 and 1959 (Falola, 2002:293). It is crucial here to note that Chief Awolowo was not altogether happy about the choice of Chief Akintola to succeed him as premier of the Western Region. It was believed that he had in mind Chief Akin Deko from Idanre, Ondo Province. Nevertheless, Awolowo must have known that Akintola would be forceful and self-reliant premier due to his background as a lawyer. He was also a recipient of several chieftaincy titles like Awolowo. Nonetheless, Akintola was a logical choice not only by virtue of his standing in the party but in view of his popularity with sections of the Yoruba electorate especially the Ibadan people (Falola, 2002:293). It will be recalled that Ibadan was then a stronghold of the NCNC in Yorubaland and AG elders hoped that the installation of an Oyo Yoruba, in person of Akintola, as premier of the West would sway the minds of the Ibadan people. That hope was partially realized during the regional election of 1960, in which the party won a majority of the seats in the city. However, Chief Awolowo won the election in his constituency and became the opposition leader at the Federal House and AG continued to rule the Western Region, with Chief S.L. Akintola as Deputy Leader of the party and the new premier.

It is pertinent to note that there were two factional groups in the AG after the 1959 federal election. The first, led by Chief Akintola, wanted the party to join the Federal Government of Balewa in order that the Yoruba might have share in the 'National Cake' (Dudley, 1973:35). The second group, led by Chief Awolowo, did not intend to join the Balewa administration and merely share the 'National Cake' but to expand the party's political base to other regions, build up its power among the people, use this power to unseat the NPC-NCNC coalition government, and grab the whole of the 'Federal Cake' if possible. Awolowo believed that this required more patience for democracy to reach the people, especially those in the Northern Region, and carry them along.

After the departure of Chief Awolowo to the Federal House, Chief Akintola the Premier of Western Nigeria wanted to control the Party machinery at the regional level without due regard to Chief Awolowo's leadership. This led to further fractionalization of the party (Dudley, 1973:35). We now had the Chief Akintola and Chief Ayo Rosiji group on one side, and Chief Awolowo and Chief Anthony Enahoro on the other side. Chief Awolowo believed that, as leader of the party he still had a great deal to do at the party level with the formulation of policies affecting the Western Region or any other region where the AG and its allies might be in power (Awolowo, 1981:119). The West, after all, remained the party base and only centre of patronage with the main source of the party funds. Chief Akintola was ambitious to replace the party leader. He was uneasy by having less in power than other two regional premiers, both regional premiers, both of whom were presidents of their parties.

The Anomie Theory, propounded by Emile Durkheim that posits that emerging crisis in various groups or one group of the society can adversely affect the desired result, is apt for AG crisis, because the crisis affected development in Western Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole. The resources that were supposed to be channelled towards developmental projects were spent on security. As a result, investment which is the hallmark of development was very scanty, since business can only thrive in a peaceful environment.

Akintola's Premiership in the West after 1959

As earlier stated, Chief Awolowo and Chief Akintola belonged to two different factional groups in the AG party and their political ideologies differed. When Akintola took over as the premier, most of the party guidelines were not strictly adhered to and vital discussions were made without reference to the party leadership (Schwarz Jr., 1965:132). It will be recalled that Chief Awolowo and his supporters in the party were attempting to consolidate their own ideological approach to Nigerian politics (Post & Vickers, 1973:75). After his return from Ghana, the party leaders had called together twelve men to form the National Reconstruction Group which was to study Nigerian economic and social problems and design policies to solve them. They produced an ideological statement on Democratic Socialism (Ikejiani-Clark, 1989:252), an outline of necessary economic measures for an independent Nigeria (Post & Vickers, 1973:75). According to Chief Awolowo:

I have advocated that our economy should be nationally planned and that such planning should be guided by the ideas of Democratic Socialism. Specifically, I have advocated the public ownership of certain industries, and the studied encouragement of Nigerian entrepreneurs, within the ambit of a national plan, to take their rightful places in the development of the country (Awolowo, 1981:213).

In his own view Dudley explained that “Democratic Socialism” meant a change from the earlier slogan of life more abundant to something less inchoate, more egalitarian and re-distributive; a move from freely competitive market economy to a more planned, centrally managed and stated directed economic framework. But such a value system was hardly likely to win the acceptance of the economic elites who had provided the financial prop for the party. For, as Chief Akintola was later parody the new ideology, democratic socialism would amount to no less than ‘one man’ “one car, one wife and one agbada”(a traditional form of Yoruba dress) (Dudley, 1973:35).

This was the crux of the problem since Chief Akintola and Chief Ayotunde Rosiji, who had been AG ministers in the national government between 1957 and 1959 (Oyediran *et al*, 1988:166:176, & Ogunmodede, 1988:265) and the member of the Western Executive Committee of the party, did not accept Democratic Socialism. It was, however, agreed that it should be on agenda for discussion at the annual congress to be held in Jos. Chief Rosiji, the secretary of the AG, had supported Chief Akinola in attacking the ideology as a sham (Ikejiani-Clark, 1989:253). The faction of the party led by Chief Awolowo accused Chief Akintola and his supporters of sabotage and an attempt to ridicule the new party programme.

Chief Akintola took several important steps like reduction of head tax, an increase in the contribution of local schools and a reduction in price of cocoa without informing or consulting the party leadership. He diverted the party’s ten percent levy on the salaries of legislators from the divisions into special fund (Schwarz, 1965:132). Akintola removed some of Awolowo’s supporters from the statutory boards. The problems which Awolowo had with Akintola might be ideological and it might also not be the question of leadership, as stated above, since ideological problems were situated within a political system. Every political party all over the world has its left and right wings, its radical and its conservatives (Onabamiro, 1983:151). The two sets of differences of value and strategic orientation led to the split in the party leadership, with one segment supporting Chief Awolowo and the party ideologies and the other backing Chief Akintola. The various moves and counter-moves by factions came to the open during the Jos convention. This became a serious matter in that it dragged the whole country into its internal quarrel. This shows that intra party crisis can affect national development.

The Jos Convention

The AG crisis broke into open at its annual General Conference which began at the African Games Club in Jos on February 2, 1962 (Onabamiro, 1983:151). In his presidential address to the congress, Chief Awolowo told the delegates that “our party now has within the ranks of its leadership and followership, a number of real dangerous contradictions some of these contradictions are only just growing or rearing their heads, others are already waxing strong”(Arifalo, 2001:284:249). He took note of a growing disaffection between a privileged and a non privileged class within the party. He also referred to several basic policy conflicts. Some of those conflicts border on the question of sustaining the party as an opposition party in the North and Eastern Regions; on the issue of pressing for the creation of new states, desirability of joining coalition to form a national government; and finally, on the adoption of an explicitly socialist programme (Falola, 2002:296).

Chief Akintola was accused of carrying out programmes which were at variance with that of the party. Akintola held the view that AG had no future at the federal level, that if the AG continued to challenge the NPC and NCNC in their strongholds, he felt that this position would destroy the party in the West, it should cooperate with the central power in order to strengthen the party's position and possibly have a share in the government (Ikejiani-Clark, 1989:253). Chief Awolowo was totally opposed to this line of thinking, as he wanted to continue in active opposition as an alternate government (Ikejiani-Clark, 1989:253). This shows that Akintola group worked assiduously against Awolowo led Action Group. This may be due to ideological differences, although some scholars claimed that the dispute was caused largely by differences in tactics between them (Ojiako, 1981:96).

After Chief Awolowo's speech and while the convention was still in session, Chief Akintola together with Chief Ayo Rosiji who was the General Secretary of the AG before the convention, A. O. Adeyi, the Minister of Trade and Industry. J.O. Adigun, the Minister of Land and Housing, and Dr. J. O. Omitowoju, the Minister of Chieftaincy Affairs left Jos by air for Ibadan to receive the Sadauna of Sokoto. In other words, they had boycotted the convention. During the convention, Sam Ikoku was elected the National Secretary in place of Chief Rosiji (Post & Vickers, 1973:77).

The Role of Elders and Traditional Rulers

After the Jos convention, during which Chief Akintola's power was reduced in a somewhat together unprecedented fashion, the rift was made public. The AG elders and Chiefs intervened before it got out of hand. It will be recalled that most of the party elders had not made the trip to Jos to attend the convention, when the news of Awolowo's unexpected offensive and Akintola's boycott of the Convention reached Lagos, party elders and leaders of the Egbe acted immediately to safe the situation (*Daily Express*, 1962).

On Wednesday, February 7, 1962, Dr. Akinola Maja who was President of the *Egbe*, accompanied by the some top leaders including T.A. Odutola, Alhaji Gbadamosi, M.A. Ogun and I.A. Okunnowo chartered a plane and flew from Lagos through Ibadan; they failed to persuade Akintola to accompany them to Jos (*Daily Express*, 1962). Although their attempt failed, the elders did subsequently succeed in persuading both sides to a meeting in Ibadan on Friday, February 9, 1962 (*Daily Express*, 1962). At the Ibadan meeting, Chief Awolowo and Chief Akintola, Leader and Deputy Leader of the AG respectively, amicably settled their differences. According to a joint communiqué which was issued after the two had been persuaded to meet together by the President of the *Egbe*, Dr. Akintola Maja , and other Western Chiefs and Elders, it was reported that:

There was a meeting of the *Oba* and chiefs of the Western Region with the elders of the AG and some leading members of the Party held somewhere in Ibadan today (February 9). The dispute and the misunderstanding leading to the withdrawal of the party and premier of the Western Region and his ministers together with some other members of the party from the Jos convention were fully discussed and amicably settled. The leader of the party and the Deputy leader, Chief Akintola, were happy to inform members of the party and all well-wishers throughout the Federation that they are once more again united and rededicated in their resolve to continue their fights for the ideals and programme of the AG (*West Africa*, 1962:579).

The peace settlement between the two leaders was temporary. On May 19, after the hearing of a five hour speech from Chief Awolowo, the West and Mid-belt Executive Committee of the party called Chief Akintola to resign as the Premier of the West after finding him guilty of mal-administration, anti-party activities and indiscipline (Schwarz, 1965:135). The AG parliamentary committee voted 120 to none that Akintola should be removed as premier, at a peace meeting where he defended himself for two hours.

Subsequently, the majority of the party members petitioned the Governor of the West, Oba Adesoji Aderemi (the *Ooni* of Ife), accusing the premier of mal-administration, anti-party activities and indiscipline (West Africa, 1962:579). In response to the request the Governor dismissed Chief Akintola as premier and appointed Chief Adegbenro to the Premiership position. Chief Akintola refused to step down, stating that the House of Assembly had to meet to ratify the decision and the issue of vote of no confidence on him (West Africa, 1962:579) as stated in the constitution.

Be that as it may, on May 25, 1962 the Western House of Assembly was convened in order to approve the choice of Chief Adegbenro, but a condition of disorder was created by Chief Akinola's faction in which open fighting between the contestants took place with the NCNC members supporting the Akintola faction in the brawl (Dudley, 1973:35). However, his expulsion in those circumstances had embittered him and his supporters to the point of exacerbating quarrel to bitter end, which it eventually proved to be. The Federal Government took advantage of the split in the AG party and this fresh party crisis to use its constitutional power to declare a state of emergency and install Dr. Majekodunmi, Federal Minister of Health, as the Administrator of the Region for six months.

Impact of the AG Crisis on Western Nigeria

In May 1962, the two regional parties in coalition at the Federal level chose to act decisively to change the balance in Nigeria's political system. The events of the six months of emergency obviously affected Chief Awolowo and his supporters, adversely. The outcome of these measures aided his rival, Chief Akintola, to gain control of the West (Akpata, 2000:227). Chief Akintola was again installed as premier of west in January 1963, as the head of a coalition of the new United People's Party and the NCNC.

The AG crisis and the state of emergency declared by Federal Government(31st December 1962-May,1963) as well as the allegation of corruption leveled against Chief Awolowo and his supporters, helped to aid Chief Akintola to gain control of the West. The Coker Commission of Inquiry was set up by the Federal Government to look into the accounts of six Western Nigerian statutory corporations. It was alleged that the National Bank of Nigeria had virtually constituted itself into a banking asylum for the AG, (Shagari, 2001:108), its leaders and their businesses. The Commission exonerated Chief Awolowo from the charges of enrichment, but indicted him for untidy manner in which he directed the use of funds. It is important to note that the motions challenging the validity of the Emergency Powers Act operating in Western Nigeria were filled by Chief Adegbenro and Chief Rotimi Williams, the AG legal Adviser, the motions were dismissed by the Supreme Court in Lagos on 7th June,1962,

On 2nd April, 1963, Chief Awolowo and twenty other AG leaders were on trial for plotting to seize federal power by means of a *coup d'état*. The specific offences alleged in this case treasonable felony, conspiracy to commit treasonable felony, and conspiracy to violate the Firearms Act. It will be recalled that Chief Awolowo himself a lawyer, decided to argue his own case since the counsel of his choice, a Briton, had been denied entry into Nigeria (Falola, 2002:288). After the trial they convicted him and others of plotting to overthrow the Federal Government by smuggling arms from Ghana and training revolutionaries in that country. Awolowo was sentenced to a ten-year prison term, which was reduced to seven years on appeal. Chief Anthony Enahoro was repatriated from Britain to face charges on the offence. He was also found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years which was later reduced to ten years (Falola, 2002:288).

Of course, the series of events from the declaration of the state of emergency to Awolowo's conviction weakened the AG, but it did not affect strong appeal of many of the positions which the party had begun to advocate after the 1959 election. But the party split and suffered a precipitous decline in terms of strength and popularity. The AG crisis began a chain of events that culminated in a major realignment of two-long terms political enemies, the AG and the NCNC. Awolowo was jailed for ten years along with several others including Chief Anthony Enahoro. During the absence of Chief Awolowo from the political scene of Western Nigeria, Chief Adegbenro was regarded as the temporal leader of the AG. He believed the best way to secure a pardon for the 'goaled leader' Chief Awolowo was to win the election and the only chance for the party to do this was through an alliance with the NCNC (Post & Vickers, 1973:123). The initial crisis brought an end to the party ruler ship in the Western Region. At the end of the emergency period in January 1963, Akintola re-emerged as the Premier and new leader of the party, United Peoples' Party (UPP) having formed an alliance with Western wing of NCNC. The AG afterwards became the opposition party in the West (Arifalo, 2001:252). The tension in the Region continued till Chief Awolowo was released from prison by General Yakubu Gowon (the then new Military Head of State) after the military coup of 1966.

The AG crisis led to disunity among the ranks of the party and Yoruba people in general. In September 1963, a group of prominent Yoruba citizens under the leadership of Dr. Majekodunmi launched a new organisation called *Egbe Omo Yoruba* (the Society of Yoruba Descendants) (Arifalo, 2001:255) to rival *Egbe Omo Oduduwa*. Up till now, the rivalry still rages on. During the Abacha regime (1993-1998) there was Imeri Group, set up by Dr. Bode Olajumoke and his allies to rival Afenifere as pan-Yoruba socio-cultural group led by the late Pa Adekunle Ajasin. In 2000, there was the formation of the Yoruba Council of Elders, *Igbimo Agba Yoruba* led by Pa Alayande and Justice Adewale Thompson, which was supported to rival Pa Abraham Adesanya Afenifere. This was the fallout of the defeat of Chief Bola Ige by Chief Olu Falae as the Alliance for Democracy (AD) presidential candidate in 1999 presidential election (Adegbomire: 2011). This laid foundation for the eventual demise of AD as a political party in Nigeria. The roots of this rivalry and the ensuing crisis may compare to those of Chief Awolowo's and Chief Akintola's group in earlier days. Bickering for tickets at party primaries has caused intense crises in Nigeria political parties before the main election. It is the opinion of this paper that party supremacy and internal democracy must be adhered to.

In 2004, the Governors of the six states of the south-west found a new platform to spread their socio-political interests as they have resolved to throw their full support behind the new socio-political group known as the Oduduwa Assembly. The group, billed to attract membership from the length and breadth of Yoruba territories in Nigeria, including Kogi, Kwara, Edo, Delta and from the diaspora; positioned itself as a better alternative to the existing Afenifere and the Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE). The Oduduwa Assembly, formed at the instance of top South-west politicians and traditional rulers, learnt, was launched in February, 2004 (Sunday Tribune, 2004:16). The group died and failed to make any significant contribution to Yorubaland. Also, in 2005 Afenifere Renewal Group was also formed to rival Afenifere the Pan Yoruba socio-political group Nevertheless, much of what is known about Yoruba unity and peace during the period centered on the fate of Chief Obafemi Awolowo a widely respected statesman inspiring people even outside his own region. His image has improved as a result of his long trial and sentence (Post & Vickers, 1973:122). He was seen as a ‘martyr’ and ‘tin-god’. Popular songs were composed about him. There was a saying during his trial that “*when they locked up Awolowo they locked up money*”, a way of linking the economic recession by the mid-1962 to his removal from the political scene. It would be called that the AG as the official opposition party found out and adequately utilised all available methods to embarrass the NPC-NCNC government (Dare, 1989:113). For this reason, the AG was hated and was regarded as fit only for opportunities to destroy the parties and to bring down the government at the centre of which was controlled by the NPC/NCNC coalition government (Dare, 1989:113). This laid the foundation for seeing opposition parties as enemies of government in Western Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole instead of seeing them as partner in progress.

In July 1963, a referendum was held in the Mid-west on the creation of a Mid-West Region. The result gave an overwhelming support for its creation. The region was the created the following month. This act of Federal Government embittered the AG which felt that the West had been unfairly treated, since states were not created simultaneously in other two regions. In essence, the creation of the Mid-west out of the Western Region was a calculated attempt at the territorial amputation of the AG.

The debacle in the Western House of Assembly, which resulted from the party crisis, marked the beginning of thuggery in the legislative arm of government. Fighting broke out, punches were traded and chairs were thrown (Schwarz, 1965:136) such that the proceedings were disrupted. They underwent a traumatic crisis in what is now commonly regarded as the beginning of the “Wild West Nigeria” (Ogunmodede, 1988:27). This is now a recurrent decimal at all levels of our legislative arm of government.

Furthermore, the result of the October 1965 election was won by the NNDP, but its victory was greeted with allegations of widespread rigging and other malpractices from the AG, which led to ‘*Operation Wetie*’ (Shagari, 2001:114). Opponents were drenched with petrol and set ablaze. Looting of property throughout the region became a common place affair (Shagari, 2001:114). While sections of towns were burnt, political destabilization increased in the Western Region and by 1965 motorists were refusing to drive through the region. During the Second Republic, the same ugly scenario repeated itself during the August 1983 election (Boyd & Maishanu, 1991:189), when lives and property were destroyed in the old Ondo and Oyo States. The AG was effectively broken as a result of the crisis, the Yoruba remained loyal to the spirit of the party

and its *'goaled leader'*. The widespread persecution of the remaining members of the AG meant continued alienation of the Yoruba. Nevertheless the Federal Government lost its legitimacy in the West (Dare. 1985:189).

Personal hatred became compounded with collective bitterness as the erosion of confidence deepened in the Region. The people of the Region split into two irreconcilable groups and it only required just one more spark to set the Region on fire and that spark was provided by the dispute over the results of the Regional elections in October, 1965.

Impact of the AG Crisis on Nigeria

The AG crisis had marked the first major crisis in the nascent Nigeria polity. The crisis broke out with a loud bang on May 25, 1962. On the day, there was a disruption of the Western Regional House of Assembly as a result of the rift within the ruling party as earlier stated above.

The tacit one-party political system that was established in each three regions in Nigeria before the 1962 AG crisis emphasized the conglomerated nature of Nigeria's social structure. But at the point of independence, two regional parties-the NPC and NCNC, both ethno-geographical based in North and East respectively – entered into a coalition to control the Federal Government with AG forming the official camp of opposition. This may be the source of Nigeria's present political instability arising from a disagreement on the basis of power sharing within the polity. Cross carpeting, which became a popular practice in Nigeria politics, was made popular as a result of the AG crisis. As early as May, 1963 Akintola had won over many AG legislators and either incorporated or crushed many other adherents with the apparatus of AG rules (Kyari, 1989:122). Similarly, under democratic dispensation, many senators and honourable members of both the National Assembly and the State House of Assembly are known to cross carpet from one party to the other. The scandal of the Federal election of December 1964 had not abated when the country faced another problem in a Western Nigeria parliamentary election of October 1965. This election was a final desperate attempt of the Southern Alliance to win power by constitutional means. The election alleged to have been *'rigged'* by the Nigerian National Alliance (N.N.A), which formed the government of Western Nigeria. Consequently, Chief Adegbenro formed an alternative government in the same Western Region (Shagari, 2001:114). This led to a breakdown of law and order but the Prime Minister refused to declare a state of emergency. The military coup of January 15, 1966 ended the crisis whose impact was felt both in Western Nigeria and the nation as a whole.

As a matter of fact, the party crisis to some extent prepared the ground for the first military putsch in Nigeria. During the 1962 state of emergency the Federal Government dispatched soldiers to help the police, who were considered not well equipped to put the crisis under control. This was the first event to push soldiers close to the corridors of power in the newly independent Nigeria nation. The accusation and counter-accusation, abuse and diatribe exchanged by politicians, exposed their *'dirty linen'* to the military. The monumental way in which the AG crisis rocked the new independent nation to its very foundations, coupled with the manner in which the Federal Government handled the crisis, made the political class more vulnerable to the attack on democracy of January 15, 1966. In essence, the AG crisis with its multiple consequences was one of the major factors that precipitated the 1966 military coup. Also, the election crisis of 1983 in both Ondo and Oyo states also contributed immensely to the military coup of 31st December, 1983. It is evident currently in Nigeria that intra party crises are more

prevalent than inter party crises .and there is near collapse of the in-built mechanism of dialogue and negotiation necessary for the resolution of disagreement in a political party as prevalent in major political parties in Nigeria. An intra party crisis in any political party can stall efforts by the party to move ahead in carrying out its development programmes. For instance, for over a year now, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) has not been able to convene its National Executive meeting and other statutory meetings due to party. Generally, the political rift in PDP today has risen to unprecedented dimension most especially in Adamawa, Ogun, Ondo and Rivers States where they have parallel state executive officers. Similarly, in Congress for Political Change (CPC), a group led by Senator Rufai Hanga is opposed to the leadership of Prince Tony Momoh executive: the group is already in court challenging the legitimacy of the Momoh led Executive Council. The case is not entirely different in All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), here; the dispute has degenerated into fractionalisation of the party. In all, the AG crisis affected development negatively in Western Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole. The negative consequences affected economy, physical infrastructure, public utilities, and mental development. All eventually contributed to the low level of development experienced during this period and the impact can still be felt today. The crisis is a bad reference point in Nigeria political history, .as it a number of fundament effects on the political space such as thuggery and violence.

Conclusion

It is very clear from the foregoing discussion that, the post-independence period was characterized by struggles for political power at both regional and national levels. The signs of unease in the Nigerian polity had been evident from the outset, which culminated in Nigeria political tragedy, perhaps due to the fact that the election was to determine which party succeeded the British colonial masters.

The AG as one of the three major political parties at independence, was unique in a number of ways; its membership, party manifestos and organization, discipline was well entrenched. From its inception, it issued policy papers on national and international issues. The party attracted a large proportion of the country's intellectuals and young men of a supposedly more radical temperament than the elders were part of the executive of the party (Arifalo: 2010). This is not withstanding the party was rocked by a serious crisis from within its ranks.

The crisis can be said to be due mainly to ideological problems that arose between Chief Awolowo, the party leader, and Chief Akintola the deputy leader, which developed into a cut-throat for the party leadership in Western Nigeria especially after Chief Awolowo's election into the Federal House in December 1959. This snowballed into the 1962 AG crisis which grew to a new height during the 1965 election. This latter event led to the party being split, with a precipitous decline of its numerical strength and everything contributed to the demise of the First Republic. The crisis also destroyed the constitutional foundations of the nation and paved way for military rule in Nigeria. Similarly, the choice of Chief Olu Falae over Bola Ige during the Alliance for Democracy (AD) party's primary elections at Ibadan in 1999 caused disenchantment among Bola Ige's supporters. This led to the balkanisation of the party, which later led to the formation of two factions led by Senator Mojisola Akinfenwa and Chief Bisi Akande. The various crises plaguing the major parties and defections in National Assembly, cross carpeting of

governors among others are vivid instance of this tendency. The crisis currently rocking most political parties in Nigeria could spell down for the nation's fledgling democracy.

The 2011 General Elections have come and gone. However, feverish anticipation grips Nigerians ahead of 2015 Elections; the envisioned political leaders would need to represent the citizens at all levels of governance in the country not as wishy-washy politicians who would throw their weight around and vacillate over the interest and well-being of those that elected them. Thus, what this demands for, are party discipline and political wisdom from electorate. Political parties in Nigeria are expected to rise above the confine of parochial interest and material enticement and vote for present political aspirants with unassailable moral integrity in order to avoid a repetition of the Western Region in 1965, and in old Ondo and Oyo States in August 1983 (Sunday Guardian, 2002:12). There is sufficient evidence to make one believe that the politicians have learnt nothing from the political history of Nigeria (Olomola: 2012). This is so because these politicians are yet to imbibe the principle, culture, rules and regulations (party supremacy) guiding the practice of democracy. Failure to imbibe these principles is partly responsible for intra-party crises in major political parties in the country and this could spell doom for the nation's fledgling democracy and national development, if urgent steps are not taken to mitigate these challenges.

This paper posits that Nigerian politicians should painstakingly nurture and strengthen democracy by allowing internal democracy, rule of law, and collectively build the nation democracy to enviable heights. The foregoing is needed so that the collective interest of all Nigeria devoid of selfish tendencies, which could threaten unity, peace, stability and progress could avoided.

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Human Rights and Human Security

By

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Abstract

Human Rights and Human Security are challenges to Africa's development because, the Continent's leadership and other stakeholders have failed to prioritize good governance through the rule of law and the promotion and protection of civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights of the people. Suffice it to say, they have instead focused on the security of the state and/or the construction of infrastructures for their personal aggrandizement to the exclusion of the ever encompassing basic tenets upon which development is anchored; the total well-being of the human person to live a normal life free from threats and respect for his inherent dignity and inviolability. Despite the abundance of land, natural resources and some of the world's best professionals blessed to the continent, the recent upsurge in civil conflicts within the last two decades in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, just to name a few; resulting mainly from the neglect of human rights and human security; suggests that until and unless citizens of a country are involved and are visible in the decision-making process of all issues pertaining to their well-being, and benefit from the resources of the country, development is undermined and violence, disease, destruction of lives and properties and displacement of people soon crop up and go beyond borders. What is most pitiable about this is that, the very fabric of the 'Westphalian sovereignty' being protected is destroyed; the best minds either perish or relocate to other continents and 'failed states' emerged; thereby making development to elude the continent. Therefore, no matter a country's military or economic power, if it does not engender the necessary mechanisms for the exercise and protection of human rights and human security, which are pillars of peace and security and, the fulcrums that balance all civilized societies; that country cannot be assured of any development. It is against this backdrop that, a new paradigm of leadership places emphasis on human rights and human security as a sure means to ensure positive peace, a sine qua non to development. In view therefore, the Paper shall attempt the following: discuss development in the context of human rights and human security, why and how the neglect of human rights and human security is a challenge to Africa's development and finally, conclude on ways in which the promotion and protection of the two principles can minimize the challenges and bring about development in Africa.

Keywords; human security, leadership, development, civilized societies

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Introduction

Human rights, human security, economic growth and economic development are intertwined and inseparable of development and can be illustrated best using the mathematical figure called a triangle; each of the three sides being important to the formation of the figure. The figure, itself, as compared herein refers to the objective of development, the happiness of the people for whom it is intended. In other words, the citizens' civil and political rights must be protected, their social services provided and, they should be free from fear and want. Sadly to say, this is not the case for majority of African states. The leadership and related stakeholders have over the years overlooked human rights and human security and the principle governing a triangle, which provides that neither one nor any of the two sides can exist without the other and still be called a triangle. The three lines must exist and be drawn in the form and manner as mathematically defined to form the triangle.

Development therefore must adhere to this principle and encompasses just increase in a state's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), status of Human Development Index and the building of the traditional state's security for its protection. It should and must include freedom of expression and association, participation, rule of law, good governance and the respect and inviolability of the human person. It is our view therefore that, while some African states have to some extent experienced economic growth and economic development by increasing level of productivity and improving technology, as well as providing basic entitlements to develop the living standards of their citizens and built a strong military to defend the territorial integrity of their respective states, they have failed to protect and promote basic fundamental liberties; thereby creating an atmosphere of negative peace and civil conflict, which has ultimately resulted in the destruction of lives and properties; and thus undermined development.

Accordingly, this Paper shall attempt the following: discuss development in the context of human rights and human security, why and how the neglect of human rights and human security is a challenge to Africa's development and finally, conclude on steps or measures in which the promotion and protection of the two principles can minimize the challenges and bring about development in Africa.

Development in the context of human rights and human security:

Following the end of World War II, which destroyed millions of lives and properties, the United Nations was organized "to maintain international peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace" (Department of Public Information, United Nations, NY10017). Few years later, on December 10, 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and in the first three paragraphs of the Preamble of the UDHR, emphasis is placed on the recognition of the inherent dignity of the human person as the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and further warned that the violation of these principles will inevitably compel victims to recourse to rebellion against the perpetrators. Forty-six years later, at the end of the cold war, specifically in 1994, Dr. Mahbub Ul Haq, Advisor to the United Nations Development Program propounded the idea of 'human security'; a principle that is human centered but, which is equally important as the traditional state security. The pronouncement by Dr. Haq was made against the backdrop that despite the gains in economic globalization, majority of the world's population was still being robbed of the benefits due to increase in

human rights abuses and internal conflicts. It is therefore safe to say that economic growth and economic development are insufficient for genuine development; because the end-result of development should be the happiness of the people and anything short of the peoples' human rights and human security is a fertile ground for conflict and subsequent poverty, which are enemies of development.

In view therefore, development in the context of human rights and human security must take into account the dignity of the individual and includes civil rights, cultural identity, access to education and healthcare, rule of law and good governance and requires the working together of civil society, the state and the market or private sector. Civil society organizations such as the press, religious and human rights institutions serve as watch-dogs and keeps checks on the state and the market to ensure rule of law and accountability, freedom of expression and association, religious freedom, and fair business transactions. The importance of civil society participation in the over-all development of the state cannot be over-emphasized because, in a democratic setting where the majority of the citizenry cannot directly participate and voice out their concerns on matters affecting their well-being, civil society is the conduit through which the people challenge and expose the wrongs and hold governments accountable in the implementation of national and international instruments. Accordingly, this collaboration must provide for a favorable climate for the market or private sector and includes fair dealings and adequate protection. Conversely, in a country where the voice of civil society is extinguished, such as muzzling of the Press, political repression, religious intolerance, arbitrary arrest and detention or interference and intimidation of the market or private sector, under-ground movements are formed and soon chaos ensue; causing much needed resources intended for development to be diverted to state security for the purpose of restoring calm and rebuilding damaged infrastructures. Consequently, development in the context of human rights and human security also requires that civil society, the state and the market or private sector partner together. Moreover, for development to benefit and empower the people, they as the beneficiaries should be involved and consulted on programs and investment opportunities within their community, otherwise, such programs or investments end up in futility or create more poverty before it started.

In the book, titled, 'Peace building in Post Conflict Societies, Strategy and Process', Ho-Won Jeong (2005), laments the possibility of a country relapsing into conflict if development policies do not emanate from and involve the local people and the government to create jobs and economically empower the people, so as to reduce deep social and economic disparities. While we do agree with Ho-Won Jeong on this issue of peace building in post conflict societies, the assertion is equally true for countries that have not experienced conflicts because, where the beneficiaries are not involved in the discussion prior to development initiatives, their interest is not usually protected and thousands of dollars end-up wasted; since most often the community abandons such projects upon completion. Additionally, before a community is removed from their ancestral land for investment purposes, adequate compensation must be provided and an ideal place found for them to raise their cattle and conduct farming activities. This strategy of 'grass root' or 'bottom-up' approach to development is further supported by University of San Diego Lecturer, Dr. Charles A. Reily, in his Article, titled, Mayors, Mayans and Poets, in which he likened development to three pistons driving a single engine; and submits that, 'development will only become a reality, when politics, economic and civil society work together' (Reily, 1-2).

Furthermore, if development is to ensure the happiness of the people, it must uphold free expression and association without harassment and intimidation by state security. Laws made should not be inconsistent or repugnant to international human rights and human security instruments. Rule of law, which provides for equality before the law and an independent Judiciary are amongst some of the principles which must obtain if development is to be realized. Correspondingly, strict regime of transparency, accountability and appropriate penalty must be in place to deter corruption. In other words, funds and properties entrusted to people should be accounted for, used for the intended purpose and anything short of that should entail civil or criminal sanction against those concerned.

Moreover, discrimination at any level stifles development and must be strongly opposed by the society if that society wants to develop. Accordingly, development in this context recognizes gender equity and allows for equal opportunity for both male and female to develop their full potentials and participate in all aspects of nation building. Thus, the state is charged with the responsibility to create a secured environment allowing those within its borders to enjoy economic, social, political and cultural rights; and also to provide job opportunities, healthcare, safe-drinking water, constant power supply, to name a few. This approach to development conforms with the Preambles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which state that 'the idea of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and economic, social and cultural freedom can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone enjoys his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural rights.' So, while development is often considered as only economic growth and economic development in majority of African states, it should and must knit with human rights and human security; if, it is to become a sustained reality; otherwise, it will stall, thus creating a challenge to the over arching developmental process.

Why and how the neglect of human rights and human security is a challenge to Africa's development.

While there may be several reasons why and how the neglect of human rights and human security is a challenge to Africa's development, this presentation focuses on three key causes that have made real development to elude Africa. Firstly, internal violent conflict is a major contributing factor. This brings us to a proviso stipulated in the Preamble of the UDHR, which warns that the disregard to fundamental human rights will leave victims with no alternative but to result to rebellion against tyranny and oppression. We also hasten to include that; the consequences of such rebellion can be disastrous for the victims, perpetrators and the innocent. . Regrettably, majority of African leaders have not learned this hard lesson, as they continue to violate the inherent dignity and inviolability of the people they governed, thereby creating dissatisfaction among the citizenry. Consequently, no matter the duration of negative peace that prevails, the people will soon rebel, and the resulting effect is the destruction of lives and properties. As the security of the state and other social services collapse, the country is declared a 'failed state' and funds intended for development programs diverted to restore post-conflict security, peace and reconstruction. In addition, there is flight of human capital and material resources, thus depriving Africa of the much sought- after talents and resources.

Predicated upon the above, the question continues to be asked; how did Africa arrive at such enormity of internal violent conflict! There is empirical data which suggests that African leaders

have failed to practice good governance, an approach that is reciprocally related to human rights and human security. The attributes of good governance as stated in Resolution 2000/64 of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), provides guidance for realizing genuine development. These attributes include: transparency, accountability, responsibility, participation and responsiveness, but how many of African leaders adhere to such attributes? Not many; as the record is replete with evidence of their non-compliance. Take for example the various refugees camps in: Liberia, Uganda, Chad, Algeria, Kenya, etc. or the Internally Displaced People (IDP's) camps in The Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Mali, Central African Republic, Somalia, among others. Those who find themselves at the helm of power in Africa have refused to practice good governance; because doing so will bring to an end their selfish motives and desires of remaining in power beyond the constitutional mandate and promoting corruption for their personal aggrandizement. It appears that the paramount concern of African leaders is to acquire personal wealth and build a traditional state security for their own protection. They dabble and squander into the national budget; while there is no space for transparency and accountability. Additionally, they behave as though they do not owe responsibility to anyone, rigged elections and constantly change the constitution to acquire successive terms, thus denying the citizenry of their fundamental rights. These leaders acquire wealth and political power, while majority of the citizenry live in abject poverty. Studies show that unemployment and lack of social services prevail in many African states, and that most people earn less than a dollar a day.

Quite recently, specifically February 11, 2013, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on its Business Daily Program reported that Donor Countries including Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, among other countries froze aid to Uganda due to massive corruption. The report further stated that thirty million United States Dollars of donor funds to support the national budget for development got stolen from the Prime Minister's office. It was also reported that development projects such as construction of schools, bridges, hospitals and other social services in some part of the country stalled as a consequence of the gap created in the national budget, thereby depriving the citizens of the much needed services and their happiness. Another African State, Nigeria is equally plagued with reports of corruption in its oil and gas industry. According to a Nigerian Parliamentary report in April 2012, 'the government presided over the loss of \$6.8bn from its fuel subsidy programme from 2009-2011 through theft and mismanagement' (The Africa Report June 2012, 36). The Africa Report Magazine quoted opposition and civil society groups as saying that, it was the massive state corruption that raised the price of oil fuel subsidy and not the growing demand of fuel as was insinuated by the government of Nigeria. The opposition and civil society groups therefore refused further increase in the cost of fuel and staged streets protests in demand of their concerns. The Report further quotes opposition and civil society as saying that most of the funds stolen from the oil revenue found their way into the ruling Party's coffers.

Additionally, lack of rule of law and political interference in the judiciary remain a menace in many African countries. In such instance, it is only the poor that are prosecuted, leaving out the wealthy and the politically favored few. For example my Country, Liberia, a Nation founded for free slaves from the America and formerly referred to as a beacon of hope for all black people just emerged from a fourteen year civil conflict that destroyed thousands of lives and properties, and also devastated the very fabric of the state; thereby prompting the United Nations and other

International organizations to refer to Liberia as a ‘failed state’. To ascertain the cause of the civil conflict, the International Crisis Group (ICG) conducted a survey and submitted a Report in April 2006, in which the Report indicted the Justice System of Liberia as being one of the root causes of the civil conflict. The Report specifically singled-out: corruption, incompetent man-power, impunity, lack of infrastructures and the Judiciary failure to exercise its role of independence, due to political interference. The report further revealed that successive governments from the founding of Liberia in 1821 up to 2003 participated and acquiesced to the egregious human rights violations.

To say the least, ‘The Arab Spring’, of 2011, which began with Tunisia and also consumed Egypt and Libya is in further manifestation of weak state institutions, corrupt government and the oppression of the people. According to Corey Wayne of Understanding Relationship.com, in an Article, titled, “The Real Cause of the Arab Spring” states that the simple answer to the root cause of the conflict is that the people were fed-up with tyrannical governments and dictators and wanted freedom. In another article posted on the internet by ‘Democratist’ on March 28, 2011, titled, ‘The Great Arab Spring of 2011: Causes and Consequences’, the author averred that, the cause of the ‘Arab Spring’ can be attributed to corruption in the political, social and economic systems of the countries; dominated by authoritarian cliques.

Upon hearing the news of the conflict in the three North African countries, many people wondered how such violent conflicts could occur in countries so rich in natural resources and high per capita income, high literacy rate and infrastructure development. Infact, according to the United Nations Human Development Report rankings of 2011, Libya and Tunisia are placed in the high human development index, while Egypt is captured in the medium. We do understand the shock, but as mentioned earlier in this paper, the reality is in the analogy of the triangle to development. In the triangle, neither one nor any of the two sides can form the figure. Hence, despite the infrastructure development, high achievement in development index and high per capita income, the lack of civil and political liberties and freedom from fear and want of the ordinary people, culminated into dissatisfaction and a violent conflict, thus substantiating the analogy that economic growth and economic development must interlock with the other components of human rights and human security for development to be a reality.

Regrettably, this was not the situation in the three North African Countries. Take for example, under Libyan criminal law 73 of 1973, political dissent was illegal. The inviolability of the human person was never respected as prominent Libyans both in and out of the Country were assassinated through the instrumentality of the Libyan government. Even now, similar situation is unfolding in Zimbabwe, Sudan and Gambia, while the destruction of lives and properties is occurring in Mali, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The second reason why and how the neglect of human rights and human security is a challenge to development in Africa is that, our leaders are still obsessed with the traditional notion of sovereignty. Unfortunately, these leaders rely on Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which stipulates that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or...” (Department of Public Information, United Nations, NY10017) These leaders treat their citizens anyway they want: ranging from annulling democratic elections outcome, insensitivity to the

needs of the people they govern and their continued refusal to reform weak institutions that will ensure strong democratic tenets. Suffice it to say, all of these abuses are carried out under the canopy of sovereignty; not realizing that the traditional notion of sovereignty is being eroded due to challenges of the 21st century through transnational problems such as conflict, human and drug trafficking, cross-border trading, terrorism, among others.

The third factor is what I refer to as camouflage poverty investment. This type of investment is carried out through the government and local leaders. It takes away ancestral land from the inhabitants for investment purposes without just compensation, offers no resettlement plan for relocation of individuals ousted from the land and negates protection to the environment. Additionally, corporations involved in such investment often connived with government and avoid payment of just taxes that could benefit the citizens. As a consequence, the community remains in poverty despite the 'so-called' investment.

A practical example of camouflage poverty investment is recorded in The Africa Report (July 2012), titled, 'How politicians gave away \$100bn of land'. The Report singles out communities in Kenya, Liberia, Ethiopia, among others, and speaks to the appalling conditions of the people whose lands were taken away by the governments and local authorities for foreign investment. Further, the Report reveals that besides the lack of benefits from this investment for the people thrown from the land, there is also nowhere for them to raise their cattle and carry out farming. Another example was reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), in its February 1, 2013 Edition of 'Business Daily', which stated that four farmers in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, filed a suit against Shell Oil in a Dutch Court for pollution of their farmland. Although, the Court largely dismissed the bid to hold Shell responsible for the pollution, it held that Shell subsidiary, Nigeria Shell was responsible to pay damages in one case because, the subsidiary did not adequately do much to protect sabotage of its facilities. The farmers who are from Ogoniland speaking through their Chief lamented the damage done to their farmland and vowed to take appeal to the Court's ruling. They further argued that, in addition to the pollution of their farmland, they are not benefiting as they should from the investment in their community because; Shell has reneged on some of its social responsibility to provide education and health services to them. Moreover, some environmental activists continue to argue that, were the farmers to receive compensation for their polluted farmland, it will still not replace the land since land is perpetual and for generations unborn.

The issue of land as a matter of human rights and human security has not only claimed the attention of those affected but also academics. Rachael Knight, et al; explicitly state that, "often, governments make concessions with a view to furthering development and strengthening the national economy. Yet, in many cases, these land concessions disposes rural communities and deprive them of access to natural resources vital to their livelihood and economic survival. Even when communities welcome private investment, projects are often undertaken in ways that lead to environmental degradation, human rights violations, loss of access to livelihoods, and inequality' (Knight, et al., 2013).

To further substantiate the consequences of camouflage poverty investment, Action Aid, the anti-poverty charity organization recently accused Zambia Sugar of tax avoidance, when it reported that Zambia Sugar generated a profit of \$127m in 2012 but paid no corporate tax. According to

Action Aid, the clever action by Zambia Sugar to have avoided taxes deprived Zambia public services of \$27m that could have educated some 48,000 children.

It is my view therefore that, the challenges of development in Africa, resulting from internal conflict, notion of traditional sovereignty and camouflage poverty investment, mainly due to neglect of human rights and human security, can be minimized if African leaders and related stakeholders take the following steps or measures.

Steps/measures and Conclusion

A popular Radio Talk Show host, Mamadee Diakite of Truth Fm – 96.1, a private radio station owned and operated by Renaissance Communication Incorporated, located in Monrovia, Liberia, normally introduces his Show by saying, ‘Liberia is getting better’! Interestingly, some callers on the show usually raise issues with Mr. Diakite concerning this statement. According to them, Liberia is not getting better, because the roads are deplorable, electricity and safe drinking water are not available in every part of the country and the security of the country is in the hands of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); instead of the Liberian Government. To augment their claims, they aver that, the Chief of Staff of the newly recruited Liberian army is a Nigerian, who according to the Liberian Government will relinquish the said position and hand over to a Liberian in 2014. On the other hand, those who support Mr. Diakite’s pronouncement argued that, indeed, Liberia is getting better because, while all of these services were available prior to the civil conflict, Liberia lacked good governance, free press and rule of law. They further argued that, the Country had only one political party and the government adopted an anti-civil society posture. Moreover, as averred by the callers, a small country such as Liberia with 43,000 square miles and a population of 2.5m (1984 National Census Results) had more arms and ammunition than it needed, especially when there was no threat to national security! And if we may add, the indigenous people, making up ninety-five percent of the population (2008 National Census Results) were disenfranchised and not allowed to participate in the political process of the country by the other five percent population; comprising Americo and Congo-Liberians until 1904, fifty-seven years after independence. Additionally, women were not allowed to participate and vote in the political process until 1946. These vices among many others sparked the Liberian civil conflict and, it is safe to say, many such conflicts on the continent. Therefore, supporters of Mr. Diakite conclude that, while the present government has yet to provide pre-war social services, it has guaranteed and protected the people’s civil and political rights. Hence, ‘Liberia is getting better’!

What shall we say then, as far as the two views are concerned! We recall the statement earlier made in this paper that genuine development can only be achieved when economic growth, economic development, human rights and human security are intertwined. In other words, while infrastructures, social services, a strong military and high per capita income are all critical elements of development, the protection of the civil and political rights of the people, as well as the attributes of good governance and the rule of law are also equally imperative. We can say further without any iota of doubt that, any development that is not human centered or that does not focus on the happiness of the people will collapse and soon be a ground for chaos and destruction.

Therefore, as we come to the close of this presentation, we must herein state emphatically that, if challenges of development in Africa are to be minimized and true development realized, our leaders and related stakeholders must and should consider the following steps or measures, which for the purpose of this presentation are contextualized under human rights and human security.

These steps or measures are:

Rule of law - provides for equality before the law irrespective of one's status or affiliation. This requires a strong and independent Justice System, particularly, a Judiciary that is free from interference, whether political or otherwise. Additionally, efforts should be made for every citizen to have access to justice, which also implies that law enforcement officers, courts and correction centers should be established and made available in both urban and rural areas. Due process, the law which provides for an accused person to be notified of his/her violation, represented by legal counsel of his/her choice and be heard in a competent tribunal before conviction or acquittal must also be adhere to at all times. Moreover, Prosecuting attorneys and Public defense lawyers must also be present in the various courts for the expeditious adjudication of cases. Simply put, impunity should and must be discouraged at all levels.

Transparency and accountability - the conscious belief that every authority delegated carries with it responsibility and accountability. It is imperative therefore for those to whom authority, whether money or power has been entrusted to account and be opened to how the authority was discharged. Additionally, citizens should be consulted on development programs that will affect their lives, particularly, those ranging from construction to investment. Income and expenditures on monies allotted in the national budget and other donors' funding must be accounted for by means of Reports that will be accessible to all who need them. Accordingly, we do recommend for all African states to enact law on Freedom of Information (FOI). This law, which has been enacted in other countries including Liberia provides for citizens to have access to information concerning the operations of the government. Further, corruption must be discouraged and punished; and may we add herein that, corruption does not only imply the taking away of properties or monies without authorization by those who are authorized to do so, but also, employment opportunities and awarding of contracts or scholarships to individuals should not be based on nepotism, tribalism or other acts inimical to the survival of the state. In other words, the merit system should be the hall-mark for all transactions.

A favorable environment for a strong civil society - meaning, the government should adopt a cordial working relationship with civil society groupings, particularly, the media and human rights organizations. Accordingly, we do propose the passing into law the 'Declaration of Table Mountain' by all African states. This Declaration aims at boosting press freedom by terminating 'insult laws' and criminal prosecution against the media.

Protection of civil and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights - by all accounts, this is the fulcrum of democracy, where the people have the right to freely exercise their franchise as it relates to participation in the governance of the country, as well as freedom of association and expression. While we deplore the rigging of elections, we equally abhor elections violence resulting from defeated candidates' refusal to accept free, fair and transparent elections results. Elections are like soccer games and players should be willing to exhibit good sportsmanship by accepting credible results and where there is reason to believe foul play, the

court and not the streets should be the proper place to prove the process otherwise. Furthermore, the government should create opportunities and a favorable environment for investments and jobs; and provide basic social services. The citizens and other residents should be free to practice any religion or culture, which is not in contravention to the principle of respect for the dignity of the human person. The issue of religious beliefs should be a matter of choice and not through coercion; as some African leaders are still unable to protect religious freedom. Even with the civil conflict yet to subside in Libya, the present authority has yet to learn from the mistakes of the past regime as evidenced by the recent report broadcast on the BBC on Sunday, February 17, 2013, in which it was reported of the arrest and detention of four persons with American passports in the City of Benghazi, for converting some residents to Christianity. It was further reported that some liberal Libyans, who are opposed to restrictions on their freedom based on religion are already expressing fears that the present government could just be heading in the same direction like the past regime.

The “bottom-up” approach to development - promotes development by beginning with the people, who are the beneficiaries and having them make input into the process. When grassroots citizens are consulted on the way forward for any development that will affect their lives, they will always feel a part and ensure its protection; and where necessary, the fair compensation for their land and resettlement are discussed and finalized before the actual implementation begins. As much as necessary, this approach involves town-hall meetings and the use of both electronic and print media to solicit the views of the citizens.

The attributes of the ‘New World Order’, is the principle which promotes the interdependence of states. In other words, what affects one state affects the others. Hence, the traditional notion of sovereignty, which provides for non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, Article 2(7), can no longer be used as an alibi to suppress and cause mayhem to one’s own citizens. It behooves every African state therefore to respect the dignity and inviolability of its citizens; otherwise, the international community will be left with no alternative but to intervene on humanitarian ground, irrespective of the sovereignty of that state. Let the word go forth that, the notion of sovereignty is now being eroded in view of the many challenges of the 21st Century; particularly where a state has failed on its major responsibility to protect its citizens, the international community has that responsibility to protect (R2P). Fellow facilitators and participants, having cautiously discussed the topic under review, may we beg your indulgence and unequivocally sound this caveat, that, our failure to learn from our mistakes and mistakes of others around us, and be ready to face the challenges of the 21st Century with a new mind-set, indicative of ‘The New World Order’, no amount of aid will develop Africa. Our past and present history should be sufficient and hard lessons to learn from, otherwise, there could soon be donors’ fatigue since the rest of the world will not always be there for us! The good news is that, ‘Africa continues to maintain its annual economic growth rate of 5% or more, an estimate from the International Monetary fund, the world Bank and the Africa Development Bank’ (New Democrat Newspaper, Vol. 20 No. 031, Liberia, Friday, February 15, 2013 Edition). We hereby call on African leaders and related stakeholders to take advantage of this opportunity and properly utilize the vast material and human resources blessed to the Continent. We believe that by including in the development agenda of each state the principles of human rights and human security as herein discussed; Africa’s challenges to development will be minimized and we shall soon be on our way to prosperity and genuine development.

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Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Darfur: A Critical Analysis of Un-Au Hybridization Mechanism

By

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Abstract

The central thrust of the paper is to locate the appropriateness of peacekeeping in conflict resolution. Since 1948, peacekeeping operation has gain steady importance as a method for resolving both inter and intra state conflicts. In Darfur, since 2003 when the horrendous carnage first broke out resulting in killing of over 200,000 civilian and displacement of millions others, the United Nations through its various agencies has been trying to resolve the conflict in the Western Sudan. In 2007 a hybridization contingency of United Nations-Africa Union Mission in Africa (UNAMID) was approved for Darfur to bring relief to the inhabitant of region-through protection of the civilian and Aid workers. The paper will use the Darfur crisis and the United Nations' involvement to gauge the usefulness of peacekeeping as a good mechanism for conflict resolution. In conclusion, the paper will explore the tenet of peace enforcement as a more swift and effective in resolving intra state conflict, given the fact that in an asymmetric crisis which the Darfur vividly portend demands that the mediator must be a powerful one, who should take side in order to establish a kind of 'balance of power' for the conflict to be successfully resolved. The paper will argue that the most successful United Nations conflict resolution employed more force than neutrality; Congo, Bosnia and Iraq. Therefore the era when peacekeepers use force only in self defence has long gone, and neutrality of the peacekeepers which was coined when the cold war was scorching and thus must be shelve forthwith. In other word the UNAMID must weigh its full force in the operation with the sole agenda and determination to end human carnage and thereafter establish a peaceful society through a genuine democratization of the region.

Key words: Peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, United Nations, hybridization, conflict resolution.

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Introduction

United Nations (UN) at its formation was saddled with the responsibility of safeguarding world peace as noted in the opening paragraph of its Charter; “we the people of United Nations determined...to Save the succeeding generation from the scourge of war which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind...” (Gordenker and Weiss, 1993) Since then the U N has been actively engaging in trying to resolve several conflicts around the world, with many challenges.

The Charter gives the United Nations Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Chapter VII contains provisions related to Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression and thus recommends tougher measures that may include peace enforcement. Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

The peacekeeping has been a major method for resolving conflict around the globe since 1948, subsequently, it has undergone several usages and many other organizations have adopted it for resolving conflict at regional, national and even local level. In 2003, the aged long conflict in Sudan exploded in Darfur region into full blown civil war between Darfur based rebels and the government of the Sudan on one hand and the Janjaweed; alleged government sponsored rebel group on the other. The conflict resulted in the death of hundreds of thousand and created what was later tagged the greatest humanitarian catastrophe. According to Dagne (2010)

The crisis in Darfur in western Sudan has led to a major humanitarian disaster, with an estimated 2.7 million people displaced, more than 240,000 people forced into neighboring Chad, and an estimated 450,000 people killed. Although, this figure was challenged and a milder figure was established by Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2006, it discovered less number of deaths especially as a result of direct effect of the conflict. However, Dagne’s figure has made some key stakeholders in the United States to declare the Darfur killing as genocide. Udombana (2005) opines that, “the Darfur crisis combines the worst of everything: armed conflict, extreme violence, sexual assault, great tides of desperate refugees—without even the unleavened bread of a desperate escape, hunger, and disease, all uniting with an unforgiving desert climate”.

The humanitarian crises that ensue led to the call on the African Union (AU) to intervene. The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was an AU peacekeeping force originally founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops, whose deployment was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By mid-2005, its numbers were increased to about 7,000, but it was still unable to effectively contain the violence in Darfur. AMIS mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the crisis in Darfur continued to escalate, bringing about deterioration in peoples lives and properties. The overwhelmed AU troops were to be reinforced by a robust UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur under 31 August 2006 UNSC resolution 1706, but the failure to obtain consent of the Sudanese government prevented the force from being operationalized. The

unanimous adoption of UNSC resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 later authorized the deployment of a 26,000-strong joint UN-AU force for Darfur (UNAMID). The Security Council extended the UNAMID mandate in 2010, 2011 and 2012 and demanded an immediate end to fighting by all parties.

One of the many objectives of UNAMID was protection of civilians cut in the crisis.

The paper examines the efficacy of the AU-UN hybrid mission especially since it is a decade now when the conflict broke out in Darfur and six years since the passage of resolution 1769 that deployed UNAMID mission in Darfur, peace is yet to return to the region. This paper therefore looks at the suitability of the mission for the Darfur conflict, and examines the challenges facing the mission in trying to resolve the Darfur conflict. The paper equally suggests policy option for achieving lasting peace in the region.

Conceptual clarification

Conflict

It has generally been known that poor governance, economic decline, disparities in opportunities and access to resources, state repression, socioeconomic inequalities among groups, low education and low income levels, social service decay, huge unemployment and deep poverty are associated with social uprisings, political tensions, civil unrests and intra-state conflicts. Woodhouse and Duffey (2000) define conflict as the pursuit of incompatible goals by individuals or groups. Stedman (1996) is of the view that; Conflict stems from the basic fact of human interdependence. Seeking to satisfy their needs wants and desires, people make demands upon themselves, upon the physical environment, upon other people, and upon whatever organization and institutions that appear to be in a position to help them. Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human life, and Zartman (1996) sees it as something that is desirable. From the above it is that conflict as long people would be together, there is bound to be one type of conflict or the other.

Conflict Resolution and Management

Conflict resolution and management are concepts that are often used interchangeably; Conflict Resolution aimed to transform actual or potential violent conflict into peaceful (non-violent) processes of social and political changes. Conflict resolution is concerned with addressing the fundamental causes of conflicts and aim to produce solutions which are mutually acceptable to all parties. Conflict resolution operates at a number of levels or tracks, and encompasses a range of techniques from conciliation to mediation, negotiation, and problem solving. While Conflict management seeks to curtail or moderate conflict and its impact. Resolution of conflict implies that the deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed, changing behaviors so they are no longer violent, attitudes so they are no longer hostile, and structures so they are no longer exploitative. The term is used to refer both to the process (or the intention) to bring about these changes and to the completion of the process. The process of conflict resolution according to Urquhart (2010), is diagnosing its nature and applying appropriate methods in order to

Diffuse the negative emotional energy involved.

Enable the conflicting parties to understand and resolve their difference;

Resolve the differences so as to achieve solutions that are not imposed, which have been agreed by all the key parties, and which address the root cause of the conflict.

Peacekeeping

The Blue Helmet defines peacekeeping as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers. Undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict. According to Hauss (2010) until recently, Scholarship assumptions of international conflicts focused on wars fought between countries. Indeed, the definitions of war used most frequently a generation ago were based on battle death in fighting between the armies of internationally recognized states. This is the case when peacekeeping was first used under the auspices of the United Nations in 1948 and 1956 respectively. However, in 1963 when the Congo crisis broke out, the saving grace was UN through the deployment of multinational peacekeeping force.

The concept of peacekeeping evolved as a child of necessity. It is an adaptation of the UN provisions in Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter- the creation of an enabling environment for international peace and security Hammaraskjold. The provision stipulates the need for parties to a dispute to seek solution through negotiation, mediation, arbitration and a resort to regional organization or other peaceful means as the case may be. Most times, parties to disputes are not too likely to resort to negotiation because of their belligerent dispositions. Thus peace-making becomes relevant to create conducive environment for the settlement of dispute, and where that fails forceful intervention may be embarked upon

Despite the fact that peacekeeping was laden by constitutional and operational ambiguity. The UN Charter, for instance, does not define peacekeeping. Its legal basis is found in Chapter VI Pacific Settlement of Disputes more often than in Chapter VII Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, though it might be most accurate to say it falls somewhere between the two, that is why Dag Hammaraskjold referred to it as Chapter VI and half of the UN Charter. Wedgwood (2001) put it as halfway between the Security Council's procedures for conciliation and its procedures for deploying force. Peacekeeping was supposed to be limited and was intended as an interpositional buffer, an armed observation force designed to discourage adversaries from violating a ceasefire or peace agreement.

The cold war effect that heralded the doctrine of peacekeeping merit that peacekeeping operations follow three operational roles prescribed by Rikhye; First, they must provide a mechanism for resolving conflicts without the direct intervention of the cold war superpowers, thereby reducing the cataclysmic escalation. Second, peacekeeping operations should mobilized international society to make commitment to the maintenance of peace, and third, the conception of peacekeeping as a diplomatic key for opening the way to further negotiation for peaceful resolution of conflict. (Rikhye, 1984),

Even after the cold war, it is seemingly necessary for any peace operations to espouse the above observations for a success at short possible time. By the time of the Congo crisis, as well as other United Nations' established mission, e.g. United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Suez became the first case of such military intervention of the Organization, neutrality was perhaps the most important of these. In practice, this required that peacekeeping forces did not intervene

in the domestic affairs of disputants or influence the outcome of a conflict. The need for neutrality also meant that peacekeepers normally had to be recruited from nations other than the permanent members of the Security Council. This last point had clear significance for middle or non-aligned powers. It has been suggested that while the great powers had to permit the UN to play a neutral role, the powers that were least aligned in the Cold War enabled the UN to appear neutral.

However, with the end of cold war, according to some authors, Weiss, Forsythe, Coate, (1994), Boutros-Ghali (1992), Bourantis and Wiennar (1995), Mingist and Karens (1995) believe that the United Nations should be given free hand to operate, looking at the success of gulf war in 1990/1991, Bosnia, Liberia etc. yet for any peace operation to succeed, there must be a nation, body or an organization that is ready to bear the burden; human resources and logistics, and the ability to use force most not be denied for some conflict escalates because of it asymmetric nature, where the powerful oppressed and abuse fundamental rights of the weak unabated. Although peacekeeping commence much earlier in Africa, since 1963, Africa could be tagged the testing ground for UN peacekeeping experiments. However, the emergency consensus of peacekeeping initiative as noted by Agi and Williams (2012) is that traditional UN approach to peacekeeping in Africa is no longer sustainable. United Nations has equally made effort to change it way by embracing second generation peacekeeping, hybrid peacekeeping, co-deployment and post conflict peace building. Beginning from 1990, these examples could be differently found in post cold war Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, etc.

One lesson that is yet to be learnt is the need to enforce more and be tough on recalcitrant and intransigent leaders whose lackadaisical attitude to governance led to the eruption of the conflict in the first place, and the uncooperative action should not be allowed to discourage the peace process. In effect, whenever the UN shy away from enforcement of peace especially where humanitarian crisis has set in, we set out to endless journey of peacekeeping that is why majority of peacekeeping is prolonged and endless. It has been observed that peacekeeping in Africa has today taken a different dimension away from what obtains during the cold war. Kuna (2005) observed that prevailing African conflict today follow intra-state posture and are more over capturing territories, or establishing separate states. Contemporary Africa conflict appears to be predominantly based on a strategy of the removal of people from resource sites, forces conscription of women and children, genocide and rape. This argument concurred with how Lamp and Trif (1999) described Africa conflict in post cold war era with are largely intra-states, intensely resource and identity based, and involve a complex interplay between militants, criminal gangs multinational companies and vigilantes.

Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2010) defined peacekeeping as field operation established by United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolved conflict between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force for the minimum extent necessary. In the same vein, Boutros- Ghali (1992) defined peacekeeping as the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field; hitherto with the consent of all the parties' concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilian as well. Peacekeeping is an activity that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and

making of peace. Thus with peacekeeping it is expected that parties to a conflict would find breathing space to mediate the differences.

Peacekeeping is one of United Nations, most finest method since 1948, it was coined as result of the ideological divide between the USSR and USA which make the invocations of chapter vii of the United Nation Charter that prescribed a military response to conflict a total impossible. The technique of peacekeeping is a distinctive innovation by the United Nations. In all likelihood, this is the result of the fact that the Charter's authors "envisaged that threats to international peace and security would primarily consist of aggression by one state against another. Peacekeeping was not envisaged as part of the organization's role, which lay primarily in establishing a system of collective security.

UN peacekeeping is based on the principle that an impartial presence on the ground can ease tensions between hostile parties and create space for political negotiations. Peacekeeping can thus, help bridge the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict have the political will needed to reach the goal. The Initial focus of peacekeeping has been inter-State conflict, it has thus, increasingly been used in intra-State conflicts and civil wars, which are often characterized by multiple armed factions with differing political objectives and fractured lines of command.

The Darfur Conflict: origin and escalation

Darfur conflict has attracted much attention, ranging from propaganda, to concern understanding, while others completely misunderstood the conflict. This paper can hardly be able to take care of the origin of the conflict because of time and space. However, a précis of the genesis, factors and escalation could be made as time permits. It should be noted that not until 1916, Darfur is an independent Sultanate (De Waal (2004), O'Fahey, 1980, Collins, 2008), with full autonomy and authority over its internal as well as external affairs and with prosperity surpassing majority of pre-colonial states around the Bilad al-Sudan. This was achieved according to Collins (2008) with the transformation of the tribal Fur kingdom to multi-ethnic by Sulayman Solongo, by conquering the massalit, Zaghawa, Birgid and Tunjur. From 1752-1787, the reign of Muhammad Tayrab ibn Ahmad Bukr, led to expansion of the Keira Sultanate, however, as noted by Collins (2008) his reign weakened the Fur authority as they have to share powerful offices with non Fur.

The Darfur ordeal began with brief conquest of Darfur by Al Zubayr during the Ottoman rule in 1874 and continuous resistance of harsh policy of the Ottoman rule led to the Mahdi revolt between 1881 and 1885 and subsequent killing of British general Gordon Brown. The Ottoman and British had to temporarily abandon the Sudan to the Mahdists not until 1898-1899 when the Mahdists were defeated and reverted the Sudan to Egyptian-British condominium rule.

Secondly, the support given to Ottoman-Germany alliance against the allied forces in the wake of the First World War constitutes the second mistake of the Darfurians. As noted by Collins (2008) in an effort to resist the Anglo-Egyptian sabotaging of its sovereignty and support to the French incursion into Darfur through the Equatorial Africa and the bitterness at the disposal of Turkish Khedive of Egypt by British authority. The combination of these made the Sultan to fall to the Condominium trap in 1916, Darfur was attacked and conquered Sultan Ali Dinar was killed and the region was merged with greater Sudan with contempt.

The point of the above statement was that the Anglo Egyptian condominium, since then left the Darfur to itself ruling it through the Native Authority or indirect Rule which do away with element in authority that are antagonist to British rule in the region and those that are loyal to Egyptian progressive element (Tubiana, Tanner and Abdul-Jalil, 2012). Collins (2008) noted that the authority of the traditional Shaykhs, Nazirs, Umdas and Shartars were recognized so long as they behave themselves, settle intertribal disputes, and maintain a semblance of law and order. Thus, according to Morton (2011) the British colonial authorities were able to maintain control, on the cheap, over Darfur populations the center does not trust, and by that they have sow seed of enmity among the inhabitant of Darfur and have since been sustained even after Sudanese independence in 1956.

Since 1956 according to the “Black Book” of Sudan, published in year 2000, the Darfur region has been marginalized and has since been complaining bitterly about it. It equally alleges that “the political and economic power of Sudan have since independence been manipulated by a small group of three tribes along the Nile, north Khartoum”. However to many observers of the Sudanese politics it is the combination of the climate change (natural resource) and governmental marginalization that helped to fuel the conflict to its present magnitude.

Young and Maxwell (2009) noted that the abolition of the traditional authority in 1970 and its subsequent reinstatement to suit the needs of government of the day greatly compound the Darfur conflict. They equally identified the ecological hardships, together with erratic rainfall, drought and famine, which has massive pressure on the population of the region, thus causing insecurity and ethnic resource based rivalry in the region. However, the coming of Omar el Bashir regime in 1989 observed Hoile (2005) heighten the perceived marginalization of the region, plus inducement by the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) led to escalation of the conflict in the region. For instance, Hoile opines that; in the 1990s Darfur region were marked by three distinct conflicts. There were many insurgencies including an unsuccessful one led by a Fur activist, Daud Bolad, among non-Arab communities which the government ought to have played its role to settle but did nothing about them, hence the imbroglios of today. Equally, in 1996 there was a long running conflict between the Rezeigat and the Zaghawa; and from 1997-99 there was fighting in western Darfur between the Massaleit and some Arab tribes. The SPLA- inspired insurgency was defeated within a matter of months and, generally speaking, intertribal conferences and conciliation, *ajaweed* and *mutamarat al sulh*, settled most of the other disputes. (Hoile, 2005)

Citing an Amnesty International’s representation of Darfur pre-rebellion also overlaps with inter-ethnic tensions: “The lack of employment opportunities, the proliferation of small arms and the example of militia raiding and looting in Kordofan and the south, have encouraged banditry, acts of armed robbery and general insecurity.” Despite this, Hoile (2005) is far from believing that these are causes of the conflict in Darfur region in 2003. In support of his argument he quoted Ghazi Suleiman who said that; The conflict in Darfur has nothing to do with marginalization or the inequitable distribution of wealth. Inherently it is a struggle between the two factions of the Sudanese Islamist movement, the (opposition) Popular Congress party and the ruling National Congress (party). (Sudanese Human Rights Activist)

However, it is the combination of all these that eventually boomerang to explode in the Darfur conflict of 2003. Hence any durable resolution of the conflict in Sudan must take the issues of ecological depression, marginalization, and equity in distribution of economic and other resources as well as the political interest of the elites into consideration.

The AMIS efforts and need for UNAMID

When the Darfur conflict turned to full blown war between the Darfur based rebels and the government of Sudan (GoS) in February, 2003, the AU was on hand to test its new found re-energization of having metamorphosed from a seemingly toothless Organization of African Unity (OAU) to a supposedly more vibrant African Union.

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was an AU peacekeeping mission deployed to Darfur at the onset of the Darfur crisis. It was founded in 2004 with one hundred and fifty forces and by mid 2005, this number was increased to seven thousand. According to Bashoff (2005) the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564 mandate AMIS to "closely and continuously liaise and coordinate ... at all levels its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) which is then mediating between the Sudan and SPLM/A." The AMIS mission was impeded by so many challenges, the failed Abuja peace talk, the size of the mission, inadequate logistical and financial supports and continuous escalation of the crisis at that material point. Hence when it is clear that the AMIS can not effectively contain the violence in Darfur, a more sizeable, better equipped with many sources of financial and logistical supplies to be deployed by UN peacekeeping force was proposed in 2006

UNAMID Establishment and Mandates

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1769 by unanimous vote on July 31, 2007; it determines that the situation in Darfur constitutes a threat to peace and authorized the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UNAMID is one of the operations seen by McQueen (2006) as partnership peacekeeping. Rodolphe Adada of the Republic of Congo appointed as Joint AU-UN Representative designate for UNAMID in 2008 was tasked to report to UN Secretary General and AU Commission Chairperson.

UNAMID when fully deployed will be the largest United Nations multilateral peacekeeping force ever deployed, with a total presence of more than 31,000 troops, police, and civilian personnel.

The UNSC resolution 1769 mandates the UNAMID mission to;

- Restore security to allow continuous humanitarian assistance;

- Protect civilians; Monitor ceasefire agreements signed since 2004;

- Help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement;

- Ensure an inclusive political process and support AU-UN efforts to broaden and deepen commitment to the peace process; and

- Monitor and report on the presence of any illegal weapons in violation of the Darfur arms embargo.

In addition, Resolution 1769 provides long-term missions for UNAMID, including:
Provide a secure environment for reconstruction, development, and return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes;
Promote human rights and basic freedoms; promote the rule of law by strengthening independent judiciary, prison system and development of legal framework; and Monitor the security situation at borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.

Equally, UNAMID was authorized to “take the necessary action” to:

(1) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent disruption of its implementation and armed attacks and most importantly to protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of Sudan, and

(2) Protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers.

Since its deployment, the UNAMID has achieved a lot of successes and has suffered some setbacks. Part of the success of the mission would include the following;

- i) Protection of humanitarian and aid workers
- ii) Relative stability in the environment
- iii) Provision of amenity and essential services
- iv) Steering of peace negotiation especially the Doha Agreement

Some of the setbacks would include but not limited to the following;

- a) The inability of the mission to stop the hostility even after six years in the field. For instance, frequent clashes between the GoS with the rebel, and within the armed rebel factions’ seems to undermine the fragile security situation in the region, with adverse consequences on UNAMID peacekeepers. Not only was the civilian population being attacked, but UNAMID troops were under constant threat of attack from the factions.
- b) The continuous staying of Internally Displaced People (IDP) in camp and their occasional exposure to attacks.
- c) According to Usman (2011) the inability of the mission to secure a complete operational freedom from the Government of Sudan; when GoS has repeatedly failed to cooperate with international peace makers and humanitarian workers. This is as a result of the reluctant attitude of the regime in Sudan which openly stated that it will give consent to only African peacekeepers even in the face of AU difficulty in raising enough African peacekeepers for Darfur. Hence, UNAMID troops are facing restrictions on movement by the Sudanese government, thus they lack free movement in Darfur which impeded their operations. They consistently impose embargo on peacekeepers most especially when tasked to conduct long range patrols and sometimes impose restrictions on flight and have refused to grant permission for UNAMID to fly at night
- d) lack of a Peace Agreement to guide their operation

Darfur Conflict UNAMID Achievement and the Way Forward

The UNAMID succinctly has the protection of the civilian (POC) as one of its major mandates. At the initial stage the mission faces a myriad of challenges, including delayed deployment, a high rise of security environment and ongoing conflict, which continue to limit the ability of UNAMID to carry out the mandate. (Holt, Taylor and Kelly, 2009)

The success and otherwise of the UNAMID could only be measured against the backdrop of the initial reasons prompting its formation.

According to .Holt, Taylor and Kelly (2009) The initial intention for the deployment of UNAMID as contained in a 2006 UN Secretary General and AU Chairperson's report (paragraph 54 and 55) mandate the role of UNAMID to include the following;

Facilitating humanitarian access, contributing to the protection of civilian, enhancing security for development and returns of IDPs and refugees; and addressing the special vulnerabilities of women and children

In a nutshell, UNAMID has performed beyond expectation given the fact that it commences operation without a tangible Peace Agreement, which means there is no working document, the only existing peace deal has been severally violated by all segments of its signatory. Hence UNAMID began its mission in Darfur on a very shaky and unstable ground. Apart from UNAMID working without peace agreement, the international communities were unable to sustain their promises that led to establishment of the mission. The International community failed to provide AMIS with promised supports, then it failed to provide UNAMID with the resources it requires to protect civilians in need (Bellamy, William and Griffin, 2010)

However, the mission effort has yielded some successes which have been earlier noted in this paper, though there is more to be done and this rest on the burning issues of the protection of the civilian and returns of the IDPs and refugees. Because any peace deal that does not return people to their abode will only justify the initial name the crisis was called (GENOCIDE). Therefore, before kudos could be given to UNAMID its plan of action in line with IDPs and refugees must be scrutinized. For instance Najeeb (2013) claimed that;

The crisis in Darfur is now a decade old, yet the fighting continues. In fact, more people were displaced by a surge of violence in January this year than in the whole of 2012. Over half the population (3.5 million Darfuris) are still receives food aid – about the same amount as five years ago when the Darfur crisis was said to be at its height. Even more telling of the ongoing suffering of civilians, 1.4 million of those receiving food aids are still living in 'temporary' camps.

For instance the DOHA agreement of 2013 which I believes is a success on both sides, could not yet be operationalized. However the need to carry every faction along is paramount to the success of the agreement.

Conclusion

Peacekeeping define as efforts by third parties such as United Nations to intervene in civil wars and/or interstate wars or to prevent hostilities between potential belligerents from escalating, so that by acting as a buffer, a negotiated settlement of the dispute can be reached

Peacekeeping evolve as a result of Cold War rivalry which constantly prevented the United Nations to act effectively in so many crises that requires it attention. Kegley opines that, because the United Nations structure limited its ability to function as a true collective security organization, the United Nations fell short of during the Cold war of many of the ideals its more ambitious founders envisioned.... The UN found other ways to overcome the compromising legal restrictions and lack of great power cooperation inhibited its capacity to preserved world order (Kegley, 2011).

A good example of the United Nations incapacitation was the Korean War which legally required peace enforcement, but the UN undertook a new approach—peacekeeping that aimed at separating the enemies. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) authorized in 1956 by the uniting for peace resolution in the General Assembly, in response to the Suez Canal crisis was the first of many other peacekeeping operations.

The intrigues of the great powers, is yet to allow the United Nations to function as legally required, since the 50s up to the present. For example in 1960, as noted by Kegley (2011) Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld sought to maintain security through what he termed *preventive diplomacy* by attempting to resolve conflict before they reached crisis stage, in contrast to ending war once they erupted. Similarly, in 1989 Javier Perez de Cuellar, frustrated with the superpowers' prevention of the UN to play as effective and decisive a role as the Charter certainly envisaged for it, pursues what was called *peacemaking* initiative designed to obtain a truce to end the fighting so that the United Nations Security Council could then establish operations to keep the peace. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan concentrated the UN's efforts on *peace building* by creating the conditions that make renewed war unlikely, while at the same time working on peacemaking and managing the UN peace operations to police those conflicts in which the threat of renewed fighting between the enemies is high. Up to this moment the UNAMID was unable to separate the enemies in Darfur, because the warring sides are yet to agree on their needs. Hence the concentration of the United Nations should be to dig deep to the root causes of the conflict, thus work towards finding a sustainable solution.

The great power rivalry as in days of Cold War is still applicable to the contemporary, when China is view as stumbling block to the United Nations efforts in mediating the Darfur conflict. UNAMID just like any other peace mission requires the consent of the host nation, in this instance; the Government of Sudan's deferral has continuously makes it difficult to craft an effective response to the conflict in Darfur. Obtaining a purely African peacekeeper to tone of twenty seven thousand is not an easy task, given the condition of most African countries, and this has been affecting the operation of UNAMID to succeed in Darfur.

Recommendation

Because the atmosphere in Darfur is still hostile just as the time of UNAMID deployment which has been exposing UNAMID personnel to extreme dangers. The UNAMID should be able to use force beyond defensive line.

Peace enforcement, peace making, peacekeeping and peace building should be a concurrent operation in the Darfur conflict in other for sustainable peace to reign.

The United Nations should endeavor to extend the UNAMID mission beyond July 2013 and deploy its full personnel and crave the indulgence of the Government of Sudan to allow the mission operate beyond humanitarian level.

Peacekeeping succeeded mostly based on the availability of peace agreement which the peacekeepers usually enforced; UNAMID has none. The Darfur Peace Agreement is dead on arrival, as it has been severely violated by all party to it; in spite of the fact that it is not all encompassing. Hence UNAMID supports and close monitoring the embryonic Doha agreement of 2013 is highly recommended.

A holistic solution to the fundamental drivers of Sudan conflict is highly desirable if a lasting solution is to be found to Darfur crisis. In addition, the Government of Sudan must eschew political will to implement the peace deals in good fail. It should work hand in hand with UNAMID to protect civilians and return the displaced back to their homestead without rancor.

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The Nigerian State and the Niger Delta Perspective

By

Aghalino, S.O* & Ofou Felix**

Abstract

The crisis in the oil belt of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria has taken its toll in virtually all human endeavours. Scholars have paid due attention to the conflict in the region with particular emphasis on the environment. This is perhaps understandable in view of the high wave of global environmental awareness and the need to engage in sustainable development. What perhaps have not been illuminated properly are the economic and security implications of the conflict in the region for the host communities in particular, and the federal government and oil firms in general. In this paper, attempt is made to situate the conflict in the region within this praxis. With the aid of synthesized primary and secondary sources, it was adumbrated that the root cause of the conflict in the region lay deep in the past. More importantly is the fact that it found that the conflict in the region has untoward impact on the host communities as there is insecurity of lives as epitomized by hostage taking, pipeline vandalisation and outright disruption of the subsistence economic base of the people in the region. For the oil firms and the federal government until recently, it has been depletion of much needed income from the sale of oil and divestment of economic opportunities. Arguably, the present administration has demonstrated enough capacity to tame the lingering conflict in the region as demonstrated in Amnesty programme. What is left to be seen is whether the concerted effort so far could be sustained.

Keywords: Nigeria, Niger Delta, Oil, Conflict, economic, Security, sustainable development Economy

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Introduction

The Niger Delta is home to some 31 million people. (Report of the Niger Delta Technical Committee, November 2008:102). It is one of the ten most important wetland and coastal marine ecosystems in the world. The Niger Delta is also the location of massive oil and gas deposits, which have been exploited since 1956 .Oil has generated an estimated \$600 billion since the commercial exploitation of oil in Nigeria. Despite this, the majority of the people in the oil bearing enclave of the Niger Delta are conspicuously poor. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) describes the region as extremely poor and prone to conflict (UNDP 2006).

The Niger Delta is not only the region that holds Nigeria's vast oil reserves but also, has assumed a new geopolitical importance in the context of global oil politics and security of the Gulf of Guinea (Ukeje 2008). Like many oil producing countries, the region has not been spared the agony of recurring violent conflicts associated with the management of oil resources (Oyefusi, 2007). Since the mid 1990s, there has been on-going violence and uprising in the Niger Delta region which have affected the economy and security of the Nigerian state. It is to be noted that Nigeria is the world's 13th largest oil producer and the 6th in OPEC. In the domestic sector, between 1970 and 1999, oil generated almost 23 billion naira to the Nigerian economy, contributes between 21 and 48% of Gross Domestic Product.

Oil dominated the Nigerian economy between 2000 and 2004 as oil accounted for around 79.5% of total government revenues and around 97% of foreign exchange earning (UNDP, 2006; Higgins, 2009). The enormous wealth from the exploitation of oil has not translated into significant increase in living standards in Nigeria. In fact, its may be cynical to state that the rise in poverty and inequality in Nigeria coincides with the discovery of oil. While this claim appear exaggerated, despite fuelling much of Nigeria's economic growth, the Niger Delta which is the oil bearing enclave is somewhat marginalized in the realm of Nigeria's national development. Essentially, there is a significant disconnect between the wealth that region generates for the federation and human development prospects in the region {Higgin, 2009}. This is as it were, underpins and provides a lingering interface in the crisis in the region. In this chapter, attempt is made to situate the conflict in the region within the context of the economic and security implication of the lingering crisis in the Niger Delta for the Nigerian state.

The Niger Delta, Oil and Oily Conflict

The Niger Delta region has been defined in terms of geology, geography and ethnography (Onokerhoraye 2000). With the ascendancy of crude oil, the Niger Delta Region is synonymous, in the perception of many Nigerians, with the oil provinces. The NDDC Act, 2000, and the OMPADEC Act of 1992 would seem to have accentuated this perception (Ekuerhare 2006) The region is not only rich in oil and gas but in other natural resources like timber and wild life. The tides of the Atlantic Ocean and the flood waters of the River Niger are most influential variable? in determining the hydrology of the Niger Delta (Ashton Jones, 1998). The significant feature of the Niger Delta is the general state of underdevelopment, not only by world standard but also in relation to many part of the country.

Currently, Nigeria is the eight largest oil-exporting countries in the world with oil revenue accounting for about 80 % of total government revenue, 95 % of foreign exchange earnings, and about 4 % of employment. Nigeria is the largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, with about

32 per cent and 34.2 per cent of Africa's oil and gas reserves respectively, the fifth largest exporting country in the OPEC and the fifth largest oil exporting country to the US (www.eia.doe.gov). Nigeria's proven reserves are estimated to be 36 billion barrels while the country's natural gas reserves are even bigger, estimated at well over 100 trillion cubic feet (Tell, February 18, 2008:33). What to note is that the Niger Delta region of Nigeria is the goose that lays the golden egg as oil exploitation is concentrated in the region.

So much wealth is derived from the bowels of the region yet, the scourge of poverty in the region is grim with people lacking basic human needs and the environment willfully and constantly degraded by oil companies (Dafinone David, 2008). When the World Bank carried a comprehensive study of the region in 1995, it concluded that the Niger Delta is the least developed area of Nigeria. Per capita income was less than \$280 per annum, with a high-rising population. Environmental resources were gradually being degraded, and there was an extremely poor human capacity and basic skills. In the same vein, the 2006 Niger Delta Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006), also arrived at the same bleak conclusion.

By the 1990s, these long years of neglect and deprivation, as well as failure of addressing the development challenges prevalent in the region, had created a volatile atmosphere where youths disrupted oil production activities at will and communities frequently engaged, with little provocation, in destructive inter and intra-community strife (Aghalino, 2010). Hutchful (1985) has shown that Shell and other oil companies have perpetuated regional and class inequality in the region by creating oil colonies in local areas where oil company workers live quite lavishly in contrast to the peasantry existence of the host communities. The region's human development index 0.564 and while this is slightly higher than the Nigerian HDI of 0.448, the region rates far below region or countdown with similar gas or oil revenues (Venezuela is 0.772 and Indonesia is 0.697) (UNDP, 2006:15). The region is characterized by appalling combination of political alienation, extreme marginalization and environmental devastation.

The region has been embroiled in conflict between the government forces and some militant elements over certain fundamental issues affecting the region. Since the last two years, militants have fought with government forces, sabotaged oil installations, taken foreign oil workers hostage and carried out lethal car bombing. At the root of the problem is a crisis of underdevelopment within the region. Whittington 2001, aptly described the apparent dilemma of the region when he stated that "the oil region in Nigeria seem to be stuck in a time warp, with little real change since oil was discovered 45 years ago. Away from the main towns, there is no real development, no roads, no electricity, no drinking water and no telephone". Unemployment is very high among the people of the Niger Delta as the oil companies do not hire their employees from the region that produce oil (Whittington 2001:16). These underlying problems in the region, must have provided the *cassus belli* and impetus for the lingering conflict that is largely undermining the corporate existence of Nigeria in spite of the haphazard attempt by successive governments in Nigeria to respond to the intractable conflict in the oil bearing enclave of the Niger Delta.

Economic and Security Implications of the Niger Delta Crisis for the Nigeria State

The federal government of Nigeria relies solely on the earnings derived from the sale of oil. The Niger Delta crisis which escalated 2005 had in a number led to shut down of oil production up to 800,000 barrels per day, threatening Nigeria's government plans to nearly double her production to four million barrels a day. The crisis is said to have cost the country an annual loss of 4.4 billion dollars (3.2 billion Euros) (International Crisis Group, 2006). The ripple effects of the crisis is apparent in the global energy market by contributing to spike in prices and reduction in daily oil production as well as the inability of the country to meet her international contractual obligations (Lyman, 2009:2).

The point to note is that the peaceful agitation for compensation and environmental remediation in the Niger Delta that was given a global undertone by Ken Saro Wiwa has been criminalized. The hijacking of the Niger Delta cause by hoodlums and militants of fortune has created what Ikelegbe (2005), called an economy of conflict in the region. In fact, demand for sustainable development of the neglected territory, has been overshadowed by high wave of insecurity and economic down as criminals now engage in oil bunkering, piracy, kidnapping and hostage taking (Otite, 2009). Kemedi (2006:3) warned that the geography of the Niger Delta, a maze of creeks and swamps, and its marginalization from state transportation and communication infrastructure, make the region extremely difficult to police. Due in part to the limitation of the state, attacks by the militants often exposed the security under belly of Nigeria that Nigeria lacks offshore security capacity despite the huge investment in the offshore and deepwater. The capability of the militants to strike beyond the coastal shorelines was recently confirmed with the attack on Bonga deepwater oilfield located almost 120 nautical miles inside the Atlantic(Ukeje nd).

Besides the enormous oil revenue that have been lost by the country due to the crisis, the federating states of Nigeria that have predicated their developmental agenda on accruable revenue from the federation account are at their wit end with possible social dislocation as attested to by their incessant refusal to implement the national minimum wage. The states of the Niger Delta region are worst hi as their derivation is calculated based on oil production quota. The oil companies are also on tether hooks, as their operations are being carried out in fits and starts as the environment is not safe for business. This, as it were must have contributed to spate of retrenchment in the oil industry. Shell, a major onshore player in the oil industry, threatened in 2007, to layoff 3,500. (Punch Newspaper, Sunday, June 10, 2007:14; Amazie, "Niger Delta Commercial Hostage takers uncovered", <http://www.vanguardngr.com>).The prioritization of national budget is one major trajectories of the uprising in the Niger Delta. The prioritization of security and the Niger Delta to the detriment of education and science and technology and other sectors of the Nigerian economy is not enabling. In 2008 for example, the nation budgeted N444 billion which was some 20 % of the national budget to the Niger Delta and security. In line with this is the proliferation of security vote and its attendant abuse (ThisDay, November 9, 2007:6).

Hostage taking is another fall out of the conflict in the Niger Delta with concomitant implication for the Nigerian state. On January 11, 2006, hostage taking of oil workers started in Bayelsa state after the declaration of "Operation Orido Danger" by MEND with the kidnapping of four set of hostages of Bulgarian, Honduras, American and British citizen (Odoemene, 2011:126). Hostage taking which was a credible tool used by the various militant groups in the Niger Delta to first

secure the release of Dokubo and thereafter gain Federal Government attention to the problem of the Niger Delta has been abused by common criminals in the region. Militants have diversified into holding adults, children and even the elderly for pecuniary gains. After the April 2007 elections, kidnapping became a business tool to settle grievances by groups who felt short changed by politicians they work for.

Table 1: Selected Case of Abductions/Kidnapping for Ransom (2002-2003)

S/N	Action/Date	MNC/Oil Servicing Co.	Youth Group/ethnic Group/State	Ascertained Purpose	Outcome
1	Hostage taking of 10 workers/April 2002	Shell	Militant Yuth Gang, Ekeremor LGA Ijaw/Balyesa State	Ransom demand for NGN 3.1m	Resulted from failure to yield to alleged frivolous demands
2	Kidnap of staff/June 29, July 2003	Oil Servicing Co. working for Shell	Ijaw youth militants in Bomadi.Burutu LGAs/Delta State	Demand for NGN 25.4m	State Government intervention/Negotiated release after 14 days
3	Kidnap of 9 crew & 4 military escorts of oil barges/November 11 – 13 2003		Ijaw Militants	Ransom/Other demand	Released 2 days later after threats by state Government/Security Agencies
4	Kidnap of 14 workers/November 2003	Chevron Texaco	Militant Ijaw Youths/Balyesa State	Ransom demands	Intervention of State Government
5	Kidnap of 9 oil workers	Nobel Drilling/Prospecting	Ijaw Militias/Delta State	Ransom demands	Intervention of State Government
6	Kidnap of 7 workers/November 28 – December 2003	Bredero Shaw Oil Servicing Co. (Shell)	Militant Ijaw Youths/Delta State	Ransom demands for USD 5m	Intervention of State Government/Negotiation
7	Murder of 7 workers & military personnel/April 2004	Chevron Texaco	Militant youths along Benin River area/Delta State		

Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, Report of the Technical committee of the Niger Delta, Vol. 1, Nov. 2008

The table above is a clear indication of the manifestation of the pecuniary motive of the militants in the region. Between 2000 and 2003, it is clear, the underdevelopment and environmental

pollution of the region counted for nothing in the demand by hostage takers. The emphasis was demand for money which buttressed the fact that the crisis in the region dovetailed from cause to commerce. The Crisis has made illegal bunkering of oil to thrive. Illegal bunkering is a major source of funds for the militants operating in the creeks. This entails pipeline vandalism with its attendant impact on the cost of oil production in Nigeria. According to the international Crisis Group, Nigeria losses anywhere from 70,000 to 300,000 bpd to illegal bunkering (International Crisis Group, 2006; 8. Shell estimated in 2005 that, illegal bunkering losses to the company are in the range of 20,000 to 40,000 barrel per day (bpd) in 2005 (Tuschl, 2007). Although, the claim of oil companies when it comes to sabotage must be taken with a pinch of salt, there is no denying the fact that oil bunkering is a challenge to the oil industry.

Table 2: Pipeline Incidence (1999 – 2007)

S/No.	Year	Vandalisation	Rupture
1.	1999	497	27
2.	2000	984	137
3.	2001	461	26
4.	2002	516	26
5.	2003	779	48
6.	2004	895	76
7.	2005	2,237	21
8.	2006	3,674	9
9.	2007	3,224	20

Source: Report of the Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, Vol. 1, Nov. 2008

Pipeline vandalism and outright sabotage of oil installation was given added impetus by the militants in the region between 2005 and 2007 as shown in the table above. This is attested to by the astronomical rise in the cases which became so pronounced in 2006 to the tune of 3,674 incidences with added instances of rupture of pipelines. The oil companies claim to have lost counts of their woes in terms of cost and revenue, but the economic and security implications of the activities of oil thieves is worrisome for the Nigerian government as huge sum of money is channeled into the hands of militants. It is believed that the profit from the illegal oil business is exaggerating greed and grievances in the region. In taking oil by force, the militants are threatening the stability of the Nigerian state and making it vulnerable as there is a preponderance of merchants of death and mercenaries. Experts say many factors aid oil bunkering mostly in the ungovernable space in the Niger Delta. Inability of the government to enforce law and order as well as compromise on the part of security personnel are clear indication of the parlous state in the oil bearing enclave of the Niger Delta.

Attacks on installation and general security in the region coupled with the federal government's inability to adequately finance its commitment to joint venture with international companies, seem to be working against the flow of foreign direct investment into the region. Central Bank figures indicate that the country lost some 600,000 barrel per day (bdp) to militants' insurgency in 2006, while the federal ministry of finance estimated that Nigeria lost US\$14.4 billion in tax and royalty income that year. As stated earlier, insecurity in the Niger Delta has led to an increase to an astronomical increase in the cost of production as companies now have to factor what WANEP called the 'Niger Delta Premium'. In 1986, the technical cost per barrel of oil was US\$1.80. Currently, it ranges between US\$8-10 per barrel (Jean Balouga, 2000). The enormity of the economic costs of the conflict in the region to the Nigerian state is shown in table 3 below.

Table 3: Estimated value of Nigeria's stolen and shut-in oil production from Jan 2008-Sept. 2008

Year	Average price of Bonny light per barrel in (USD)	Volume of stolen oil per day in barrels)	Value of stolen oil per annum (in barrels)	Volume of oil shut-in per day (in USD)	Volume of oil shut-in per annum (in USD)	Total value of oil stolen or shut-in per annum (in USD)
2000	28.49	140,000	1.5 billion	250,000	2.6 billion	4.1 billion
2001	24.50	724,171	6.5 billion	200,000	1.8 billion	8.3 billion
2002	25.15	699,763	6.5 billion	370,000	3.4 billion	9.9 billion
2003	28.76	300,000	3.2 billion	350,000	3.7 billion	6.9 billion
2004	38.27	300,000	4.2 billion	230,000	3.2 billion	6.4 billion
2005	55.67	250,000	5.1 billion	180,000	3.7 billion	8.8 billion
2006	6.84	100,000	2.4 billion	600,000	14.6 billion	17.0 billion
2007	75.14	100,000	2.7 billion	600,000	16.5 billion	19.2 billion
2008	115.81	150,000	6.3 billion	650,000	27.5 billion	33.8 billion

Source: Judith Burdin Asuni, **Blood Oil in the Niger Delta**, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 229, 2009, p.6.

The exact amount of oil stolen in Nigeria is not known but it is significant. Estimates range between 30,000 and 300,000 (bdp), (Asuni, 2009; 5) A recent study by the international Centre for Reconciliation (ICR) put the total value lost to the Nigeria economy for stolen crude and disrupted oil for three years between 2003 and 2008 at N14 trillion (about \$100 billion (Ibid p.6)). The ICR report shows that although the actual volume of stolen crude went down between 2003 and September 2008, the total dollar loss to Nigeria steadily increased due to the rapid increase in the price of oil which, peaked at \$147 in 2008. The conflict has cost Nigeria government dearly. As much as one million barrels worth of oil daily has been shut in due to violence. This has severely reduced government revenue affecting the entire country.

The magnitude of Nigeria's dependence on oil is further highlighted as shown in the 2008 budget. The budget projected revenue of N1.986 trillion with 80% coming from oil, while other sectors provide a mere 20% (WANEP, 2008). This revenue is predicted on a sustained

production of 2.1m barrels per day, already recognizing a shut-in of about 800,000 barrels from a previous production level of 3 million bdp (Ibid). With the Crisis, the Niger Delta and threat to ripple the section, this fiscal projection was threatened. The consequence is mass retrenchment of workers, destruction of oil production facility, vandalisation of oil pipelines, loss of lives and reduction in international investment in the sector. The stability and development of the Niger Delta is critical to the economic well being of Nigeria and the wider West African region. In general terms, the conflict in the region has a multiplier effect as it threatens global energy security and overall geo-strategic interests of key global players; principally the United States and its Western European allies and emerging powers such as China and India (Ukeje nd: 3). This precarious situation must have informed the Bill Clinton administration to set up the African Crisis Response Initiative to train militaries in selected African countries (ibid).

The recent impact of local conflicts in the Niger Delta in global oil prices is a clear manifestation of the relative importance of the Delta In world energy mix (Stephen Davies and Von Kemedi. :12). Presently, Nigeria oil resources stand at about 34 billion barrels while the country gas reserve is estimated at about 187 trillion cubic feet. Nigeria oil production capacity is about 2.8 million barrels per day but actual production is hamstrung by OPEC quota. Violence, Kidnapping, sabotage and seizure of oil facility often disrupt Nigeria oil produce. Militias have often used threats on oil and gas facilities as leverage points on the state and federal governments (Stephen Davies and Von Kemedi, 2005).

The growing insecurity in the area have further impacted on the economic lives of the local people as company workers stay back at home for several months (with temporary workers among them otherwise known as contract staff being hard hit. Domestic production of food is totally affected due to insecurity on the farmland leading to surge in prices, growing cost of living and mounting social vices (Sanubi, 2011). Nightlife, in most parts of the Niger Delta is now practically dead in the region. The real losers may not be only those in the entertainment and recreational industry, but the region in general (Epelle, 2009). Insecurity itself breeds divestment as nobody will be prepared to risk his life-saving in ventures which he is not sure to be alive to reap the fruits of his labour. With divestment comes emigration. Most government in Europe declared Niger Delta a high risk area. From time to time, the issued travel advisory to their citizens.

Theft and illegal trading in refined petroleum products began on a small scale in the late 80's and have increased with increasing cost to the Nation. The theft of processed crude oil has underpinned the vandalisation of petroleum pipelines. The NNPC reported that there were 114 line breaks in Port Harcourt and Warri area of its distribution network between April and May 2000 alone. (Ikelegbe 2005. 221). The stealing and smuggling of crude has become very quantity of crude oil that is taken daily. Some estimate between 10 and 15% of national daily production is stolen. Estimates range from between 75million bpd to 300million bpd. In 2003, shell lost was in the average of 30,000 bpd and this increased to 100,000 in 2002 (Ikelegbe. 2005:222). The threat to the nation economic security had led to increased in the surveillance of the region. The Nigerian Navy arrested between April 2003 and July 2004 about 24 ships loaded with crude oil (Lawai 2004). More importantly, the disruption of oil production affects the arteries of the economy. For example, when the Chanomi Creek Channel pipeline was blown up, there was a cut off of oil supply to the Warri refinery and this affected refining capacity and in turn led to massive importation of fuel at huge cost to the Nigerian state.

Igbikiowubo (2004) opined that 15 of the impounded ships carried crude worth about USD150 Million. The involvement of militants in bunkering is a threat to economic and national security. This also includes the stealing of condensate and other refined products like kerosene and diesel from vandalized pipelines. It was reported that Nigeria lost about \$1.9 billion to illegal oil bunkering in 2007 and \$3 billion in the first seven, months of 2008. According to the Joint Task Force, out of an estimated 411 illegal refineries operational in the Delta region, 111 were destroyed in July 2008 (Gilbert, 2008).

The government has depended on the Joint Task Force (JTF) to bring security to the region. Heavy handed counter-insurgency has previously resulted in deaths of the local population. Human rights abuses and swelling support for the militants, thereby widening the schism between local population and the Federal Government. (Esien, 2008). This has gone to show that the activities of the Federal government and the oil forum have shown that "blood may be thicker than water but oil is thicker than either" (Anderson 2001: 30). The annals of oil are an uninterrupted chronicles of naked aggression, genocide and violent law of corporate production. Another security implication of hostage taking in the Niger Delta is the strategic location of the region itself. The Niger Delta is within the gulf of guinea which is very sensitive and indeed strategic to the economic requirements of NATO counties especially now that the Middle East is becoming extremely volatile. The western country would take more than a passing attention at the Niger Delta should Nigeria allow the crisis in the region to go beyond control. This situation must have informed the Bush led administration in the US to establish an African High command (African) in the Gulf of Guinea (Esien, 2008:16). The Bush initiative and that of the Clinton administration has shown in bold relief that oil in the Nigeria in particular and other producers may not be taken for granted as oil security is equivalent to national security.

Conclusion

The Niger Delta perspective of the crisis of the Nigerian state is worrisome. The economic and security costs of the conflict in the Niger Delta are enormous, both directly and in terms of lost opportunities. The conflict has direct impact on the Nigerian state in terms of human, financial and economic sacrifices. The most obvious public concern is the disruption of oil exploration and production and the attendant force majeure, which drags down economy and leads to the loss of foreign exchange sorely needed to finance national development.

For the oil companies, the costs are quite high. These include the loss of revenue due to illegal bunkering, non performing contracts, and high cost of providing security for staff and equipment and large sum of money paid out in form of public relations for potential trouble makers. Oil production deferments arising from community disturbances and sabotage have direct implication for the credibility of the Nigerian to the extent that Nigeria is beginning to be termed the next Gulf. In a way, the unhealthy militarization of the region discourages investments in the region that could bring the much needed jobs for the people.

The phenomenon of ethnic militias has attained a disturbing trend in the region (Kalajaiye and Akinsola, 2007). While the issue of ethnic militia is not entirely new in the region as attested to by the activities of Isaac Adaka Boro (Kaemi 1982, Oyerinde 1998), over time, this has taken a

dangerous dimension as evident by the wave of hostage taking. The conflict in the manifest negatively in terms of budget prioritization, delay in project execution and by extension, hike in project cost as a result of the fact that contractors must factor in the Niger Delta Premium. Arguably, the present administration has demonstrated enough capacity to tame the lingering conflict in the region. What is left to be seen is whether the concerted effort so far could be sustained.

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